I would have preferred to dedicate this sequel to analyzing the progress being made in the “real world.” Alas, it is only months since the first publication in this series—far too early to say much of anything. In the world of theory, things are luckily not so uneventful. At this point we have moved far beyond debate over the legitimacy of sovereign Rusynness and are wading into the domains of what it should become and how it can be achieved.I will give a brief summary of the progress made on both of these in the Osnovu Rusiniji.
After declaring the vision of Karpato-Rusynism, the beginning sections of the text set out to explain the core deficiencies that have fostered our present condition. They are: (1) we are not a nation, but an ethnicity that has repeatedly failed to cross the threshold into nationhood; and (2) there is a lack of the requisite vitality and courage to change this. These are agreeable premises, and hardly all that one should endeavor to understand. Achieving victory for a cause (in our case, a prosperous Carpathian Rus stretching from the foothills of the Tatras to the peak of mount Hoverla) requires an ideological and strategic doctrine that can sustain interaction with the trials its proponents inevitably face. Without achieving this type of clarity, a new movement will fall apart at the most critical moments, regardless of its spiritual merits. Section V onward consisted of an introduction to this arena, and while admittedly verging closer to truisms than integral parts of a political schema, established several guiding principles: evolution must come through collective sacrifice in the pursuit of unity; a new vanguard must rise; if nothing else, vitality over anemia.
I apologize to those who wanted more. Further analysis was omitted in order to not overwhelm the reader or distract from the main purpose of the work, which was its first sections and their conclusions. These concerns are now irrelevant, and luckily for us, I have a sense of where to continue.
The decades following the revolutions of 1989 represent one of the greatest eras of opportunity that the Rusyn people have ever seen. There were times when we had been more autonomous and demanding in our ambitions, but to claim another era has been freer or more supportive of the rights of minorities would be foolish. Our trusted elite with its tremendous intellectual capability, tendency for delusion, and the courage of a fawn at the sound of a snapping branch, would have accomplished far less if this were not the case. Clearly there are benefits that come with living under a regime of such tolerance, especially the protection it often provides to those vulnerable and otherwise thoroughly mediocre. It would be wise to consider this before dealing out criticism, because my friends, our nation is certainly in these categories!
Knowing how we have benefited from this era makes looking into the future a troubling experience. Over the past few years, tremendous energy amongst the intelligentsias of Europe and North America has been dedicated to combating the rise of “illiberalism”. This should not be surprising given the current state of the West, where there exists a general feeling that the ideas and institutions that have upheld the prevailing social order of the past decades have failed to live up to their original promises. Many increasingly wonder if they have been overconfident in the power of the liberal international system, in the excellence of democracy and capitalism, in the ideas that have taken up residence as the doctrine of truth for the past eighty years. It seems as if there are signs every day that show the weakening of a once unchallenged ideological hegemony.
Common sense dictates that it would be a terrible thing for our nation if the values that created the peaceful garden of modern Europe and liberal international order were discarded. How awful it would be if it were made clear just how encumbered the Rusyn has been by his rosy and presumptuous view of the permanence of this transitory golden age. In all seriousness, must we keep reminding ourselves that this subsistence life where we are given the bare minimum to ensure loyalty to the system will not lead to our prosperity? A suspension of our meager allowances and the disrespect of our rights might be constructive, for at least people would feel compelled to take action. Then again, common sense is just that for a reason. We are so perpetually shortsighted that maybe this will only galvanize the desire to return to the days of prime revivalism even more.
In any case, I do not believe the end times are here or that the collapse of the West is imminent. While the rest of the world may fall away from the ideals of the unipolar moment, it is far more likely that Europe’s story will be marked by a prolonged campaign of intense censorship and subversion by its governing institutions. A recent example of this was seen in the invalidation of Romania’s first round election results, justified by claims of campaign fraud and the ever-convenient excuse of Russian interference. Whether these are true or not, one wonders if a Pro-EU candidate secretly backed by a league of NGOs would have received the same response. I will go with the answer: no. The fact that such radical measures were deemed necessary reveals both this order’s vulnerability and its remaining will (and power) to crush any actor perceived as a legitimate threat. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that these efforts will forever stop what is already in motion. This regime is like a gardener who does not—and cannot, because of his misconceptions of botany—understand why or how to stop the new plants that keep appearing under his feet. He may be able to kill a seedling here or there, but soon enough, what was once a tranquil meadow of roses will become a wasteland of warring wildflowers and weeds.
Our primary interest in these emerging trends is not in their individual effects, but their collective conflict with our transformation into a politically ambitious minority. To understand the full meaning of this, there is another phenomenon that first requires examination: the natural antagonism of a political Carpathian Rus toward its environment. To whom and how exactly is it antagonistic? The days when the answers were well known have long passed, in part because political interests only translate into meaningful conflict if those who hold them are daring enough to do so. Let us use Ukraine as the entry point for its rediscovery, as we are already familiar with the subject through the material provided in the article Ukrainianism.
For the past thirty years, what we have asked for is simply the recognition as a distinct nation and the basic rights this affords. While fulfilling this request might not solve the problem of Rusyn sovereignty being at odds with the interests of the Ukrainian state, it would at least allow the great ideological struggle of the past two-hundred years to end. Both peoples could finally move past being in a mode of existential conflict and look toward a more peaceful future. Of course, it has also become clear (and should have been from the beginning) that even this is an improbable goal. Not a single argument or effort we have ever put forward has led Ukrainians to engage with us in dialogue. Instead, our requests have been continuously met with nothing except hostility. But why shouldn’t they? The concession I have mentioned would go against the very foundations of the Ukrainian project, something any politically literate member of their society understands. We have not the capital, population, or political influence that approaches the level required to force this issue. Under these circumstances, only an exceptionally naive and progressive government would ever think to willingly “resolve” this situation through compromise.
The rapid aging and assimilation our people are experiencing means theydo not havethe luxury of decades to wait for this to change. A continuation of the status quowill lead to the extinction of Rusynness from Subcarpathia, and for that matter, all regions of our homeland eventually. The time for action is now. Yet succeeding in any significant sense is something that we are ill-equipped to handle alone for the reasons already given. To have any chance, we require aid from allies of our cause.
This urgency might be new, but understanding the need for an entity greater than ourselves is not. For many years the prevailing view in Rusyn activism has been that despite our lackluster efforts, progress will eventually be made when Ukraine confronts the reality that it will need to end its oppression of Subcarpathia if it ever hopes to join the European Union. The opinion that this direction is ultimately a dead end, and that a peaceful outcome is improbable, was seen as delusional cynicism. Who nowadays can dismiss the possibility? As another writer recently pointed out, having the EU force the issue of recognition looks dead on arrival. Indeed, it is increasingly apparent that the candidate who so many believed would be the most suitable for the role of a just arbiter will conveniently forget our existence so that they can maintain an alliance with our oppressor!
How unable most of these same people are to even muster a good effort to publicly oppose this notable omission or admit their incompetence at seeing the direction of the future is telling of quite a few things. It makes the few who are saying something all the more worthy of praise. In truth, the lack of European support on this issue was always bound to reveal itself. Ukraine is an important country for Europe first as a bulwark against the perceived threat of an expansionist Russia, and second in fulfilling the mandate of spreading the values of liberal democracy. Keeping the country firmly within their orbit is of vital importance, and its status as a border state affords it certain political exceptions that countries further west cannot claim. In light of this reality, and their tacit agreement to allow our erasure in Subcarpathia to continue, the conclusion that the Rusyn is at odds with the European political establishment regarding Ukraine is nearly confirmed. The idea of a peaceful resolution with their guidance can be all but discarded.
What I have written here is not some profound hidden knowledge; a simple realist analysis by anyone could have come to the same conclusion. One could be more ruthless in showing it by simply asking what we have to offer in comparison. The answer is essentially nothing except an opportunity for the West to disregard its own political interests to faithfully follow the principles it supposedly venerates. I am sorry, dear reader, the cold calculations of realpolitik when the stakes are this high usually win out.
Why then, have we (I use this word loosely) been so foolish in our thinking otherwise, and for so long? In fairness to our compatriots, there was a track record over a period of thirty years where it seemed these ideals really mattered. As I have stated many times and places before, the reason for the European Union’s support regarding our communities in Central Europe is that they lack the geopolitical importance of Subcarpathian Rus and we did not demand anything that was an affront to the power of these nations. Remember, as good citizens of fledgling democracies we asserted our newly gained freedom by requesting only to be acknowledged as Rusyns and treated as equals.
This blow to the viability of partnership with the greater political structures of Europe constitutes only one among numerous interrelated concerns. Here is another that follows from the topic of our other communities: what country in Central Europe controlling a piece of our homeland has good reason or incentive to allow any form of Rusyn self-governance? The weight of asking for anything related to autonomy dwarfs the regular request to be tossed a few euros for the purpose of holding a festival or publishing poetry books. I do not believe we are bereft of the basic understanding of this topic despite the unwillingness to discuss it openly. An imaginary world lacking Ukraine does not spare the Rusyn from all of his troubles.
The most fundamental principle of Karpato-Rusynism is that we will fight for our rightful sovereignty, or if this is unattainable, then for the greatest amount of autonomy possible. Such a declaration has profound consequences that have nothing to do with its intellectual worth or moral truth. Any state with a significant ethnic minority living within its borders is forced to stifle their actualization if it wishes this to remain so. A new autonomous Rusyn territory in one country might inspire others to take similar steps, and a new sovereign nation would embolden them even further. This built-in worry is compounded by the fact that countries like Slovakia and Romania were some of the greatest territorial beneficiaries from the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and now have to consider the issue of large minority groups (who dwarf us in population) that are not particularly loyal subjects. The current owners of Carpathian Rus would no doubt prefer not having to deal with these concerns more than they already are. The structures afforded to us as a minority are not merely the result of ideology, they are a part of a strategy to mitigate the chance of more radical outcomes.
If the European establishment will ignore us on the Ukrainian issue, and the other countries that control parts of our homeland are likely opposed to an autonomous Carpathian Rus, what now? Who, if not any of these nations and greater entities, has enough power and reason to aid in our struggle? To my mind, there are two realistic possibilities to consider. The first is Hungary, the sole notable political exception in Central Europe due to its lack of dominion over any part of Carpathian Rus and the substantial number of Hungarians living outside its borders, in the very same countries and regions as us, no less. It is no secret that if possible, this nation’s leaders would wish to change a few things and might be willing to work together with others to do this. The victims of Trianon are one of the greatest examples (in theory) of a potential ally through circumstance that can be found in our world today. How some things have truly changed since the days of Magyarization!
This country is nonetheless limited in its ability to act on these desires due to being trapped inside the grip of NATO and the European Union, despite frequent protestations otherwise. Remember, the yearly influx of funds flows from Brussels (and can be frozen, as it recently was), not the other way around. The nation’s ruling party has not been able to endear itself to most of the local intelligentsia either, and understandably so. There are many worse options than Orbán’s government (a host of traitorous ones even). Yet is there anything genuinely inspiring coming out of the halls of parliament or the prime minister’s office? Their general criticisms are usually correct. As for the implementation of solutions, I once heard them described as trying to be the Eastern European version of a twentieth-century democracy before progressivism strangled the zeitgeist of Western intellectual life. The image has never left me. A terribly insufficient ideology for the internal and external enemies they are up against in the twenty-first. It would only take a single regime change at the ballot box and a matter of months to erase everything that they have built up. If this happens, then we should bid adieu to the possibility of any serious cooperation. The true potential here is markedly less exciting upon deeper inspection. They do not have the characteristics of an ally that our type of endeavor requires, at least not by themselves.
Who then, is the other possibility? I think there is a good heuristic one can use to find themselves when lost at sea: where does your enemy give their loudest protest? Where do they shriek to startle your gaze? In this place one might find a part of the solution. Doing this exercise puts into view the dreaded boogeyman of these times—the one the reader has probably already guessed from the start: Russia. Try yourself and witness the terror that follows any earnest discussion of this country, as though it were a rabid dog whose very mention could transmit a virus to the mind. Any substantial dialogue inevitably devolves into a mess of caricatures and propaganda. There are, admittedly, good reasons to ignore this topic in public dialogue. Thankfully for us, they do not apply to the writer of this essay.
It cannot be denied that in the Rusyn’s first decades of being consciously alive, his idolization of Russia was vital for national survival. Through this connection, a national movement was born and able to endure challenges of assimilation and political violence where an independent Rusyn identity could not. Those shocked by this statement do not know their own history. It is one of the very few subjects that Ukrainophiles and Russophiles tend to describe more faithfully than our own, unfortunately. I digress; how does anything from, let’s say, the situation in 1882 have any relevance to now? There can’t be anything worth dwelling on about all of this old nonsense given how different things are today.
This is certainly the default behavior of the average revivalist, who treats the relationship between Russia and Rusynia as a matter of social archaeology. If questioned about this topic in relation to the political challenges of today, they will argue about authoritarianism or a similar point that inevitably leads to the answer that there is nothing of interest, and that one shouldn’t contemplate these things at all. As far as this is possible, it is important to not be overly critical of those who find this area of discussion difficult. Aside from our greatest enemy, there are few topics as emotionally and politically charged. I have noticed even in myself a visceral reaction born from debates with individuals claiming our nation does not actually exist. These experiences are not uncommon, and it is a shameful result of so many historical Rusyn communities being dominated by traditionalist Russophiles and the cognitively challenged. The many Rusyns who have died as a consequence of the brutal war in Ukraine also cannot—and should not—be simply whisked away, regardless of the complex reasons behind the conflict. I think it’s even fair to give credit to the believers in the ideas of liberalism for their opposition to Russia. Many of their criticisms are entirely accurate.
What these legitimate frustrations and moral commitments offer, however, is very little regarding our underlying political reality. If we temporarily ignore them, if only for the sake of a more personal analysis, one might find surprising things to consider. For instance, it is indisputable that Russia has the greatest resources and political autonomy of any possible ally. They, just like us, also have no shortage of reasons to consider some type of agreement. There is no longer a need for this country to be a source for our identity. We would prefer a more open and less corrupt political system than theirs for ourselves. Do these things change the fact that Ukraine represents an existential problem for our nation, and that Russia is the only other country where this is the case? Is Russia not one of the few countries that could persuade the United States to ignore an unfavorable result for the Europeans in exchange for cooperation on other geopolitical interests? Does our—correctly—placed primacy of developing the Rusyn language and culture instead of adopting theirs remove our place as the westernmost extension of the Rus, which they have always viewed themselves to be the leader and protector of? Many a soul has argued that this final point provides enough basis for faith in their answering our call, but I will not labor on the topic of civilizational kinship. Such arguments will not persuade the modern reader in any case. The allure of this path grows with every repeated act of disrespect and oppression, regardless of whatever narrative one chooses to construct. Perhaps the real place of the Rusyn is not entirely in the geographical and ideological place he currently inhabits. An overreliance on history leads one astray if they are not careful, yet sometimes the present does rhyme with the past.
It was always likely that the reemergence of an ambitious Carpathian Rus would convert our present irrelevance into the perception of a foreign island that cannot be tolerated. In fact, I would argue that Europe would be right in viewing us this way. There is no escape from the antagonistic nature of our geopolitical metastructure unless the responsibility of national ambition is abdicated. At any point over the past thirty years, the realization of a sovereign Rusynia would have been an incredible undertaking. The convergence of these underlying factors with the wave of rejection in liberal democratic ideals, hysteria regarding Russia, and an increasingly aggressive response by entities like the European Union seeking to maintain control, drives home the precarious nature of our mission. The ascension of Karpato-Rusynism in this environment is akin to dropping a torch into a powder keg. Believing that there will be a softhanded approach to our movement is delusion.
At the same time, much skepticism and uncertainty remain to be resolved if there is to be any definite desire in pursuing cooperation in the name of shared interests. Who is confident enough at this time to proclaim that in the defeat of a common foe, our possible “ally” will not just take their place as assimilator? How certain are we that in our moment of weakness they will do as they promise? The activists of the Euromaidan believed in the promises of the West, and look at the state of their country now. I am reminded of a certain sliver of land called Transnistria hundreds of kilometers further east which up to this point has not been rescued from its perpetual languishing existence.
There is no answer that can be given with any real certainty. Even if somehow this were possible, it is only appropriate to also ask ourselves if we would actually be satisfied. We are not stuck in theory about what success regarding this last question would look like, because there are examples of those who have taken the opportunity. These unrecognized nations are well known, and it is an unfortunate list by any account of living standards, development, political freedom, and intellectual creation. Not a single one has accrued any real sense of independence from a pattern of reliance on generous amounts of economic aid and military support. What they do have is that their state exists when it otherwise would not. This is the bargain on offer: existence in exchange for servitude. Not prosperity, not resources, not access to Western institutions and their monetary funds. But at the very least, survival.
A similar outcome for us is undesirable for a host of reasons. Regardless of whatever value it would bring, the situations of the communities living in the European Union are nowhere near politically dire or tested enough to compel a move with these serious tradeoffs. For those whose primary desire is a sovereign Rusyn nation—that is, you and I—this hypothetical subservience is antithetical to our cause. Such an end result could realistically be favorable for Subcarpathia, the home of the majority of our national population. After all, there is an unmistakable feeling that the situation in Ukraine is slowly approaching a stage where we must decide between giving in to erasure or lashing out against it. If these are the choices, ours is obvious. In time this could be true for other regions, especially if there is a particularly violent response to our movement as it emerges from the womb. The problem, of course, is that in the absence of any experience we are forced to work from theory alone. And if this is our single guide, it is difficult to justify this path or declaring any of these outcomes as certain eventualities.
Here we arrive at another temporary stopping point. Despite our progress, the arduous task of what exactly to do with all of this remains. This will be the focus of Part III.