Introduction

The official line of the current Rusyn establishment, which can be defined as the continued growth of Rusyn identity and prosperity since 1989, has never been particularly convincing. Throughout my time as a player in Rusyn activism, the story of this continued thirty-year awakening has not lined up with my own experiences in the diaspora or in my recent adventure to the homeland. In fact, I challenge the notion that we are growing in the first place and would argue that we have actually stagnated if not declined as a nation since at least the late 2000s or early 2010s. This rough date is chosen as Dimitry Sydor’s actions towards sovereignty for Subcarpathian Rus and conviction by the Ukrainian court system seem to have pushed Rusyn institutions towards worse organizational practices than before. In the aftermath, there is a notable greater hesitation for pushing boundaries of acceptable goals amongst all Rusyn organizations and individuals, along with the desire to further take the route of political internationalism. One should not interpret this event however as the only cause for stagnation or judgment regarding the man himself, but as a final nail in the coffin for a system that was making progress up to a point despite its serious flaws.

Before going further, it is important here to understand what I am about to write is not in the frame of evaluating lies or falsehoods in their common definition. What instead one should think about in this examination is the lie in the structure of institutions themselves. In this one can say the “lie” somewhat takes a life of its own outside of any one individual. They are flaws in the way they have been configured in the first place and the people who abide by them are often oblivious to the reality. Others continue to parrot and act on what they know are false positions. It is this second group that is more worrisome.

There are some important facts and policy opinions to understand before moving to my model of evaluating Rusyn institutions. This is primarily due to the need for substantiating my claim of a general Rusyn decline. Here are some of the most important:

• While the total amount of named Rusyns increased in the 2021 Slovak census, the number of speakers has decreased.
• There has been no major geopolitical change for Rusyns in the last 15 years and the recognition of Rusyns in Ukraine is in no better of a situation.
• The average age of membership in the diaspora organizations of North America has risen to almost retirement age. In some organizations, the young adult population is below 10%.
• There are no Gen Z or early Millennial (below 30) founders or community leaders of organizations.
• No significant policy or project has been issued by the World Congress of Rusyns in the last 15 years.
• The organizational structure of Zakarpattia is disunited, without a central institution and set of goals.
• There are still no political Carpatho-Rusyn organizations thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union (except for one person specially elected as a minority member in Romania).

Some of these are facts, others educated opinions. For example, my argument regarding there being no geopolitical change is based on a few points. The first is that no actual laws or progress towards recognition in Ukraine in any official capacity has occurred. A second is that Rusyns have already been recognized everywhere else important and have received no additional privileges like autonomy. My statistics regarding less than 10% is from being the former membership manager for the Carpatho-Rusyn Society, the largest Rusyn diaspora organization. This role allowed me to evaluate data on membership quite extensively. On a few of these such as Zakarpattia and the World Congress, it is particularly hard to get data, but those who know the scene well will understand where I am coming from.

For more source material regarding each of these points, feel free to email me at [email protected] and I will respond. In an attempt at brevity, I will forgo the long process of arguing each of these in this work except for the short brief. Perhaps in the future there will be a written report analyzing them.

The Model

In my estimation, the model to best interpret the current framework of Rusyn action is in something that can be called Embedded Stasis Obligations (ESO). In short, the basis of this thesis is that the current structures of Rusyn organizations have a high amount of built-in incentives and obligations to remain in stasis. This is true from both a leadership standpoint and at the level of organizational goals. Because this is especially prominent in our case, those that would swim outside of the boundaries set for us by the obligations will be weeded out from being able to influence or get into positions of power and the goals able to be set by an organization will be constrained. Therefore, not only will our leadership class be incompetent, but our institutions will be weak because of it.  

This theory is not meant to be linear in the sense that there is one specific thing holding our evolution down, but a process of identifying the many obligations for stasis placed on us in the hope that they can be carefully undone. It is also likely true that our ESO count is substantially higher than other peoples around us. This is a very complex topic, but some more basic reasons can be named such as being a stateless people and capital poor. In some cases, there can be as many as four or five different obligations blocking the way to progress towards a better Rusyn position. For the sake of illustrating this theory, we will take one example by looking at the economic funding structures of our institutions.

Economic Incentives

Most of the Rusyn organizations we have in countries like Slovakia and Serbia that are focused on cultural-political work are funded through national government initiatives focused on their minority populations. This method of funding negates the ability for stepping outside of a predetermined framework. If an organization does then they will lose its ability to fund its operations, and a competitor who will play the game will take its place. This doubles as a mechanism for self-selection of leadership where those that do not follow the rigid boundaries will be quickly exited due to the desire to not lose funding.

Conclusion

It is simple reasons like the above that set the precedent for our nation and eliminate otherwise fantastic people from our ranks of leadership. Understanding the ESO and its effects can help to remove them in the first place. Doing this will often require the teardown of old institutions, and the reworking of who we see as the optimal Rusyn leader. Should we do this effectively, our general level of competency will grow even if our goals are not orientated towards any particular end.