

THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA

by

F. NEMEC

*former Czechoslovak Government
Delegata in Ruthenia*

and

V. MOUDRY, Dr. Jur., M.A.



HYPERION PRESS, INC.
Westport, Connecticut

Published in 1955 by W.B. Anderson, Toronto
Hyperion reprint edition 1981
Library of Congress Catalog Number 79-2916
ISBN 0-8305-0085-5
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ěemec, F. (František), 1898-
The Soviet seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

Reprint. Originally published: Toronto : W.B. Anderson, 1955.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Zakarpatskaŭa oblast' (Ukraine)—Annexation to the Soviet Union. 2. World War, 1939-1945—Territorial questions—Soviet Union. 3. Czechoslovakia—History—1938-1945. I. Mondř, V. (Vladimír) II. Title.

DK511.Z3M45 1982 947'.718 79-2916
ISBN C-8305-0085-5 AACR2

PREFACE

In the summer of 1944 the Czechoslovak Government in exile in London appointed one of its members, F. Němec, as a "Government Delegate for Liberated Territories" and sent him to Russia. He was to proceed from there to whichever part of Czechoslovakia would be liberated first, and to establish and run the administration of that part of the country until the Government as a whole could take over.

As it happened, the first liberated part of Czechoslovakia was her easternmost province, Subcarpathian Ruthenia. It was the province which, a few weeks after the end of the war in Europe, was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, to become part of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

PREFACE

In his capacity as the Government Delegate, F. Němec moved to Ruthenia at the end of October, 1944, and stayed there - with quite a long interruption for negotiations in Moscow - until the end of January, 1945.

The story of his experience in Ruthenia and in Moscow during these three months is the principal theme of the following pages. Fortunately, F. Němec brought with him to this continent a considerable collection of documents relating to the period in question and the narrative draws primarily from these documents. Only a few missing links were supplied from memory.

The authors are well aware of the limitation of their work and do not claim it to be a definitive history of the Russian seizure of Ruthenia. Obviously, no such book can be attempted so long as the Russian and Czechoslovak archives remain inaccessible. Yet the evidence presented in this study will, the authors believe, make clearer the picture of events in the critical period in and around Ruthenia. It may show some of the techniques used by the Russians in preparing and carrying out their political conquest of the province. And both the narrative and the documents may reveal, at the same time, some interesting views on Czechoslovak-Soviet relations during the war and on the Soviet diplomacy in general.

The book is divided into two parts. The narrative of events in Ruthenia and in Moscow in the mentioned period forms the central portion of the first part (1944-1945: chapters 2, 3 and 4). This is preceded by a chapter explaining the organization of the Czechoslovak Government in London and its foreign policy, mainly in relation to Russia. Lastly, an *Introduction* outlines

PREFACE

shortly the historical and political background of Ruthenia up to the occupation of the province by Hungary in 1939. The purpose of these two chapters is merely to help the reader to orient himself before his attention is focussed on the story itself.

The second part of the book contains the documents from which the story has been reconstructed. More about the documents will be found in the *Translator's Note* in the second part. Suffice it to say here that no pertinent document from among those in the possession of F. Němec has been left out.

For readers curious about the respective shares of the authors in the work, the following may be of interest: to F. Němec goes the credit and the responsibility for the central part of the book, i.e., chapters 2 to 5 in Part I, even if the arrangement and the formulations are those of his co-author. The latter is fully responsible for the rest, i.e., the Introduction and the chapter on London in Part I as well as the translation and the arrangement of the documents.

VLADIMÍR MOUDRÝ
TORONTO

FRANTIŠEK NĚMEC
MONTREAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

Introduction	3
1944-1945	
1. London	59
2. East	83
3. Moscow	125
4. Epilogue	157
5. Postscript	173

PART TWO

Translator's note	187
List of documents	195
Documents	207
Bibliographical note	363
Index	371

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

1

Ruthenia under Hungary

When the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismembered after the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference created from the north-eastern corner of Hungary, inhabited by Ruthenians, an autonomous territory and added it to the Czechoslovak Republic.

This territory, later called Subcarpathian Ruthenia¹, roughly resembled a triangle pointing south-east. On the west, its shortest side adjoined Slovakia along the river Uh. The north-eastern side of the triangle followed the crest of the Carpathian mountains, bending slightly towards south-east until it met its southern counterpart in the big mountain massif, where the Rumanian Carpathians begin. The southern frontier line went from this point toward the west, following approximately the river Tisza until it joined the north-south line at Chop. The length of the Slovak-Ruthenian frontier was about 95 miles, the length of the north-eastern and of the south-eastern lines about 180 and 210 miles respectively.

¹Unless otherwise necessary, Subcarpathian Ruthenia will be subsequently referred to as Ruthenia. The term "Subcarpathian Ruthenia" is the translation of the Czech *Podkarpatska Rus*, as given to the territory by the Czechoslovak constitution of 1920. The treaty of St. Germain speaks only of the "Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians". The territory was also known under a number of other names: Hungarian Ruthenia, Ruszka Kraina, Subcarpathia, Carpathian Ukraine or, finally, Transcarpathian Ukraine.

It was the first time that the Ruthenians living south of the Carpathians had been organized into a political unit. True, some 90,000 were left in Slovakia, that is, outside the frontiers of the new territory, also, it contained considerable non-Ruthenian minorities, such as Magyars (15%), Jews (13%), as well as some Slovaks, Germans and Rumanians. But the bulk of the Ruthenian people, some 450,000, were now living in Ruthenia, forming there a nearly two-thirds majority of the total population of about 720,000.

From an ethnical and especially linguistic point of view, the Ruthenians of Hungary belonged to the group of Eastern Slavs, i.e. Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians) and Byelorussians. Their language, with a variety of local dialects, was nearly identical with that of the Ruthenians in Galicia and did not differ to any great extent from the Ukrainian spoken in southern Russia. There is no doubt that the Ruthenians came to Hungary from the north, that is, from Galicia and from Ukraine. It is generally agreed that they appeared as permanent settlers south of the Carpathians for the first time in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and that their penetration continued for quite a considerable time. As mentioned, they never created any political, separate unit in their new country. Their territory first formed part of the sparsely inhabited military marches on the north-eastern frontier of Hungary, later they entered into the Hungarian political system of *'comitats* (counties).

These facts are easily understood if we remember the geographical character of their country and its ecological conditions. In the north, it is dominated by the Carpathians, from the main crest of which the land descends through side chains and long valleys, generally in a souther-

ly direction, towards the marshy plains of the river Tisza. About 50% of the land is covered by forests and only about 46% is devoted to agriculture, including some 15% which can be used only as pasture. In the long narrow valleys the soil is poor and scarce; solely the plains yield more satisfactory results to agriculture.

The Ruthenian settlers thus were and remained poor peasants, graziers and lumbermen; vassals and serfs of the Hungarian magnates, they were kept by both nature and social organization on a low economic and cultural level. Only their clergy attained a higher social status.

Naturally, the small number of Ruthenians in Hungary accounts also for their political insignificance. In Hungary of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries they represented merely some 2.5-3% of the total population. Moreover, once settled in Hungary, they were cut off from their co-nationals in the north, the Ruthenian Carpathians, although low enough to permit them to immigrate, formed a physical barrier sufficient to prevent them for a long time from systematic contacts with their cousins in Galicia and Russia. Living in the narrow and deep valleys of their mountains, the Ruthenians had little contact even among themselves and tended to divide into yet smaller, isolated groups in which the feeling of solidarity with the whole was considerably weakened.

In addition to this, in the second half of the XVIIth century, their strongest link with their country of origin was severed. Originally, the Ruthenians belonged to the Eastern Orthodox Church but, under influence from Galicia (and, no doubt, political pressure), a union with the Roman Church was effected. The Uniate Church was allowed to keep some of the external aspects of the Orthodox Church, such as the use of the Church Slavonic in the liturgy, of the Cyrillic

alphabet, marriage of the priests, etc. There were Ruthenian bishoprics in Uzhgorod and Presov, the Ruthenian Uniate Church was subordinated to the Primate of Estergom.

The fact that this Church could maintain its own language and alphabet helped the Ruthenians to keep separated from their Slovak or Magyar co-religionists and to preserve thus their ethnical individuality. It also enabled the Uniate clergy to enter into and maintain contacts with the West while studying at the Catholic seminaries in Trnava, Vienna and Erlau. In this way they often escaped from their provincial isolation and came in contact with the western culture, including French liberalism and German romanticism.

On the whole, the XIXth century found the Ruthenians on a rather primitive level of socio-economic, cultural and above all, political development. Among all the nationalities of Hungary they were the last to feel the influence of the rising nationalism and liberalism which swept Europe in the first half of that century.

Before 1848, there was no political activity among them and it is only in the cultural field that signs of national awakening can be found. No doubt, the ideas of Pan Slavism and the contacts with the national movements in neighbouring Galicia and Slovakia influenced some individuals among them, but the masses of the people and considerable part of the clergy remained untouched. During the revolutionary period of 1848 and 1849 they kept relatively quiet and we hear of them only after the revolution in Hungary was over.

Meanwhile, both the Slavic Congress in Prague and later the politicians in Kremsier did not forget the Ruthenians. The first grouped them together with the Slovaks in the proposed reorganization of the Empire; in a draft of a petition

to the Emperor, some basic national and political claims were made on their behalf. They were to be recognized as a distinct and self-governing nationality with their own national congress. In Kremsier Palacky's suggestions leaned towards similar aims, only there the Hungarian Ruthenians were to be joined to the group of the Polish lands. The Ruthenians themselves appeared on the stage only at the end of 1849, when a Ruthenian delegation came to Vienna to present their demands to the Emperor. They demanded the recognition of the Ruthenian people as a separate political body and the reorganization of Hungary's administrative districts along ethnical lines, establishment and protection of Ruthenian schools and press, equality in the public service and in the army, preference for Ruthenians in nominations to public service posts in Ruthenia.

It is uncertain to what extent if indeed at all, these demands influenced the Vienna Government. Some of them were fulfilled already before the delegation handed in its petition, in an Imperial Decree concerning the provisory administration of Hungary. The defeated country was divided into five military districts, one of which comprised all the counties inhabited by Ruthenians. Each military district was divided into several civil districts with district commissars at the head. One such district was formed from four predominantly Ruthenian counties (Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Marmaros) with its center at Uzhgorod. The commissar here was an Austrian bureaucrat, Ignatz von Villetz, and the chief of his chancery was a Ruthenian patriot, A. I. Dobryanski. He was the son of a Uniate priest; educated in Slovakia, he came under the influence of the awakening Slovak nationalism and of the then current Panslav ideas. When the revolution broke out in Hungary in 1848, Dobryanski fled to Galicia, from which he returned with the Russian armies

and with a title of a "commissar".

The new regime brought to the Ruthenians some decided improvements in their situation. It introduced into Hungary the principle of the equality of nationalities, as expressed in the March constitution. Several decrees of the Vienna Government gave some support to the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary, especially in their language rights in schools, churches and administration. Ruthenian was introduced as an official language (besides German and Magyar) in the four Ruthenian counties and many Ruthenians were given posts in the public service there. In the Uzghorod high school Ruthenian replaced Magyar as language of instruction in religion, history and the language itself.

These results, however meagre, announced the beginning of the political awakening of the Ruthenians. But their hopes were soon to be disappointed. In September 1850, all civil districts, including the Ruthenian district, were abolished. Dobryanski was transferred to Vienna, other Ruthenians replaced by Magyars and all the incipient reforms and the beginning assertion of the Ruthenian element in the public life were nullified step by step.

The non-Magyar nationalities who in 1848-1849 supported the Habsburg dynasty against the Magyars and expected its help and protection in exchange, soon had to realize their miscalculation. To any reforms and federalistic plans the conservative Habsburgs preferred centralization and preservation of the political and social *status quo*. To achieve this they regarded the Magyar aristocracy and upper classes as better allies than the weak peasant nationalities. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 was the final word of the dynasty on this point: the national and political aspirations of Slovaks, Rumanians, Serbs and Ruthenians of Hungary were sacrificed to the Ma-

gyars as a price of their willingness to come to an understanding with the dynasty. The nationalities, discouraged by the reaction under the Bach system and later sensing the turn of the tide, attempted to reach a direct agreement with the Magyars themselves. But here a basic difficulty presented itself.

In its beginning the Magyar nationalism developed along the usual lines—revival and preservation of the Magyar culture. In this it did not differ from the national aspirations of the other nationalities living in Hungary. But once the political field had been invaded, an inevitable clash followed. The Magyars looked upon the Hungarian state as their own heritage; leaning on the tradition of nearly ten centuries, they refused to regard Hungary as anything else but a state belonging to, and which should be ruled by, only one nationality, the Magyars themselves. The non-Magyars, however, invoking the new concept of natural rights, demanded equality and self-government for themselves as collective bodies, within their compact territorial settlements. The Magyars were willing to grant some rights to non-Magyars as individuals, but refused to go any further. They saw well the danger hidden behind the self-government of various ethnical groups, realizing that it would spell practically a federalization of Hungary and desertion of the ideal of the unitary Hungarian state. The danger was aggravated by the fact that most of Hungary's nationalities were settled on the periphery of the country and had co-nationals living in far greater numbers across the frontiers, often in independent states. If carried to its logical extreme, the self-government of ethnical groups could mean destruction of Hungary in her historical limits.

The Magyar solution of the problem gained recognition in the Hungarian nationalities law of 1868, in it a certain number of rights were gran-

ted to individuals but not to the nationalities as such. The law proclaimed the equality of all citizens regardless of their nationality; the use of non-Magyar languages was to be allowed in local administration and before the local courts, the Church authorities could decide which language to use in their administration and in the schools which they maintained. On the other hand, the statute declared Magyar to be the "language of the State"; the official language of the country in all governmental services "is and will remain Magyar". This was based on the assumption, also expressed in the statute, that "all citizens . . . form a single nation, the Magyar nation, one and indivisible".

The claims brought forward between 1850 and 1868 by the non Magyar nationalities, including the Ruthenians, were but a repetition and amplification of their demands formulated in 1848. It was no wonder, then, that the nationalities statute of 1868 did not bring any reconciliation between them and the Magyars. The compromise of 1867 was a great disappointment of the nationalities with the dynasty. The nationalities statute and the subsequent Magyar policy towards them, as it developed after 1870, persuaded them that no working compromise was possible with the Magyars either, especially when it became apparent that the Magyars did not intend to take the nationalities law as a starting point for further development and compromise but rather as the extreme limit of their concessions and that they soon deserted not only the spirit of the statute but also its letter and went over to the policy of open Magyarization. Thus the nationalities began to look for the fulfilment of their national aspirations not only to their own forces but also to help from outside.

However, in the case of the Ruthenians, it would be an exaggeration to say that the demands pre-

sented in their name in 1849 or later were backed by the majority or a substantial part of the Ruthenian people. The programs were the work of a tiny layer of educated men and the people did not often know very much about them. The Ruthenians were too busy trying to keep alive, too hungry and too illiterate to be interested in politics.

The country was poor, of pastures and forests and never enough tillable soil. The methods of agriculture were primitive and since the Ruthenians considered agriculture as the only honourable profession the holdings were divided and redivided with each generation until the area available for a family could no longer sustain its members. In addition, the land property in Hungary was divided extremely unevenly. In 1900, nearly a third of all the land was taken by some 2 000 estates owned by individuals, cities or churches, while more than 1,350,000 landowners were crowded on only 7% of the tilled land. In Ruthenia these conditions were aggravated by the fact that all the great estates were in Magyar hands.

The lack of land its very low productivity and the poor methods of cultivating resulted in poverty and semistarvation of the population. The diet of an average Ruthenian consisted mostly of corn or oats, potatoes and vegetables, fat and meat being rather an occasional exception. This led to a generally poor state of health, to tuberculosis, typhoid and pellagra, the most current illnesses. Such factors could not but keep the Ruthenians on their low social and cultural level. Lack of education, of health care and of political rights closed the vicious circle. The situation of the Ruthenians in Hungary was indeed hopeless.

There was no escape from this poverty but emigration or assimilation (Magyarization) It is estimated that from 1880 until the First World War about 50,000 Ruthenians left the country The Ruthenian emigration was relatively one of the strongest among the nationalities of Hungary second only to that of the Slovaks The largest part of the emigrants was of peasant stock, the countries of destination, the United States, Canada and some of the South American republics

Another way of escape for the Ruthenian was his assimilation into the ruling nationality Only to those who spoke Magyar and were willing to forget their non-Magyar origin were the better positions and opportunities offered Indeed, from the eighteen-seventies, the Hungarian Government and practically the whole Magyar nation, pursued a policy of systematic assimilation of non Magyar ethnical groups The best means to this end seemed to be the school The Magyarization of the Hungarian education started in the late seventies and eighties with laws ordering that teachers in state supported schools must have a good knowledge of Magyar and that in the elementary schools Magyar was to be taught so that the children when leaving school (at the age of twelve) could express themselves intelligibly in Magyar Later a special statute attempted to introduce even the children in kindergartens to the "study of Magyar as the language of state" Schools with Magyar as the language of instruction were established in increasing numbers in nationally mixed districts and in purely non-Magyar territories Sometimes, the supporters (mainly Churches) of private schools were exposed to a little *violence douce* to make them accept Magyar as the language of instruction The system was brought to completion, in 1907, by the Apponyi school laws The laws proclaimed all teachers (including those in the schools maintained by Churches or other organi-

zations) to be public servants and established their minimum salaries. The authorities in charge of a private school might ask the state for subvention to make up for the higher salaries and, after that was granted, the school became state supervised. The new laws also re-ordered the teaching of Magyar in all schools. If instruction of Magyar was found insufficient or if any subversive (i.e. nationalistic) tendencies of the staff or in the local school committee were detected, the school might be (and usually was) closed.

The effects of this policy were soon evident. The number of non-Magyar elementary schools declined constantly. Although it is difficult to get reliable figures, the general trend is obvious. From around 600 elementary schools in Ruthenia where the language of instruction was Ruthenian in the seventies, there were only 45 remaining in 1915. As for the high schools, there never were any with Ruthenian as the language of instruction if we do not count two theological seminaries where a few classes weekly were devoted to the Church Slavonic.

On the whole, the Ruthenian peasant did not object to these measures. Not only was his national consciousness undeveloped, but he often welcomed the state schools for economic reasons, as they meant lessening of financial burdens exacted from him for the support of the Church schools.

From the purely ethnical point of view there was no great danger of Magyarization for those who went to the school for only five or six years; besides, the attendance was poor and interest small. From among those who went through the Magyar high schools, many became Magyarized. But there never were more than a few Ruthenians who could afford the luxury of higher education. In the middle of the XIXth century, there were about

250 Ruthenian students in all Hungarian high schools, and later (in 1906) the number dropped to some ninety or hundred.

From the cultural point of view, the results were, of course, deplorable. In 1918, after the war, there were practically no educated Ruthenians who could serve their country in executive or judiciary posts. The percentage of illiteracy was staggering: the average for the whole territory was nearly 60%, reaching in some villages even as much as 90%.

This sad state of affairs was reflected also in other fields of culture. While other nationalities had to a degree a press and were able to publish books, the Ruthenians never had more than one or two very modest newspapers, usually written in a mixture of the local dialect and Great Russian and hardly comprehensible to a simple peasant. The rest of the literary output consisted mainly of almanacs, religious and sometimes popular didactic books. The main bearers of the culture were the Uniate clergy. Some of them tried to work for the betterment of the people, by publishing a newspaper or two, almanacs or books, and to do their best with the scanty resources at their disposal. Yet, a large proportion of the clergy was Magyarized or on the best way to Magyarization.

It was a losing battle for the tiny group of the Hungarian Ruthenians. And their chances were still diminished by the division of the small number of their educated men into two or three groups, each with a different plan for the future of their people. We mean the pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, and the local orientation.

The question whether the Hungarian Ruthenians were (and wanted) to be considered as Russians, Ukrainians, or a separate nationality, was primarily a linguistic and ethnographical problem. Yet, it also had political repercussions and more

often than not its solution was approached with political aims in mind.

The local orientation stressed the age-long separation of the Ruthenians from their country of origin and maintained that in their isolation and under the strong influence of the Magyars, the Ruthenians of Hungary had developed into a special nationality, different from both Russians and Ukrainians. This trend was, for obvious reasons, supported by the Hungarian Government and the only one allowed to be advocated publicly. Probably because of this fact, it was favoured by many Ruthenian clergymen.

The Russian trend seems to have been strongest in the middle of the XIXth century. Most of the Ruthenian patriots who stepped forward around 1848 and later, men like Dobryanski or Dukhnovich, were Russophiles. Imbued with the ideas of Panslavism, they saw in Russia the only possible saviour of their small people; no doubt, also the intervention of the Russian armies in Hungary in 1849 was not without influence.

The Ukrainian trend in Ruthenia was a direct offspring of the Ukrainian nationalism which developed in Galicia and Southern Russia in the XIXth century and soon became a well organized and surprisingly strong movement in all respects. The proximity of Galicia, with its Ukrainian schools and intensive cultural and political life, was a definite advantage. Moreover, there was no difference in religion between the Galician and Hungarian Ruthenians, nor in their language. Thus, in the last two decades of the XIXth century the Ukrainian orientation among the Ruthenians in Hungary grew stronger every year and to such an extent that it might have been expected to oust finally the Russian and the local trends.

However, in the first years of the XXth century the Russian orientation was considerably strengthened. Help came evidently from outside,

i.e. from Russia, and its effects were manifested in a rather dramatic way. Around 1912 there occurred in some Ruthenian villages mass conversions from the Uniate to the Greek Orthodox (Russian) Church. The movement seemed to be motivated less by religious than by political, pro-Russian, feelings of the converts. The Hungarian authorities investigated and the result was a mass trial in the little town of Marmaros Sziget, which began in December, 1913, and ended in March, 1914. There ninety four persons, mostly Ruthenian peasants, were charged with treason and conspiracy against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. The main fact on which the accusations were based was the connection of the leaders of the movement with a Russian political organization, the "Galician-Russian Society" of St. Petersburg, headed by a count Bobrinski.

Indeed, the few previous years witnessed no small activity of count Bobrinski in all "Russian" parts of the Dual Monarchy. He made several trips there, and in Hungary a warrant for his arrest was issued in 1910. The religious ferment of the Hungarian Ruthenians was used and possibly also provoked by him for political purposes. He and his Russophile friends hoped by inducing the Ruthenians to conversions to the Orthodox Church, to awaken or strengthen their feelings of solidarity with Russia. The Ruthenian peasants who were, by this time, somewhat estranged from their clergy, became easy material for propaganda, even if most of them were far from grasping its political implications. Apart from religious motives, mixed with primitive nationalistic feelings, it was also elementary economic and social grievances which led them to turn their backs to the Uniate Church. They always chafed under the burdens which the Uniate Church imposed on them; not only financial ones, but also personal services, a remnant reminiscent of the feudal robot. The

Hungarian authorities saw only the political intentions of the agitators and welcomed the mass trial as an opportunity for discrediting the Panslav movement and unveiling the Russian intrigues abroad. Bobrinski, whose activities before and after the trial were none too clever, was cited as a witness by the defense and both the Austrian and Russian diplomats had a busy time discussing whether or not he should receive a safe-conduct for his trip to Hungary. When the trial ended in March, 1914, with a condemnation of thirty-two accused, two points seemed clear: first, that the religious and social unrest of the Ruthenians in Hungary was used for political ends by the Russian Panslavs and nationalists and, second, that the Ruthenian peasant's national and political consciousness was hardly more than elementary.

Thus in 1914, at the beginning of the war, we find the Ruthenians a nationality of poor peasants, undeveloped from every point of view. They lacked an educated upper or middle class in sufficient numbers, there was no organized political activity among them and culturally, they did not progress much from the eighteen fifties. The handful of educated men (mostly priests) who escaped Magyarization, were too powerless to provoke and to lead any wide nationalistic movement. The mass of the people was too poor and too uninterested to take an active part in such a movement.

The First World War

It was not surprising that during the First World War the Ruthenians remained passive and, whether at home or in the army, relatively loyal to the Dual Monarchy.

The first formulation of Ruthenian national aspirations in this period came towards the end of the war, from Ruthenians settled in the United States. The numbers of Ruthenian immigrants in America had grown considerably while their economic situation steadily improved. With cultural and political betterment, and under the impact of American democracy, came also the development of stronger national consciousness. Yet, in spite of a general trend in this direction, the situation was far from being clear cut. Some groups tended more towards cooperation with Slovaks or with the Ruthenians of Galicia, with whom they had in America many contacts and common interests. Others expected their salvation from Russia, while yet another, quite large group, remained under the influence of their Magyarized clergy which had the control of many Ruthenian associations organized on the religious basis. At the end of the war, there were among the American Ruthenians, not unlike in their homeland, three main groups, pro-Magyar, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian, although the last one lost much of its influence after the Russian defeats during the war and after the revolutions in 1917, especially after the Bolshevik revolution.

Those American Ruthenians who opposed the pro-Magyar trend, were still not quite sure, in the summer of 1918, of their positive aims. At that time, T.G. Masaryk, the leader of the Czech and Slovak emigration and the future President of the Czechoslovak Republic, came to the United States from Russia, and soon the program of the Ruthenians focussed in a new direction. About the end of May, 1918, some of them presented Masaryk with a memorandum discussing the possible inclusion of an autonomous Ruthenia into the future Czechoslovak state. Yet, in a series of meetings held in June, July and October of the same year, the anti-Magyar Ruthenians, now organized in an "American National Council of the Hungarian Ruthenians", still could not decide clearly on their specific aims. Instead, they listed them simply in order of preference: (1) complete independence; (2) if that were impossible, union with the Ruthenians of Galicia and Bukovina; (3) if that were impossible, as wide an autonomy as possible, without saying which country they would prefer to join. Their demands were presented to President Wilson who rejected the first two as well as autonomy within Hungary as unacceptable to the Allies, and recommended that the Ruthenians seek union with one of the neighbouring nations. In October, 1918, the Ruthenians were accepted as members in the "Central European Union" which, with Masaryk as President, represented "nationalities entitled to self-government." Simultaneously, the Ruthenians started with Masaryk discussions on the conditions under which they would be willing to join the new Czechoslovak state.

The outcome was an agreement between Masaryk and Žatkovič, one of the Ruthenian leaders, which guaranteed autonomy to the Ruthenians and promised satisfactory boundaries to Ruthenia within Czechoslovakia. The agreement signed on October

26, was confirmed in Scranton by the National Council of Ruthenians, on November 12, under the condition that the autonomous Ruthenia would include all those Hungarian counties or their parts which were inhabited by Ruthenians, and that it would have its own Governor, diet, administration, etc. The resolution of the Council was submitted to a referendum of American Ruthenians and approved by a 67% majority, 28% voting for union with the Ukraine, 1% each for Russia and Hungary, and 2% for complete independence. President Wilson was informed of the agreement, the resolution, and the results of the referendum, while Žatkovič and another member of the Ruthenian Council, Gardoš, were sent to Paris to inform the Peace Conference. The Ruthenians in Hungary also were to be advised of the decision.

Meanwhile, in Hungary, both the Ruthenians and the Magyars were attempting to solve the Ruthenian problem in their own way and within their own possibilities. The new Government of now completely independent Hungary, under Count Károlyi, was in a rather precarious position with regard to the various nationalities of Hungary. They all refused any attempts at conciliation and demanded complete independence. The only remaining hope was a compromise with the Ruthenians, the majority of whom seemed in November and December of 1918, to be inclined to accept autonomy within the framework of Hungary. Delegates from Ruthenian counties were invited to a meeting in Budapest, where a majority of them approved a memorandum addressed to the Hungarian Government, asking for autonomy within Hungary, a special Ruthenian ministry and nomination of a Ruthenian Governor for the autonomous territory.

Their demands were quickly granted, by the promulgation, on December 21, 1918, of Law X on the autonomy of Ruthenia or, as it was termed, "Ruszka Kraina". This law, a truly liberal one,

gave the Ruthenians actually more than they had ever demanded. They were recognized as a separate nationality and given the right of self-government in the administration, justice, education and religious affairs in their territory. Ruthenia was to have its own national assembly for its own affairs as well as an adequate number of representatives in the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest. This autonomous Ruthenia was to be created from the territories inhabited by Ruthenians in the four counties of Marmaros, Bereg, Ugocsa and Ung, the fate of Ruthenian inhabited parts of other counties to be decided after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

However, Ruthenia's autonomy under Hungary remained more or less on paper, although a Minister for the territory was named and a Governor and the nucleus of an administration started to function in Mukachevo. The reasons for the failure were several. First, the new arrangement failed to appeal to all Ruthenians, especially to the more radical ones who were not content with the provisory delimitation of their territory and who wanted either a complete independence or unification with the Ukraine or, later, with Czechoslovakia. Further, the anti-Magyar and pro-Czechoslovak elements were able to gain the attention of the peacemakers in Paris and, together with the Czechoslovak delegation, to persuade them in favour of the Czechoslovak solution of the problem. Finally, the Károlyi Government itself collapsed in March, 1919, and was replaced by the Bolshevik régime of Béla Kun, which event did not add much to Hungary's popularity among either the Allies or the Ruthenian leaders.

In the December meeting of the Ruthenian delegates in Budapest, some of the delegates from eastern Ruthenia had opposed the idea of autonomy within Hungary and worked for the union of Ruthenia with the Ukraine. In Hust, the easternmost

town of Ruthenia, the adherents of the pro-Ukrainian tendency organized a National Council and national committees in the neighbouring villages and started negotiations with the Ukrainians in Poland. In January, 1919, Ukrainian military units from Eastern Galicia appeared in Marmaros Sziget to support the Hust National Council, only to be expelled by the Rumanian army.

Another trend had already manifested itself in November, 1918, in the western part of the Ruthenian territory. There, first in Lubovňa and later in Prešov, a National Council was organized under the leadership of Dr. Beskid. This council, although it sympathized at the beginning with the Ukrainian movement, soon started to work in favour of joining Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia.

Between these two councils which opposed any compromise with Hungary, stood a third one, established on November 9, 1918. This council, led principally by the Uniate clergy, remained faithful to Hungary and demanded for Ruthenia only autonomy within the Hungarian state. It was this council which negotiated with the Károlyi Government and achieved an agreement from which resulted the Hungarian Law X on the autonomy of Ruthenia.

It is difficult to say which of those councils would have prevailed under normal circumstances. As may be seen from the following enumeration of principal events, the margin of free decision by the population itself was rather narrow.

In the middle of January, 1919, Czechoslovak troops occupied Slovakia, including its eastern part inhabited by Ruthenians with their centre in Prešov, as well as the town of Uzhgorod itself. By now the Prešov National Committee had accepted fully the Czechoslovak solution and its President, Dr. Beskid, left for Paris where he met with Žatkovič and Gardoš, who had come from the United States.

Meanwhile, on February 13, 1919, the Uzhgorod

National Council was informed about the decision of the American Ruthenians and about the agreement between Masaryk and Žatkovič. The Council, however refused by a majority to consider the Czechoslovak solution and insisted on its plan for retaining Ruthenia as an autonomous part of Hungary, but even here unity was not complete. Already in January, 1919, some of the Council's members discussed with Hodža, the Czechoslovak Government delegate in Budapest, the possibility of joining Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia. And when, on the initiative of the Hungarian Government, the Ruthene Diet was elected in March of 1919, with a large pro-Hungarian majority, its main demand was the definitive establishment of "national" frontiers for the Ruthenian autonomous territory. In case their demands were not fulfilled by the Hungarian Government, the deputies declared themselves ready to revise their original declaration of allegiance to Hungary.

The Károlyi Government fell in the second half of March and was soon replaced by the Communist régime of Béla Kun. Shortly thereafter the military occupation of Ruthenia was completed by the Rumanian and Czechoslovak units proceeding from the east and west respectively, until they joined in the town of Mukachevo. At this juncture, at the beginning of May, Žatkovič arrived in Uzhgorod from Paris, bringing with him the message from the American Ruthenians as well as a report on the situation in Paris. His main aim was, however, to induce the Ruthenians at home to unification and to persuade them to accept the Czechoslovak solution. On May 8, 1919, this was achieved at Uzhgorod, at a joint meeting of the three National Councils of Hust, Uzhgorod and Prešov, when they merged into a Central National Council and in a resolution expressed their willingness to join Czechoslovakia as an autonomous territory.

The resolution as completed in the subsequent

meetings of the Council demanded the greatest possible autonomy for Ruthenia within the Czechoslovak Republic, including practically all matters with the exception of foreign relations and military affairs. It was also stipulated that the frontiers of future Ruthenia should be drawn in such a way as to include all territories inhabited by the Ruthenians, that is, not only the four predominantly Ruthenian counties of Marmaros, Bereg, Ung and Ugocsa, but also parts of the counties west of the river Uh, which were already regarded as belonging to Slovakia. These demands were presented by a Ruthenian delegation, headed by Žatkovič, Beskid and Vološin, to the President of the Republic, T.G. Masaryk, on May 23, 1919, and were also sent to Paris for the information of the Peace Conference.

The Ruthenian delegation from the United States arrived to Paris in February, 1919. There they met with Beskid, the representative of the Prešov (pro-Czechoslovak) Ruthenian Council. The Czechoslovak views on the Ruthenian problem were presented on February 5, 1919, to the Supreme Council by Dr. Beneš, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia. In his exposé he said he desired only to "draw attention of the Conference" to Ruthenia: the Ruthenians did not wish to remain in Hungary and proposed to form an autonomous state in close federation with Czechoslovakia. Though Czechoslovakia made no claims on their behalf, Dr. Beneš said that he had undertaken to put their case before the Conference. He added that it would not be feasible to join Ruthenia to East Galicia and that, if the latter were to become Russian, it would be dangerous to bring Russia south of the Carpathians; if East Galicia was to belong to Poland, neither the Poles nor the Ruthenians would favour the joining of the two countries; and if incorporated into Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia would mean a financial burden but would afford

Czechoslovakia the advantage of a common frontier with Rumania.

Having heard Dr. Beneš's case, the Supreme Council asked the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs for its opinion. On March 12, 1919, this Committee pronounced itself favourable to the autonomy of Ruthenia under the protection of Czechoslovakia (with Italy dissenting).

Previously, Dr. Beneš had been able to arrange for Žatkovič and other Ruthenian delegates to have interviews with Colonel House (February 17) and with Tardieu (February 24), both of whom they attempted to impress with their demands for union with Czechoslovakia. On May 8, 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers considered the reports of the territorial committees, among them also the report of the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs. It was agreed that the peacemakers were willing to give Ruthenia autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic and that the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs should make recommendation on the future status of Ruthenia in relation to Czechoslovakia. On May 15, 1919, Dr. Beneš explained to the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs that it was the general policy of his Government to encourage throughout the Republic a process of evolution towards some form of federal organization. He warned, however, that such an evolution could only be gradual and would take time, especially in view of the different degrees of cultural and economic development in the various provinces as well as unequal national consciousness. Two days later he supplied the Committee with a written document outlining Czechoslovak plans for Ruthenian autonomy. The country was to be given an official name, decided in agreement between the Prague Government and the Ruthenian Diet. An autonomous Ruthenian Diet would be established to have legislative powers in all linguistic, educational and ecclesiastical matters on the terri-

tory of Ruthenia, as well as in all those matters which the central Parliament may later confer on the Ruthenian Diet. The head of the executive was to be a Governor, appointed by the President of the Republic and responsible to the Ruthenian Diet. The Governor would be the final authority in all the mentioned matters and also in all matters of local administration. There would be special Ruthenian sections in all central ministries, a special Ruthenian appellate court and a Ruthenian minister without portfolio (a native of Ruthenia) in the central cabinet. This scheme was evidently based on the wishes of the Ruthenian delegates and on the resolution of the Central National Council in Uzhgorod.

The Czechoslovak Committee accepted this plan without changes and after some additions by the Council of Foreign Ministers, it was sent to the Committee on New States. There a tentative draft was approved on May 29, 1919, and the decision reached that its articles should be included in the minorities treaty with Czechoslovakia. A final draft was approved on June 16, and accepted by the Council of Five on August 6, 1919. On September 10, 1919, the Minorities Treaty with Czechoslovakia, containing the terms of the final draft in articles 10 to 13, was signed at St. Germain-en-Laye. Appropriate references were inserted also in the Peace Treaty with Austria (art. 53) and later with Hungary (art. 48).

The principal obligation which Czechoslovakia accepted by the Minority Treaty was to organize Ruthenia as an autonomous territory endowed with the fullest possible autonomy compatible with unity of the Czechoslovak state (art. 10). Ruthenia was to have, first of all, its special Diet legislating in all linguistic, educational and ecclesiastical matters. The Governor of Ruthenia was to be appointed by the President of the Republic and responsible to the Ruthenian Diet (art. 11). The officials in Ruthenia were to be

chosen as far as possible, from the local population (art. 12), and Czechoslovakia guaranteed that an equitable number of Ruthenian representatives would be given seats in the legislative assembly of the Republic (art. 13) Czechoslovakia accepted these obligations as being of international character, under the guarantee of the League of Nations whose members might at any time bring forward complaints concerning the fulfilment of the treaty (art. 14).

As may be seen, the obligations imposed upon and accepted by Czechoslovakia were considerably less than those proposed by Dr. Beneš in his memorandum to the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs. The Committee on New States itself admitted that it had left out many details of the Czechoslovak scheme, although no reason for doing so was given. Also, Žatkovič and his colleagues, believing that the text covered all their wishes, did not object at the time.

The frontiers of the new territory in the east, between Rumania and Czechoslovakia (i. e. Ruthenia), closely followed the ethnographical division, leaving only about three Rumanian villages in Ruthenia. In the north, the old historical frontier between Poland and Hungary was retained, while in the south the line was drawn more or less according to Czechoslovak wishes. It gave Czechoslovakia the important railway junction of Chop, on the Slovak border, and from there a railway connection with the Ruthenian towns to the east and north-east. No doubt, economic as well as strategic reasons were decisive here, although the frontier thus included within Ruthenia firm and compact mass of Magyars, representing about 15% of the total population. The establishment of a dividing line between Ruthenia proper and the rest of the Republic was fixed by the Allies as following roughly the river Uh, leaving the parallel south-north railway in Slovakia and the

town of Uzhgorod in Ruthenia. This left some 90,000 Ruthenians in Slovakia, outside of the autonomous territory. Although it was agreed in Paris between Beneš and Žatkovič that the question would be reopened later by negotiations between the Ruthenians and the Government of the Republic, the frontier remained unchanged. This became one of the Ruthenian grievances against Prague.

The Hungarian delegation at the Peace Conference naturally protested against the decision of the peacemakers, maintaining that the majority of the Ruthenians would prefer to remain in Hungary and that, according to historical right, the territory formed an integral part of the Crown of St. Stephen. They stressed the fact that a large number of Magyars was being allotted to Ruthenia and that a potential danger of irredentism was thus being created. They also pointed to the fact that the new frontier would end the economic symbiosis of the Hungarian plain with the Ruthenian mountains. Since the Ruthenians were used to selling their produce and their labour, especially in harvest time, in Hungary, the new situation would result in their impoverishment.

The Hungarian protests were of no avail. The Allies felt that the Czechoslovak solution was the best one under the circumstances and that the international guarantee accepted by Czechoslovakia was sufficient to secure for the population of Ruthenia the possibility of making their wishes known publicly and for the Allies the right to watch over the fulfilment of these wishes.

Dr Beneš, when speaking in Nove Zámky in 1933, and in Uzhgorod, on the Ruthenian problem, maintained that the Czechoslovak solution was the only possible one. Indeed, this seems to be the truth once the Hungarian solution was ruled out and a Ukrainian or Russian one became unrealistic, as they did. Though it was not stressed greatly at that time, it was nevertheless appre-

ciated by the peacemakers and by Dr. Beneš that the addition of Ruthenia gave Czechoslovakia a territorial connection with Rumania. Thus the foundation was laid for the future Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, all of whom had reasons to watch any revival of Magyar territorial ambitions and to check any revisionist plans of Hungary. Ruthenia, as a link in the Little Entente, gained enormously in importance, as Dr. Beneš himself admitted in the two speeches: without Ruthenia, the Little Entente would become impossible and the organization of Central Europe as based on the Peace Treaties, would probably collapse sooner or later. For these reasons, Dr. Beneš concluded, Czechoslovakia would never relinquish Ruthenia, under any circumstances whatever, and would defend it "to the last drop of blood", since through the Czechoslovak solution the destiny of Ruthenia was decided for hundreds of years, and this solution was a final one.

Ruthenia under Czechoslovakia

Dr. Beneš was probably one of the few Czech politicians who saw in 1919 the future international importance of Ruthenia for the Czechoslovak Republic. At home, in Prague, the unexpected territorial aggrandizement was not accepted with any great enthusiasm. Nobody knew much about Ruthenia besides the fact that it was a small, undeveloped and very poor country, which presented a liability rather than an asset for the new state. And first of all, the Czechoslovak armies had to conquer Ruthenia in a war with Bolshevist Hungary, whose troops meanwhile reoccupied part of its territory. It was only in July and August, 1919, that the territory of Ruthenia was fully occupied by the Czechoslovak units, insofar as it was not in the hands of their Rumanian allies.

Under the circumstances, the introduction of a normal civil administration was necessarily postponed. From the beginning of the Czechoslovak régime, Ruthenia had been under the jurisdiction of the Minister for the Administration of Slovakia (Dr. Šrobár), who conferred upon the French commander of the Czechoslovak armies, General Hennocque, dictatorial powers in Ruthenia. At the same time, he invited him not to interfere in civil matters which were reserved for his attaché, a Czech civil official, Dr. Brejcha. This civil and military dictatorship lasted until 1922, when the Prague Government introduced, with some hesitation, a normal civil administration similar to that in the rest of the Republic.

The Czechoslovak Government and the Ruthenian leaders, especially Žatkovič, had tried since the summer of 1919 to settle in some way the basic constitutional and organizational problems of Ruthenia. Žatkovič began to discuss his plans with the President of the Republic, Masaryk, already in 1919. His main aim at that time, besides autonomy, seems to have been to ensure agreement on the western frontier of Ruthenia and to gain for her that part of Slovakia which was inhabited by Ruthenians. Although no concrete agreement was reached, Žatkovič hoped for the best and went to the United States in August, 1919, to report to the American Ruthenians. With their approval he returned to Prague in October, only to find that the preparations for autonomy had not progressed at all. It was not until November, 1919, that the Prague Government issued a provisional *General Statute*, the draft of which had been worked out by Masaryk himself. According to it a Provisional Administrator, subordinated to the Ministry of Interior in Prague, was appointed. To help him in his duties, there was a Provisional Directorate, with Žatkovič as its President. Any differences between the Administrator and the Directorate were to be settled by the President of the Republic. Nobody seemed to be content with the results achieved, least of all Žatkovič. He was nominated to the Presidency of the Directorate in November, 1919, and in February, 1920, he handed in his resignation which, however, was not made public by the Government. After some more discussions, a new Statute was published in April, 1920, by which Žatkovič was made Governor of Ruthenia, without gaining any more power than he had had before. The real power was in the hands of the Vice-Governor (a Czech official), the immediate superior of the whole civilian administration in Ruthenia, who had to countersign all documents emanating from the Governor's office.

The Governor could veto any decision of the Vice-Governor, but the latter could appeal to the Prague Government, whose decision was final. There was also to be a Governing Council of fourteen members, partly nominated by the Central Government and partly elected by the mayors of the villages. The Council was supposed to discuss matters submitted to it by the Central Government or by the Governor but, since legislative measures concerning Ruthenia could be published without a hearing before the Council, it led rather an unimportant and shadowy life.

Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak Constitution was promulgated on February 29, 1920. Its article 3 concerned the position of Ruthenia and on the whole took over the principal stipulations of the Minorities Treaty. Ruthenia was given an official name, Subcarpathian Ruthenia (*Poňkarpatská Rus*), it became an inseparable part of the Republic and was promised the fullest autonomy compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovak state. It was to have its own Diet, with legislative powers in linguistic, educational and religious matters as well as in all matters of local administration, including those which might be conferred on it by the laws of the Republic. However, the President of the Republic had practically an absolute veto over the legislation of the Diet. The Governor of Ruthenia was to be nominated by the President of the Republic following the suggestion of the Prague Government and was to be responsible also to the Ruthenian Diet. The officials in Ruthenia were to be chosen as much as possible from the local population.

It is evident from this summary that the Czechoslovak Constitution differed in a few important points from the text of the Minorities Treaty and in many from the original scheme as presented by Dr. Beneš to the Peace Conference. The President of the Republic was given an absolute veto over

the decisions of the Ruthenian Diet, while his veto against the central Parliament was merely a suspensive one. On the other hand, the Governor was made responsible also to the Ruthenian Diet, that is, by implication, responsible also to the Prague Government or to the central Parliament or both.

No progress was made in the question which so intensely interested Žatkovič and his friends: the frontier between Slovakia and Ruthenia. All of his proposals to assure a plebiscite in the eastern part of Slovakia were rejected, mainly because of the uncompromising attitude of the Slovak politicians. Nor were any steps taken, then or in the future, towards the election of the Diet: constitutionally, Ruthenia remained until 1938 in a state of permanent provisorium.

The social question also became important. The country was poor and the impact of the Bolshevik revolutions in Russia and Hungary was felt in Ruthenia. When Žatkovič returned in June from Prague, the Social Democratic Party (under the name of the International Socialist Party), led by its radical Bolshevik wing, proclaimed a general strike. Žatkovič, harassed by his enemies and frustrated in his plans, journeyed once more to Prague, and offered his demission, hoping that in this way the speedy realization of the autonomy could be enforced. But his demission was accepted and Žatkovič returned to the United States. He then published an *Exposé*, in which he gave an account of his activities and of his complaints. His experience had turned him against the Republic and his countrymen in America soon followed. A congress of Ruthenians, held in Pittsburgh in November, 1921, demanded in a memorandum the realization of the autonomy of Ruthenia as stipulated in the peace treaties, and other similar protests followed in later years.

No new Governor was nominated after Žatkovič and the administration of the country was carried on under the Czech Vice-Governor until November, 1923, when Dr. Beskid, the former President of the Prešov National Council was appointed Governor, with a new Vice-Governor, Mr. Rozsypal, a Czech official. Dr. Beskid remained at his post until his death in June, 1933, and was succeeded by Konstantin Hrabar, another Ruthenian.

After the resignation of Žatkovič, and even before the dictatorship in Ruthenia was ended in 1923, the Czechoslovak Government started to introduce in the country the administrative system as it had developed previously and was being organized in the historical lands. This work culminated in 1927, with the promulgation of a new statute on the organization of administration. It divided the Republic into four administrative units or lands, i. e., Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia and Ruthenia, and subdivided them into districts, the lowest administrative unit within the district being a village. Lands, districts and villages were to enjoy some amount of self-government in certain matters, through their elected assemblies. Actually, they were greatly limited by the supervision and control exercised by the central Government through its offices in the lands and the districts. The new organization made Ruthenia still more dependent on the Prague Government and tended to efface all differences between that country and the rest of the Republic. Ruthenia became, for all practical purposes, only one of the four lands.

The inability or unwillingness (the first claimed by the Czechs, the second ascribed to them by their critics) of the Czechoslovak Government to honour its treaty obligations, had repercussions both at home and abroad. Since 1921, the position of Ruthenia and her internal situation had been made the subject of petitions to the

League of Nations, sent in, in some cases by (more or less Magyarized) Ruthenians who remained in Hungary, in other cases, by the Ruthenians of America, and finally, by some political leaders in Ruthenia itself. The grievances contained in the complaints were basically the following:

The Czechoslovak Government, in spite of clear treaty provisions, refused to establish Ruthenia as an autonomous territory ruled by the Ruthenians themselves, the country was subjected to a policy of centralization and Czechization, carried out by Czech officials, police, courts, and schools, and manifested especially in the large numbers of the Czech element in the country, in the creation of Czech schools, etc; finally, beyond the western boundary of Ruthenia, about 90,000 or more Ruthenians were living who were also subject to forcible denationalization, i. e., Slovakization.

The Czechoslovak Government's answer to the first point was invariably that they did intend to establish the autonomy of Ruthenia, but that such a step must be carefully prepared by first teaching the population the principles and responsibilities of political self-government. The Ruthenians were politically inexperienced and could be easily seduced by unscrupulous leaders, some of whom worked in the interests of foreign states. Thus, not only the existence of Ruthenia herself but also peace in that part of Europe would be seriously threatened. Furthermore, autonomy would be used mainly or only by the Magyar and Jewish minorities who, owing to their privileged position in pre-war times, were better educated and economically stronger. A premature autonomy would thus defeat its own purpose, the cultural, social and national emancipation of the Ruthenians. As for the predominance of the Czech element in the administration, the memoranda of the Prague Government

pointed out that the only possible way to carry on the administration of the country was to send to Ruthenia Czech or Slovak officials, judges or teachers since there was, especially at the beginning, a complete lack of educated Ruthenians. Only gradually, as new generation was trained, could they replace the Czechs and Slovaks.

As for the schools, the Czechoslovak Government pointed out that enormous progress was being made in the organization of education in Ruthenia as compared with the pre-war times. The Czech or Slovak schools were necessary for the children of Czech or Slovak officials living in Ruthenia and their relatively high number was explained by the dispersion of the Czechoslovak element. Besides, many Jewish and Ruthenian parents asked for their establishment, feeling probably that a better chance would be offered to children knowing also the language of the state. Otherwise, the Prague Government categorically refused any suspicion of a policy of denationalization.

In the question of the frontier between Slovakia and Ruthenia and of the Ruthenian minority in the former, the Czechoslovak Government seemed to be moving in a vicious circle. The frontier could not be changed in favour of Ruthenia or a plebiscite in the disputed area arranged, until the autonomous Diet of Ruthenia had met; elections to the Diet could not, it seemed, be held while there was no definite frontier.

The League of Nations accepted the Czechoslovak explanations and contented itself with the promises that autonomy would be established in some foreseeable future. Yet, in spite of that and even when the arguments of the Czechoslovak Government are taken at their face value, the fact remained that Czechoslovakia, until forced by external circumstances, did not fulfil its obligations towards the Powers and towards the Ruthe-

nians. This is not to say that Czechoslovakia did not do an excellent work during the twenty years of her administration or that she treated Ruthenia no better than a colony, as was sometimes maintained. On the contrary, the achievements of the Czechoslovak administration in many fields were quite spectacular, especially when the difficult circumstances and obstacles are taken into consideration.

Probably the greatest achievements of the Czechoslovak administration in Ruthenia were those in the field of education. When Czechoslovakia took over in 1919 and 1920, the number of elementary schools in the country was around 500 (900 classes) with about 62,000 pupils. The language of instruction was Magyar and only in 34 denominational (Greek Catholic) schools, Ruthenian was tolerated in some courses. All centres of higher learning (high schools, teachers' seminaries) were Magyar. In 1935 there were in Ruthenia 440 purely Ruthenian elementary schools with 2,200 classes and 99,000 pupils, while the Magyar minority had 112 schools (360 classes) with 17,000 pupils. Further, there were 17 German, 7 Hebrew and 4 Rumanian elementary schools. The attendance which was very low at the beginning (average 25%) went up to 90% in 1933. Illiteracy was widespread and difficult to fight, especially with the older generation and yet, from the average of 60-70% at the end of the war, it dropped to about 40% in 1930.

The greatest difficulty was the lack of qualified teachers after the war. Of the 674 teachers in 1919 only 379 remained with the new régime. By 1934, however, there were 2,300 teachers in the elementary schools in Ruthenia. The financial burden involved with the development of the elementary and higher education was not small. While only 10% of all elementary schools in Ruthenia

were maintained by parishes or churches, the rest were state schools and, as such, paid for by the government. Besides the elementary schools there were established under the Czechoslovak administration 4 Ruthenian high schools, 3 teachers' seminaries and many occupational schools.

At the beginning of the Czechoslovak administration a great difficulty arose over the language question in schools. At first, the Prague Government was inclined to prefer the local dialect which, however, had not yet achieved full status of a literary language. Later, Great Russian was more stressed until, after many discussions, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences decided that the Ruthenian dialect was to be regarded as Little Russian or, in other words, Ukrainian.

In another field of culture, namely the religious question, the policy of the Prague Government appeared to be less fortunate. After the war, it seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia, that the right time had come to convert the Ruthenian peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian émigrés who flocked to Czechoslovakia, including Ruthenia, after 1919. A drive for "orthodoxy" was started in Ruthenia with the result that the number of the members of the Greek Orthodox Church grew to some 112,000 or 15% of the whole population, for whom some 120 new churches had to be built. In 1910, there were only about 600 members of that Church in Ruthenia. It is a question how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feelings of the population and to its dislike for the partly Magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox émigrés and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. However, it certainly added one more element to the con-

fusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.

The Czechoslovak administration in Ruthenia made no less progress in health care than in education. The number of medical practitioners rose from the pre-war 28 to 70; new hospitals were built and the old ones modernized or enlarged and the number of beds more than doubled. A network of consultation centres was established and great attention was paid to preventive medicine, epidemical and venereal diseases and alcoholism. In the health care, however energetically pursued, the Government met with two major obstacles: the lack of confidence of simple, often superstitious peasants in modern medicine, and the poverty of the people from which resulted a constant state of undernourishment and consequently a lowered resistance to any illness.

The state as well as the private organizations soon realized that emergency or philanthropic measures (distribution of bread, milk or grain) were not the right answer to the problem. What was needed was the improvement of the country's economic conditions. In its attempts to accomplish this, the Czechoslovak administration had to fight against circumstances, some of which were only partly under its control and which, indeed, were probably unsurmountable by ordinary means. On the other hand, it remains an open question, whether the Government did use all the existing possibilities to develop fully the economic life of Ruthenia.

The agricultural situation as it presented itself to the new régime in 1920, was characterized by two facts. First, only some 46% of all land was devoted to agriculture, including some 15% of pastures, the rest being forests; second, most of the land belonged to the great estates and

only a minor part to small holders. Since the soil was poor, especially in the higher, mountainous regions, the annual yield was much smaller than in the Czech lands or in Hungary. Moreover, the population was growing rapidly and between 1921 and 1930 it increased by 120,000 or 20%, as compared with 8% for the rest of the Republic. Before the war the surplus of the population either emigrated overseas or was absorbed into Hungary, and many of those who stayed used to go to Hungary at least for the seasonal work, mainly harvesting, and thus obtained some sustenance for the unproductive winter months. All these outlets were stopped after the war sooner or later. The Government tried to alleviate the difficult situation by bettering the methods of cultivation which were indeed primitive, but no improvements of this type could catch up with the growing land hunger. Land reform, division of large estates among the smaller or landless peasants, was to be a more radical means to appease it, but even here no substantial results were achieved. From various (and differing) available sources the most favourable would indicate that up to 1938, some 57,000 hectares (or 142,000 acres) were divided among 30,000 families, and some 32,000 hectares (or 80,000 acres) still remained to be divided, while about 6,000 applicants did not receive anything. The land reform with its residual estates, communal, church and state property, did not change significantly the picture of the division of land in Ruthenia. In 1930, some 75% of holdings between 1 and 5 hectares (2.5 to 12.5 acres) added up to only about 12% of all land; 23.5% of the holdings between 5 and 30 hectares (12.5 to 75 acres) accounted for 20% of all land, and the remaining 68% of land, including forests and pastures, were divided among 1650 owners, private individuals, state, churches or communes.

The situation in industry was even worse than

in agriculture. With the exception of the salt mines in Akna Slatina, any industry there was in Ruthenia could not bear the competition of the industry in the rest of the Republic, and the Government did not try to prevent its gradual disappearance after the war. Forestry suffered greatly by the new situation. Only about 30% of the wood production was of good quality and the competition with the Czech or Slovak wood was nearly impossible because of the great distances and lack of cheap transportation, while the former Hungarian market was practically closed.

All the work of the Czechoslovak administration whether successful or not, cost the Government a great deal of money. The trade balance of Ruthenia was passive. All the educational and many of the technical reforms needed capital investments without profit. It has been calculated that between 1918 and 1932 the country received in taxes from the inhabitants 2,664 crowns per person on the average, but spent nearly twice as much without counting the expenditure on the army and most of the public or state owned enterprises or services, such as railways, posts, etc. In this connection, the Czechoslovak régime was currently reproached that it had flooded Ruthenia with its officials, teachers, judges, etc., and that these people lived off the country. From the purely financial point of view nothing could be further from the truth. The necessity, at the beginning, of sending trained administrators and educators to the country which had none of their own, is obvious. On the whole, the Czechoslovak administration, being basically and thoroughly democratic, was honest, tolerant and efficient. A conjecture may be hazarded that Ruthenia would not have fared better under any other of the neighbouring states.

As for the Ruthenians themselves, one circum-

stance has to be kept always in mind. Neither in 1920 nor, say, in 1935, were they quite and unanimously certain what kind of nationality they actually were. This question split them into several groups and, with all its linguistic, religious and, of course, political aspects and repercussions, it was another serious problem facing the Czechoslovak Government from 1919 to 1938. The simple peasant who did not worry too much about such things, considered himself a *Rusin* or *Ruthenian* and let it go at that. The educated classes wrote either in Russian or Ukrainian or tried to cultivate one of the local dialects, all according more to political inclinations than any other reasons. Thus the linguistic question was mixed with and complicated by political considerations, especially those concerning the future of Ruthenia. To decide, for example, what language should be used in schools or in local administration (i.e., Russian, Ukrainian or local dialect) was a political step of major importance and consequences.

In the political life of Ruthenia none of the three main trends - Russian, Ukrainian or local, formed a separate and homogenous group but all cut across several party organizations. The picture was complicated still more by the establishment in Ruthenia of nearly all political parties existing in the rest of the Republic, by the antagonism between the Orthodox and Uniate Churches and by the influences of the Russian and Ukrainian émigrés.

The Ukrainian tendency was represented by the Ruthenian National Christian Party, led by Voloshin, and supported mainly by peasants, part of the educated classes and by the Uniate clergy, the latter working hand in hand with the Czechoslovak People's (Catholic) Party. But the Ukrainophile trend had also been accepted by the

Social Democratic Party (a branch of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party), partly by the Czechoslovak Republican (Agrarian) Party and, since 1925, by the Communist Party. The Ukrainian movement was centered around the organization *Prosvita*, and was very active with its net of organizations, especially in the cultural field. There was hardly any doubt that the Ukrainian tendency was steadily gaining, mainly among the younger generation. Although by and large loyal to the Czechoslovak régime, its ultimate end was, of course, the incorporation of Ruthenia into some future Ukrainian state.

The Russian trend manifested itself at the outset mainly in three groups: the Autonomist Agricultural Federation, the Labour Party and the Fencik Party. The first originated in 1923, when the majority of the original Federation opposing its union with the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party withdrew and, under the leadership of Ivan Kurtyak, founded an independent party. After the death of Kurtyak the party was led by Andrey Brody. Its Russophilism later changed to a greater stress on the local trend. Demanding always the realization of autonomy, the party manifested, at least on the surface and for the time being, its loyalty to the Republic. It was, however, well known that Brody was, and in 1939 proved himself to have been, a Magyarophile. The Labour Party, under its slightly misleading name, was a group led by Mr. Gagatko and Mr. Tsurkanovich (originally from Bukovina), both vehemently pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian. Their Russophilism, as expounded in their newspaper *Russian Soil*, was very similar to the old Panslavism and pre-1914 Russian nationalism. Since the Imperial Russia, the main attraction of such a program, was a thing of the past, they counted instead on the future in which she would be resurrected. The party was also the main support and mouthpiece in all attempts to

convert the population of Ruthenia to the Orthodox religion. The last of the Russophile groups owed much of its existence and success to its leader, Mr. Fencik, a former teacher in the Uniate Theological Seminary and secretary general of the organization *Dukhnovich*. Violently autonomist, with open Fascist tendencies, anti-Czechoslovak and anti-Ukrainian, Mr. Fencik could find kind words only for Poland and later also for Hungary.

None of those and other still smaller parties and groups usually went to the polls alone but formed a *blóc*, either among themselves or with some big national party. Thus, the autonomists of Kurtyak and Brody went to the polls in 1929 with the Czech National Democrats, in 1935 with the Slovak People's (Hlinka) Party. The Labour Party of Mr. Gagatko was supported at the beginning by the Czech National Socialist Party (Dr. Beneš's) and it was only when this party dropped its Russophile policy that Mr. Gagatko found shelter with the Czech National Democrats in 1929.

The picture of the political division may be completed by mentioning the Unified Magyar Party, which concentrated most of the Magyar votes (some of them, however, going to the Communists, Social Democrats and the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party), the two Jewish parties (Zionist and Orthodox) which did not go to the polls after 1925, and a few German groups, later united in the Henlein (Nazi) Party.

The Czechoslovak Government professed neutrality towards these trends and outwardly tried to steer a middle course among them, with the result that it was always accused by some of favouring the others. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that the parties composing the government coalitions had their preferences, as has been seen. Moreover, the presence and

activities of various groups of Russian and Ukrainian émigrés made things still worse. The attempts to cultivate a local, autonomous trend were not very successful. The Ukrainian trend showed growing strength and it seemed that one day the neutrality would have to be dropped and a decision made - unless the Ruthenians took things into their own hands. Dr. Beneš, when speaking in Uzhgorod in 1934, proclaimed officially the neutrality of his Government in the language question. It was to be left to the Ruthenian Diet to decide whether it was to be Ukrainian or Russian. At the same time, Dr. Beneš cautioned the Ruthenians that the quarrels in this matter should stop. Their political aspirations, directed beyond the frontier, whether to Ukraine or to Russia, were, in his opinion, only political fantasies without a realistic political basis, because nothing which could happen in Russia or in the Ukraine could influence in any way the political and constitutional position of Ruthenia.

From the point of view of the Prague Government the most important aspect of the political picture of Ruthenia was, of course, how many votes in the elections were given to the parties supporting the coalition governments in Prague, and how many to the opposition parties, especially to those in the permanent opposition, like the Communist Party, the Autonomist Federation or the Fencik Party. The results of the elections to the Central Parliament in 1924, 1925, 1929 and 1935 show the following: for the government 40%, 46%, 64% and 37%; for the opposition 60%, 54%, 36% and 63%, respectively. Detailed analysis would show that around 10% of the opposition vote went in all elections to the Magyar party. The Communist Party's votes varied from 40% in 1924 (30% in 1925) to 15% in 1929 and up to 25% in 1935. The early defeats of the Government in 1924 and 1925 can be explained partly by the disorgani-

zation and poverty of the country as well as by the post-war radicalism of the electorate. But the figures of 1935 also appear to show, besides the gains of the Communists, an increase in the votes for the autonomist groups which obtained nearly another 25% of all votes. Of the nine deputies elected to the Prague Parliament from Ruthenia, only three went with the Government and six with the opposition. In other words, in spite of all its work and some excellent results, the Prague Government was not able, after sixteen years, to gain the confidence of even half of the population of Ruthenia.

Munich

Hungary never accepted as just and durable her new frontiers as settled by the Peace Treaties. She kept pointing out that the areas ceded to Czechoslovakia contained large Magyar minorities which had been deprived of the right of self-determination as professed by the peace-makers, further, that those areas had belonged to Hungary by historical right for more than a thousand years and that all their inhabitants should have been given the opportunity to express by a plebiscite their will on whether or not they wanted to stay in Hungary. Hungarian policy and revisionist propaganda since 1919 always tried to put forward these demands in the international field as well as among the Magyar minorities and the non-Magyar population of the succession states.

The realization of their aims came finally during and immediately after the Munich crisis, in which Poland and Hungary formed a common front with Germany against Czechoslovakia. The Munich decision of the Four Great Powers settled principally the question of German demands on Czechoslovakia. In a special declaration, however, it was stipulated that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by an agreement

between the respective governments, should form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the governments of the Four Powers. The negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia started at the beginning of October, 1938. On October 2, the Hungarians asked for a speedy opening of the negotiations concerning the reintegration into Hungary of the Czechoslovak territories inhabited by Magyars, the realization of the right of self-determination for Slovaks and Ruthenians, as well as a token cession of some frontier towns, Chop and Berehovo in Ruthenia among them. The delegations of the two countries met, on October 9, in the frontier town of Komárno to carry on a discussion of their respective proposals.

Although the Czechoslovak delegation in Komárno agreed at the opening of the discussion to the Hungarian demand to hand over symbolically some purely Magyar towns, it soon appeared that the difference between the Magyar and Czechoslovak proposals was too great to be bridged by negotiations. The Hungarian delegation insisted that for ethnical considerations the Hungarian census of 1910 should be used as a basis, while the Czechoslovak delegation contended that the Magyar census was notoriously biased and unreliable on the questions of nationality, and insisted that the Czechoslovak census of 1939 should be used. The disagreement further centered around the Slovak towns of Bratislava, Nitra and Košice, and the Ruthenian towns of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod, the cession of which the Hungarians demanded.

Since agreement could not be reached, the Hungarians broke off the negotiations and decided to request the signatory Powers of the Munich agreement to settle their territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Although Italy and Great Britain were prepared to take part in such a conference, Germany strongly dissuaded both Czecho-

slovakia and Hungary from this course, and succeeded in bringing about the reopening of direct negotiations a week later, when new Czechoslovak proposals were handed to Hungary. Ribbentrop, by mistake or deliberately, made the Czechoslovak minister, Chvalkovsky, believe that Germany would support the exclusion of some Slovak towns and of the Ruthenian towns of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod from the territory to be ceded to Hungary. He even received Slovak and Ruthenian politicians in a personal meeting in Munich, on October 19, and listened to their demands, telling the Ruthenian minister, Bachinsky, that "what was Ruthenian must remain Ruthenian", so that Bachinsky declared himself quite optimistic for the future of Ruthenia. At the same time, the Germans impressed upon the Czechoslovak politicians and diplomats that the new proposals must be radical and speedy and that the Hungarians also had German support. The new Czechoslovak proposals of October 22, were therefore more far-reaching than the previous two, yet still refused to consider handing over the important Slovak towns of Bratislava, Nitra and Košice, as well as Uzhgorod and Mukachevo in Ruthenia. Since not even these concessions seemed sufficient to the Hungarians, and neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary was prepared to go or yield any further, the negotiations were broken off once more and both countries demanded an arbitration from Germany and Italy.

The decision of the two arbiters was announced on November 2, 1938, at Vienna. If it was very unfavourable to Slovakia, it was directly disastrous to Ruthenia. Of the disputed towns, only Sevelyush was left to her, and both Uzhgorod and Mukachevo went to Hungary. Up to the last minute Hungary insisted that a plebiscite should be organized in Slovakia and Ruthenia, especially since, in the case of the latter, Hungary hoped that such a plebiscite could be in her favour.

In this demand she was backed by Poland which desired a common Hungarian-Polish frontier and the suppression of Ruthenia as a possible nucleus of the Ukrainian movement, threatening Poland's own Ukrainian territories in Galicia. However, Germany decided that, for the time being, it was in her interest to keep Ruthenia (or rather the remnants of it) in the framework of the Czechoslovak rump-state.

Whether a plebiscite in Ruthenia would have given the whole territory to Hungary, seems rather doubtful. In spite of the chaotic situation and of the now open Magyarophilism of some Ruthenian politicians, the bulk of the population was now no more inclined towards union with Hungary than before the Munich crisis.

Under the impact of the Munich crisis and due to the demands of the Slovak autonomists (Catholic Party), Czechoslovakia had to be transformed into a federative Republic. On October 5, President Beneš, resigned and the Government had to be reconstructed. It promised to both Slovaks and Ruthenians the fulfillment of their autonomy. After long and difficult negotiations, the first steps in this direction were made by another reconstruction of the Government, in which ministers of the now practically independent Slovakia were included. Several days later, on October 11, a Ruthenian Government was appointed, with Mr. Brody as Premier, Mr. Fencik as Minister of Resources, for the "Russophile" trend, and with Mr. Revay as Minister of Communications, Mr. Bachinsky as Minister of Interior, and Mr. Voloshin as the Secretary of State, for the Ukrainian trend. A reshuffle of this cabinet came two weeks later when it was discovered that both Brody and Fencik had conspired towards uniting Ruthenia as a whole with Hungary. Brody was replaced by Voloshin and the Ukrainian trend thus gained complete victory,

since Brody was arrested and Fencik fled from the country. Ruthenia was known now as Carpatho-Ukraine, which expression became official after its autonomy was enacted in the Constitutional Acts of November 22, 1938. The autonomy given to Rutheniaby those statutes was very extensive. In principle, only the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of National Defence, and the administration of the communications and of the national debt, were to be common.

The new Government of Ruthenia was, of course, facing tremendous and actually impossible tasks. Economically, the country was now completely dependent on the rest of the Republic. By the Vienna Award, the country lost more than 180,000 of its inhabitants and 1,586 sq. km. of its territory. Nearly all fertile land had been given to Hungary and whatever industry there was in Ruthenia, went there with it. Without help from the rest of Czechoslovakia, the country would have starved in a short time. Moreover, the political situation tended only to aggravate the economic chaos. Hust, the new capital (a market town of 16,000 inhabitants) became a center of an extremely nationalistic Ukrainian movement, streng ened by numerous arrivals from the neighbouring Galicia, and encouraged by Germany. The régime was becoming more and more influenced by the extremists with totalitarian leanings, people like Dr. Revay and his brother, whom the relatively moderate and sensible, but weak and inexperienced, Premier Voloshin, was not able to keep in line. All political parties were dissolved and replaced by a sole *Ukrainian National Union* with its para-military organization *Sich*.

In the elections to the Ruthenian Diet, held on February 12, 1939, only one list, that of the Government candidates, was presented to the electorate, assuring an easy victory for the

Government in an assembly which met only once.

The leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Ruthenia, big and small, believed that their hour had now come, and that the era following Munich was the beginning of the unification of all Ukrainians, and that this unification would start from Ruthenia. Their dreams about the future of their country could grow to such dimensions only because they were supported ostensibly by Germany. A local leader of the tiny German group in Ruthenia (about 13,000) was given a post of State Secretary in the Hust Government, and the secretary of the German Legation in Prague (and later in charge of the German Consulate at Hust) made, at the end of November 1938, a trip of inspection in Ruthenia, from which he reported that "Carpatho-Ukraine is viable, especially if foreign help is available for reconstruction". In December the Ruthenian Government and a representative of Germany concluded two agreements giving Germany considerable concessions and rights to economic exploitation of the country, especially in mining.

At the same time there were continuous armed clashes on the Polish and Hungarian borders, between the members of the *Sich* and the Polish or Hungarian frontier guards and, inside the country, the disorder was growing. In January 1939, the Prague Government decided in favour of a radical step. It dispatched a Czech, General Prchala, to Hust and appointed him a Minister in the Ruthenian cabinet. However, the friction between Czechs and Ruthenians was not diminished by this measure but rather aggravated. The Hungarians whose hand in the agitation inside the country could not be concealed, tried constantly, in their turn, to gain Germany's approval for their occupation of the rest of Ruthenia but throughout January and February of 1939 the Reich

did not consider such an act opportune.

It was not until the first half of March 1939, that Hitler began the liquidation of the remnants of Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks were induced to proclaim independence on March 14, and on March 15, the German Army occupied the newly created Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. A few days before this final crisis, the Prague Government still had enough strength to reshuffle once more the Ruthenian cabinet in favour of the more moderate elements, dismissing Revas and replacing him by Mr. Klochurak, an adherent of the Voloshin wing. However, a week later, the German Minister in Hungary informed the Hungarian Government that there were no objections to the occupation of Ruthenia by Hungary. On March 14, the Hungarians presented in Prague an ultimatum demanding, among other things, the evacuation of Ruthenia by the Czech troops, to begin within twenty-four hours. The ultimatum was accepted and the first Hungarian troops started to cross the border of Ruthenia on March 14 and 15, 1939.

The Ruthenian Diet, convoked for this occasion, met on March 14, and declared the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ruthenian Government had already demanded protection from the Reich the day before, but this was refused and Voloshin advised the offering of no resistance. The complete conquest of Ruthenia was a matter of a few days for the Hungarians who were opposed only by badly armed members of the *Sich*. On March 16, the first Hungarian units reached the Polish border.

The Hungarians were not content with the conquest of Ruthenia proper but showed aspirations also for the eastern parts of Slovakia, inhabited by Ruthenians. Hungary had only to use a well tested recipe: armed clashes developed

along the frontier and unrest and agitation beyond it. On March 28, 1939, the representatives of now independent Slovakia and of Hungary met and, by a protocol signed on April 4, Slovakia ceded to Hungary a band of territory along its eastern frontier. This pushed the old frontier of Ruthenia about thirty-five miles in the north and some eight miles in the south, towards the west. Hungary (or Ruthenia) gained thus some forty villages, with approximately 40,000 inhabitants.

The Hungarian Government realized that a simple reoccupation of Ruthenia was impossible. Therefore, it proclaimed a policy which promised some measure of autonomy to the country but, of course, only to that part of it which was occupied in March 1939; the territories ceded to Hungary under the Vienna Award in November 1938, had become part of Hungary proper. By the Law VI of June 22, 1939, the Hungarian Parliament gave to the Prime Minister the right to select among the former representatives from Ruthenia (whether elected for the Prague Parliament or the Ruthenian Diet) ten persons whom the House would then nominate as its members for the recovered territory. The leader of the thus selected representation was A. Brody, whose first parliamentary speech, in which he declared loyalty to Hungary for himself and for his people, took place on July 1, 1939.

Ruthenia under Hungary was to be administered from its capital, Uzhgorod (situated now actually outside Ruthenia proper), by a Commissioner and a General Counsellor, both nominated by the Regent of Hungary. The Commissioner had all administrative and legislative power in his hands. Only in questions of "general interest concerning the Subcarpathian territory" would he be advised by the Counsellor who, in turn, would be helped by

a committee of eight members, nominated by the Prime Minister. The official languages were Magyar and "Hungaro-Russian", and the inhabitants had the right to address themselves to the authorities also in "Hungaro-Russian", in which case the answer had to be in the same language. The promised autonomy remained, however, on paper. The old pro-Russian movement was swept away under the Czechoslovak régime in the winter of 1938-39; the Ukrainian movement was crushed by the Hungarian army of occupation. Therefore, there remained only the Magyarophile leaders of the Brody and Fencik type, and the Hungarians had relatively easy task in keeping the country quiet.

The Czechoslovak agrarian reform was investigated and, in many cases, nullified. Many schools were closed and those teachers who remained had to pass an examination in Magyar, after a six months' course, while teaching in Ruthenian in high schools was suppressed altogether. Bilingualism was introduced and it was expected that it would not require much effort on the part of the Ruthenians to master Magyar; the older generation still remembered it, the children would learn it soon.

However, many Ruthenians did not feel quite happy under the new Hungarian rule. Soon after the beginning of the war, groups of young people took to the deep, inaccessible forests of the Carpathians. After the defeat of Poland in the autumn of 1939, when Russia occupied Galicia and became a neighbour of Hungary (and of Ruthenia), considerable numbers of young Ruthenians fled to Russia, with the hope that some day they might be allowed to fight against Hungary. This opportunity they found only two years later, when Germany invaded Russia. Up to that time, nearly all of them were kept in labour or prison camps, which many among them did not survive. Those who

did, were allowed, in 1941, to join the Czechoslovak Brigade in Russia, recruited there from Czechs and Slovaks living in Russia, from descendants of Czech settlers in Volhynia, and from Slovak and Ruthenian prisoners of war from the ranks of Slovak and Hungarian armies fighting against Russia.

During 1938 and 1939, the problem of Ruthenia was the object of a considerable interest, less on its own merits than in connection with Hitler's alleged plans to make the little Ruthenia a starting point for a German-sponsored Great Ukraine. Germany's support of the militant Ukrainian nationalism inside and outside Ruthenia was not unknown, and the world press as well as the diplomatic circles indulged during the period in copious speculations as to the further developments in this respect.

Indeed, on March 10, 1939, no less person than Stalin saw fit to take up the question in his speech to the XVIIIth Congress of the Communist Party, taking place in Moscow. He ridiculed the current hopes of the Ukrainian nationalists and compared Ruthenia to a little fly which would ask an elephant (the Soviet Ukraine) to join him. Interpreting the speculations of the western press as attempts to throw a bone of contention between Germany and Russia, he at the same time warned that any lunatics in Germany, dreaming about joining the Soviet Ukraine to Ruthenia, would find in Russia enough of strait-jackets ready for them.

This speech was, as it were, the last important utterance on Ruthenia at the time. Five days later Ruthenia was re-incorporated into Hungary. Few imagined that in some six months Russia would

stand on the Ruthenian frontier and that in about five years the Soviet elephant would gobble up the little fly.

1944 - 1945

1

London

Exactly a week after the Four Powers had signed the Munich agreement, on October 5, 1938, Dr. Eduard Beneš, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, resigned his function and in a radio broadcast took leave of the nation. Less than three weeks after his resignation, on October 22, 1938, he left Czechoslovakia by air for England. Both his resignation and his departure were brought about by more or less direct pressure from Germany and from some Czech political circles. Yielding to this pressure, Dr. Beneš expected that the position of the present Czechoslovak Government vis-à-vis Germany would thus be made easier. He knew that his person, a symbol and living reminder of the First Republic, would be an insurmountable obstacle on the way towards any appreciable normalization of relations between Hitler's Reich and the Republic as it emerged from the Munich crisis, weakened to helplessness and actually depending for its further existence upon the goodwill of the German rulers. For this reason also, he kept as much as possible to himself during his stay in England and later in the United States, where he went, in February 1939, to lecture at the University of Chicago. His reticence in political matters at that time was equally due to the fact that, during the rest of 1938 and at the be-

ginning of 1939, the British Government circles did not wish him to deploy any political activities which would criticize, attack or try to change the Munich agreement and its aftermath.²

This does not mean, however, that Dr. Beneš lost all interest in the political development in his country and in Europe, or that he severed all contacts with his friends within Czechoslovakia or abroad. On the contrary, very soon after his arrival in England, he started to build around himself a group of collaborators and kept up connections with home. Already at that time it was his firm opinion that Munich was not an end but a beginning of a great crisis which would explode into an armed conflict, sooner or later, possibly in 1939, on the issue of Poland.³

It was the 15th of March, 1939, that released Dr. Beneš from his self-imposed reserve. The occupation of Prague by the German Army and the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as well as of the independence of Slovakia, and the occupation by Hungary of Ruthenia, were flagrant negations of the Munich agreement and of the First Vienna Award following it. By these acts of violence, concluded Dr. Beneš, the Munich agreement was destroyed as a treaty by its chief author and the First Republic emerged into existence - legally - as it was before Munich.⁴

Thus interpreting the situation, Dr. Beneš sent on March 16, 1939, telegrams to President Roosevelt, to Prime Ministers Chamberlain and Daladier, to M. Litvinov, and to the League of Nations, asking the first four not to recognize Hitler's last venture and demanding the League's help for his country, according to the Pact,

²*Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš*, London, 1954, p. 81. Further cited as: Beneš, *Memoirs*.

³*Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60, 64.

especially its article 10. The telegrams were signed by Dr. Beneš as "former President of the Czechoslovak Republic".⁵ Naturally, when the war broke out in September 1939, no more reasons for any reticence existed, the Czechoslovak émigrés were now in the same camp with Great Britain and France and had a common enemy.

The spring of 1939 and especially the outbreak of the war marked the beginning of Dr. Beneš's and his collaborators' long struggle for the liberation of Czechoslovakia and for its re-establishment to the status as it existed before Munich. It was based on the theory of the so-called legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state which can be summarized as follows: All that happened after September 19, 1939, (the Munich settlement itself, the Vienna Award, establishment of the Protectorate, etc.) came about illegally, unconstitutionally, and was imposed upon Czechoslovakia by threats, terror and violence; besides, the Munich agreement was never accepted by the Czechoslovak Parliament, as prescribed by the constitution. Consequently, the Czechoslovak Republic existed now, *de iure*, as it did before Munich. Hence, the government of the so-called Protectorate as well as that of the post-Munich Republic⁶ was unconstitutional; Dr. Beneš's re-

⁵Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 65.

⁶The legal position, from the point of view of the theory of continuity, of the so-called Second Republic, (Sept. 29, 1938 to March 15, 1939) was not quite precise in the first years of the war. Dr. Beneš did not mention the matter in his memoirs; on the other hand, the Decree of the President concerning the Re-establishment of the Legal Order, of August 3, 1944, stipulated that legal norms promulgated during the time of oppression were not part of the Czechoslovak legal system, and stated expressly that the time of oppression began on September 30, 1938. It may be noted that Czechoslovak post-war commentators pointed out that "against the wishes of the London legislators to the contrary, this constitutional decree confirmed the severance of formal continuity between the pre-Munich legal order and that of today" (Bílek, F., and V. Chalupný, "Základní předpisy o obnovení právního pořádku" in J. Hoffman, *Nové zákony a nařízení*, vol. VIII, p. 1254.).

signation was invalid, and he himself, at present, and possibly a government nominated by him in exile, would be the only constitutionally legal organs of the Republic. Also, the separation of the Sudetenland and of the territories which went to Poland and to Hungary, as well as the independence of Slovakia and the occupation of Ruthenia had to be regarded as invalid, and Czechoslovakia was to revert to its pre-Munich frontiers. In other words, by the actions of March 15, the Munich and post-Munich settlements were annihilated and things should revert automatically to the *statu quo ante*. This should be recognized by the Great (and small) Powers, and not only should any recognition be refused to the situation created by the events around March 15, but the whole Munich settlement should be repudiated by those who had signed it, the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia should be guaranteed for the future and Dr. Beneš and his Government in exile acknowledged as the only legal Government of the Republic. As a corollary to this theory, a resistance movement should be (and was) organized outside the territory of the occupied Republic. This movement would be led by a regular state organization, as far as possible identical with or similar to that of the pre-Munich Republic: the President, Government, diplomatic and consular representations, independent Czechoslovak army, etc. This organization would fight, with all its available forces, as an ally of the western powers against Germany and for the liberation of Czechoslovakia.⁷

To make the powers accept this theory and all its present and future implications was one of the main tasks of Dr. Beneš and his collaborators.

⁷ Beneš, *Memoirs*, pp. 106, 107. Also the note of the Czechoslovak Government to the Allied Governments, on Dec. 16, 1941, reproduced in Beneš, *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války*, pp. 301 to 306. (Further quoted as: Beneš, *Six Years*.)

To examine why this particular theory was adopted and to go through all the details of long and complicated diplomatic discussions that followed Dr. Beneš's reappearance on the political scene in 1939, would be clearly beyond the scope of this outline. Only main points can be given, and it might be said here that the goal was not reached until 1942, and even then not completely.

Great Britain recognized first, in December, 1939, the Czechoslovak National Committee, established meanwhile in Paris, as a rightful representative of the Czechoslovak people, entitled to organize a Czechoslovak army in France and in Great Britain. On July 21, 1940, she took cognizance of the establishment of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London, and on July 18, 1941, she recognized the position of the President and of the Czechoslovak Government in London as being equal to that of other allied heads of state and governments then in the territory of Great Britain. Finally, on August 5, 1942, Great Britain announced that its Government regarded themselves as free from any engagements in respect of arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia and concluded in 1938, and that at the final settlement of the Czechoslovak frontiers, Great Britain will not be influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938.⁸ But she refused to be bound too definitely in the question of the continuity, especially as far as territorial settlement was concerned; although repudiating the changes of the Munich period, she still did not state expressly that she regarded the Czechoslovak pre-Munich frontiers as immutable.⁹

As for France, her Government recognized the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris on November 17, 1939;¹⁰ on September 29, 1942, in a note

⁸ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 197 et seq. Beneš, *Six Years*, pp. 281-282; Táborický, *The Czechoslovak Cause*, p. 25.

⁹ Ripka, *The Repudiation of Munich*, p. 11.

¹⁰ Žižka, *Bojující Československo: 1938-1945*, pp. 39-43.

of the French National Committee in London to the Czechoslovak Government, General de Gaulle stated that the Committee considered as invalid *ex tunc* the Munich agreement as well as all other acts following it and that it recognized the Czechoslovak Republic as existing in her frontiers before September 1938.¹¹

With the United States of America and with the Soviet Union, the problem was much simpler, since they were no partners to the Munich agreement.

The Government of the United States never revoked its recognition of Czechoslovakia and continued to acknowledge its national integrity and its international status.¹² In a note of the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Winant, to Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated July 31, 1941, the United States of America announced its readiness to enter into regular diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Government in London, and stated at the same time that it did not recognize that the Czechoslovak people were deprived of their rights and privileges by a temporary extinction of their liberties.¹³ Simultaneously, Dr. Beneš was informed that, as far as the question of final settlement of frontiers was concerned, the United States Government had no obligations in this matter.¹⁴ On October 26, 1942, the Czechoslovak Government was informed that its recognition by the United States, from the previous year, was to be considered as full and definitive.¹⁵ In a personal interview in May 1943, Cordell Hull confirmed to Dr. Beneš that the Munich agreement

¹¹ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 232.

¹² Cordell Hull to Senator Lee, on June 12, 1941, quoted in Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 182.

¹³ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 178. See also Táborský, *The Czechoslovak Cause*, pp. 100-101.

¹⁴ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 178.

¹⁵ Táborský, *op. cit.*, p. 101

and later developments were, for the United States, "null and void".¹⁶

With regard to Russia, the procedure was not only simpler but, after the German attack on Russia in 1941, even quicker. Up to that time, the situation was not without ambiguity: on one hand, the Soviet Union did not recognize, and vigorously protested against the Munich agreement; on the other, she had recognized both *de facto* and *de iure* the independence of Slovakia. In December 1939, shortly after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Government asked the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, Fierlinger, to close the embassy and leave Russia. But Dr. Beneš regarded these measures of the Soviet Government as temporizing manoeuvres and agreed with Fierlinger's report that, for the Soviet Union, they were only "meaningless formalities".¹⁷ He counted always on the possibility of Russia being dragged into the war sooner or later and tried to pass over those facts without re-cremations and to cultivate friendly, if informal relations with the Soviet diplomats, whether in the United States or in Great Britain.¹⁸ Thus, it was quite easy for both Governments to conclude, four weeks after the German attack on Russia, a treaty of alliance, signed on July 18, 1941, through which the Soviet Government recognized President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government in London as the legitimate representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic. The treaty also automatically liquidated the Soviet recognition of Slovakia and the relations between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia reverted to "the alliance and friendship which united the Soviet Union with the Czechoslovak Republic before the Munich crisis of 1938; and which was affected but not destroyed by Munich and the events that

¹⁶ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 194.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 137, 153.

followed".¹⁹ The signature of the treaty meant, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak Government, that the Soviet Union knew now only the Czechoslovak Republic as it had existed before Munich.²⁰ Moreover, in May and June, the Soviet Minister, Bogomolov, informed Dr. Beneš and the acting Foreign Minister, Ripka, that the Soviet Union wanted a strong and independent Czechoslovakia of the pre-Munich frontiers.²¹ This was reiterated to Beneš by Molotov in a personal interview on June 9, 1942, in London, so that the President was able to say, in his broadcast speech of August 8, 1942, quoting Molotov, that Soviet Russia did not recognize any changes of the Czechoslovak frontiers in 1938 and 1939, and that she took her stand on the pre-Munich Czechoslovak frontiers.²²

Hand in hand with these diplomatic negotiations, the organization of the Czechoslovak Government and its organs, including the army, was being built. Dr. Beneš decided that the centre of his and his collaborators' political activities should be London.²³ After some discussions between the Czech and Slovak emigrés there and in Paris, a Czechoslovak National Committee was established, in the fall of 1939, in Paris where a Czechoslovak Army was also being organized from those Czechs and Slovaks who had escaped meanwhile from their occupied country.

After the collapse of France, both the political leaders and the army were transferred from France to England. There, after having secured its recognition by the British Government (July 1940) Dr. Beneš, acting now as President of the Republic, nominated a Provisional Czechoslovak Government. The nomination of its members was not

¹⁹Ripka, *The Repudiation of Munich*, p. 17.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Beneš, Radio speech on August 8, 1942, in Beneš, *Six Years*, p. 107; Ripka, *The Repudiation of Munich*, p. 18.

²³Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 84.

to be an empty formality - not only were ministers nominated but also each department was organized with a staff of officials and all necessary paraphernalia. This was not a difficult task since, already in the fall of 1938 and the spring of 1939, but especially after March 15, 1939, and after the outbreak of the war, hundreds of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, etc., were able to escape from Czechoslovakia to the west and were willing to help in the liberation of their country. There was also a large group of diplomatic officials who, after March 15, refused to give up their legations or consulates to the German Foreign Service and to return home. So far as all those people could not be made soldiers in the Czechoslovak Army in France or Britain, there existed even a certain *embarras de richesse* from the affluence of people willing to serve the cause of Czechoslovakia's liberation in the departmental offices in London.

In the political composition of the Czechoslovak Government, it was attempted to adhere roughly to the pre-Munich political situation, as it had existed at home. In all the cabinets until the change in Moscow, in 1945, the major parties of the right, centre and left were represented. The parties of the extreme right, considered pro-Hitlerite, were excluded; for specific reasons also, the Communists were not represented in the Government, though those present in London supported it after Russia was forced into the war.

To make the Government a really representative one was of course impossible, owing to the circumstances: there was no elected parliament, to whose members the Government would be responsible, and there was no electorate from which any parliament could issue. Nor were there, among the politicians who came to London, the top leaders of the Czech or Slovak political parties. The only exceptions

were Mr. Šrámek of the Czech Catholic Party, Mr. Hodža of the Agrarian Party, and Mr. Bechyně of the Social Democratic Party.²⁴ Moreover, those who were there were not sent as mandatories of their parties but came on their own. The absence of a parliament was to be partly remedied by the institution of the so-called State Council, which had "to accomplish certain functions, belonging to the elected assembly"²⁵ However, the State Council was only an "advisory assembly of the President of the Republic and a subsidiary organ of supervision within the frame of the provisional State organization of the Czechoslovak Republic" and all its members were nominated by the President of the Republic for a period of one year.²⁶ Politically, again, the State Council had to follow in its composition the political divisions in the Prague parliament, as it existed before Munich, and it was thus to be "a political body which would be a unifying element of all political emigration".²⁷

Indeed, the Council included in its ranks personalities from all important political trends of pre-war Czechoslovakia, from the left to the right, again with the exclusion of the extreme right, after 1941, the Communist party also had its representatives in it. The members of the Council were nominated purely on a personal basis, since "all those invited to join the Council sit there as individuals and not as ex-

²⁴ Only Mr. Šrámek remained in collaboration with Dr. Beneš during and after the war. See footnote 32.

²⁵ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 113.

²⁶ Art. 1 and 2 of the Decree of July, 1940, of the President of the Republic, concerning the Establishment of the State Council; text in Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 128 *et seq.*

²⁷ Beneš, *Memoirs*, pp. 113-114.

ponents of any political party".²⁸

The legislative function of parliament was not given to the State Council but, through a decree of the President of the Republic, of October 15, 1940, to the President himself. By it, on the motions of the Government, he was empowered to issue decrees with the force of law, including constitutional acts, but such a decree had to be countersigned by the Prime Minister and by the member or members of the Government responsible for its execution. The State Council had the right (and, indeed, the duty) to express its opinion on any draft of a decree of the President presented to it; it had also the right to put questions to the members of the Government, who, however, were not under any legal obligation to answer them.²⁹

Besides the President, the Government and the State Council, there was also a Juridical Council, a body of five members whose purpose was to give "legal advisory opinions as to whether a particular enactment or decision of the Government or of any of the central offices was compatible with the Czechoslovak juridical order".³⁰ As the State Council was a shadow of the former parliament, so the Juridical Council was a shadow of the former Czechoslovak Supreme Administrative Court, and its opinions were not more binding legally than those of the State Council politically.

The Czechoslovak state organization in exile possessed, for obvious reasons, only the supreme administrative organs, i.e., the various depart-

²⁸ Thus Táboršký, at that time secretary of President Beneš, in *Czechoslovak Cause*, p. 119. It is rather doubtful whether the theory was accepted by the members of the Communist Party when they entered the State Council.

²⁹ Decree of the President of the Republic concerning the Execution of the Legislative Powers; text in Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 129.

³⁰ Táboršký, *The Czechoslovak Cause*, pp. 128-133.

ments of the Government and only two of them, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, had a complete organization from top to bottom. the first in its diplomatic and consular representatives in the Allied and neutral countries, the second in the Czechoslovak units in France, Great Britain and, later, Russia. In time of war, the army was, of course, of eminent importance. The Czechoslovak Army, which had been transferred from France to Great Britain in 1940, was reorganized and completed, and its independent existence anchored in a special British-Czechoslovak treaty. In Russia also, separate Czechoslovak units were organized in pursuance of article 3 of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of July 18, 1941.

Thus, in 1940 and 1941, Dr. Beneš was able to reestablish legally and partly in fact, the Czechoslovak state organization in exile, with its President, Government and its departments and a substitute for parliament. It would be certainly a gross oversimplification to call all this machinery a "one man's show" with reference to Dr. Beneš's leading position in it. There is no doubt that, among the other Czech politicians, there was none with the moral and political authority comparable to his, nor had anybody such vast and thorough experience of long standing in international affairs as he had. By the sheer weight of his personality and his prestige, he was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the men surrounding him as their natural leader, as the only man able to see clearly his and their way out of the post-Munich chaos and desperation. This will explain why he received in the newly organized Government, from the constitutional point of view, practically unlimited and uncontrolled power. According to the Czechoslovak constitution, the President was not responsible in the exercise of his executive functions to his

cabinet or the State Council, of both of which he nominated the members.³¹ The ministers were responsible only to the President and not to the State Council; if the State Council itself was hardly more than a political discussion club, it was because its members willingly accepted Dr. Beneš's and his Government's leadership and assented to their roles of political minors. Constitutionally, they were not important, since they could only advise and recommend, but not prevent or enforce legislation; politically, they had only one power: the threat of an open disagreement, which would have embarrassed the President and the Government in the public eyes. This, in its turn, was lessened by the feeling of the need for unity in a time when everything was at stake.

Dr. Beneš's extremely strong position, which he enjoyed as the President of the Republic, was accepted with full consent by all his collaborators, whether in the Government or in the State Council and, indeed, during the whole war there were few major disagreements on this point between him and the other political leaders.³² It might be then said that, while the ultimate decision in all political and legislative matters, in theory and in fact, lay with the President, his

³²If we disregard the Communists who, up to the summer of 1941, attacked Dr. Beneš as a lackey of imperialism and a few meaningless splinter groups, the two major disagreements would be with Mr. Hodža, a Slovak, one of the leaders of the Agrarian Party and former Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, and with Mr. Bechyně, a senior social democratic politician and, up to 1941, President of the State Council.

³¹Adhering to the theory of continuity, Dr. Beneš and his collaborators recognized as valid the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920. From the point of view of this constitution many acts of the London Government could be regarded as unconstitutional, including the establishment of the Government itself and resumption of the Presidency by Dr. Beneš. To solve the dilemma, the Government pointed to its exceptional position and stressed the provisional character of its acts, insofar as they were to be presented to the liberated nation for subsequent ratification or rejection.

Government shared the responsibility with him. The Czechoslovak policy during the war could be called a "Beneš policy" only if we think of its inspirer and planner, but it must be regarded as the policy of the Czechoslovak Government in exile, since it was always unanimously accepted and executed by the whole Government and by the State Council, for whatever the latter's consent was worth. This, of course, goes for decisions and acts of which the members of the Government were informed by the President or by other individual members of the Government.

This has to be borne in mind when the relations of Czechoslovakia with Soviet Russia are considered, especially in any discussion of the events around the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, signed in December 1943.

The Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of 1941 was concluded only for the duration of the war and it was the opinion of Dr. Beneš, shared by his collaborators, that the relations between the two countries should be put on a broader basis and regularized for a longer period. The reasons for such an opinion were many and varying and only an attempt can be made here to discover and to estimate the more weighty among them. The Munich crisis loomed large in Dr. Beneš's mind. He thought that, to a great extent, it was caused, and its outcome determined, by the exclusion of Russia from European affairs - a consequence of the mistrust of the then French and British Governments and leading political circles towards that country. The two western democracies' betrayal of Czechoslovakia, left to face alone the expansive Germany, made Dr. Beneš look for yet some other future assurance of the security and independence of his country. Again, Munich was, in his opinion, also one of the first steps towards the second world war because of the lack of co-

operation between East and West against the Nazi aggression and, if any future repetition of the German "Drang nach Osten" was to be prevented, both the western democracies and the Soviet Union would have to continue their cooperation begun during the war.

If, on the other hand, the West and East would not come to a durable understanding in the post-war period, a still greater catastrophe would threaten the world. It was of vital importance to Czechoslovakia that a permanent agreement be reached between the two, since otherwise any split between West and East could lead, in her case, to another, new Munich. That such a cooperation was not only desirable but also possible was one of the principal political theses of Dr. Beneš during the war. His opinion was that, not only at present but also in the coming years, Soviet Russia was and would be willing to come to some sort of compromise and cooperation with the western democracies. Its internal development before and during the war Dr. Beneš interpreted as a trend towards liberalization of the Soviet system, stressing at the same time that the western democracies were no longer adhering to the purely liberalistic type and were themselves more and more tending towards socialistic or collectivist solutions of social and economic problems. Thus, the gap between the two systems, at least in practice, was growing smaller and the possibility for further cooperation greater. Dr. Beneš realized, of course, that many attitudes of the Soviet régime, especially during the war, might be only tactical and opportunistic, and stressed that the basic ideological difference between the Soviet and democratic systems remained unbridgeable. In this last respect, the only policy was mutual tolerance and respect of different political systems on both sides and non-interference in the

internal affairs of the partners.³³

Since Czechoslovakia had, after the war, to seek support and assurance not only of the western democracies but also of Soviet Russia, (of which, Dr. Beneš did not doubt, she would be an immediate neighbour), it was eminently important for her future to know if the new "democratic" trend in Soviet Russia, as well as its cooperation with the West would continue and, if possible, help in the strengthening of the good relations between the West and the East. This meant, practically, ascertaining as far as possible the political intentions of the Soviet rulers with regard to Central Europe and especially Czechoslovakia and, in case they were acceptable, concluding with Russia a treaty of friendship and on post-war collaboration. Such a treaty would also show to the rest of the world Russia's political intentions towards her small neighbours.

Through his own considerations and in the discussions with the Soviet diplomats, Dr. Beneš came to the conclusion that those intentions were good and honest. Although the idea of some broader treaty was already in his mind in 1941, he did not think the time was yet ripe then; later, in 1943, before and during his trip to the United

³³This summary of Dr. Beneš's views is based on his *Memoirs*, on the last three chapters of the Czech edition of his book *Democracy Today and Tomorrow*, and on his *Úvahy o Slovanství*, or *Essays on Slavonic Policy*. Reference can be had also to his speeches published during the war in England by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially to his speech to the State Council on February 3, 1944, printed under the title *Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*. See also Táborský, "Beneš and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XIII, pp. 154-181, *passim*. A summary and a critical appraisal of Dr. Beneš's views on Russia during the war may also be found in O. Friedmann, *The Break-Up of Czech Democracy*, London, 1950.

States and Canada, he decided that the situation was more opportune. After several interviews between Beneš and Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador, (in April 1943), supplemented during Dr. Beneš's absence by Bogomolov's communications to Ripka, Dr. Beneš and his Government came to the conclusion that a friendship treaty with Russia (patterned on the Anglo-Soviet treaty of March 1942) was not only desirable but feasible. The Soviet answers to main questions posed by Dr. Beneš and his collaborators (Masaryk and Ripka) were satisfactory. Russia was willing to conclude the treaty and stress in it the mutual obligation of non-interference in internal affairs of the treaty partners; she would accept a clause concerning Poland's possible future adherence to the treaty, and she would also agree to the transfer of the German minority from Czechoslovakia after the war.³⁴

The British Government, when informed about Dr. Beneš's intentions of going to Moscow and signing the treaty there, advised against it, but Dr. Beneš argued that "our example and our agreement with the Soviets could be the best proof of what possibly would and could be the actual policy of the Soviet Union after the war, and that it was in the interest of ours and of all the others to show to the whole world through our treaty with the Soviet Union what the Soviet Union wanted, and what policy it meant to pursue, and that it could and should . . . bring the Soviet Union nearer to Great Britain as well as to the United States . . ." ³⁵ Dr. Beneš added further that the treaty would, above all, help "the stabilization of the situation and the peaceful development even of the Soviet Union in her relations to Europe and to the world", ³⁶ and to all questions,

³⁴ Beneš, *Memoirs*, pp. 242-243.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

he repeatedly stressed that all that the Soviet Union promised, he accepted as "true facts" and that, according to his experience, he had no reasons not to believe in their words.³⁷

After some discussions, it was decided that the question of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty would be put on the program of the forthcoming conference of the three powers in October 1943, which actually happened. Dr. Beneš at the same time announced that after that conference he would go to Moscow in any case and would sign the treaty.

This trip was undertaken in December 1943 and on December 12, 1943, the treaty was signed. Its articles 1 and 2 declared a policy of lasting friendship and friendly cooperation between the two states, after the war, and an obligation to help each other militarily and in other ways in the war against Germany and her allies, as well as to not conclude a separate peace with them. Article 3 then extended this obligation into the future, in case Germany were to renew her policy of "Drand nach Osten". In article 4, the contracting parties agreed "to cooperate in a close and friendly manner after the reestablishment of peace as well as to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State". The treaty was to remain in force for a period of twenty years and an additional protocol (the so-called "Polish clause") was signed at the same time, allowing the opportunity to adhere as a third party to the treaty to any country bordering on Czechoslovakia or Russia and which had

³⁷ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 245. Cf. also Dr. Beneš's message to the State Council on February 3, 1944 (*Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*, pp. 22-23). The details of the discussions preceding Dr. Beneš's trip to Moscow are related in Táborský, "Beneš and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945", *op. cit.*, pp. 155-158.

been the object of German aggression in the present war.

The significance of the treaty for Czechoslovakia, in Dr. Beneš's and his Government's opinion, was first of all that it was "a permanent safeguard against any new expansion of pan-Germanism"; "a guarantee of our frontiers and also a guarantee that Munich shall never happen again" and "an outstanding guarantee of our independence and of our Republic such as has never previously been vouchsafed to us".³⁸ Internationally, it represented one of the factors in a post-war security system³⁹ and greatly strengthened Czechoslovakia's international position, especially in the Central European sphere.⁴⁰ Historically, it represented "the culmination of the Czechoslovak nation's traditional striving for permanent alliance with the great Russian Empire in which it always saw a powerful guarantee of its security and liberty..."⁴¹

During his stay in Moscow, Dr. Beneš had, naturally, several long interviews with the leading Soviet statesmen, including Marshal Stalin. In those discussions, "all fundamental and important questions relating to their (i.e. Czechoslovak and Soviet) mutual relations have been settled to the full satisfaction of both parties, in friendly harmony and complete solidarity and friendship".⁴² In all matters concerning Czechoslovakia, the discussions "dealt with the Republic in its pre-Munich frontiers" and questions concerning Slovakia, Carpathian Ruthenia or minorities were discussed "solely as questions of our home policy".⁴³ Since in all those discussions a

³⁸ Beneš to the State Council, February 3, 1944 (*Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*, p. 26).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Ripka, *East and West*, p. 38.

⁴¹ Ripka, *loc. cit.*

⁴² *Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*, p. 28. ⁴³ *Ibid.*

"complete understanding of points of view" was manifested and since Dr. Beneš believed that it would be "a fundamental mistake to regard as mere tactics the Soviet attitude in the matters of the Comintern, religion, cooperation with the West, Slavonic policy, etc.",⁴⁴ he could and did regard his trip and all that had been achieved through it, as a great success for the Czechoslovak policy.⁴⁵

In Moscow, Dr. Beneš also met the leading Czech and Slovak Communist politicians who had come there before or at the beginning of the war (Gottwald, Kopecký, Nejedlý, Slanský, etc.). The representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in London were members of the State Council but the Party was not represented in the Government. In the Moscow discussions Dr. Beneš attempted to draw the Communist Party to yet closer cooperation with his Government. Although an understanding was reached in a series of questions, the Communists still refused to enter the Government and the question of their participation in it was thus left open for the future. However, in Dr. Beneš's opinion, the outcome of the discussions was satisfactory, since they had shown that a complete future understanding was possible and that a "civil war at home could be prevented" i.e., the Czechoslovak movement would not be split in two factions, as later happened in the Polish and Yugoslav cases.⁴⁶

As a supplement to the treaty of December 1943 an agreement between the two Governments was concluded in London on May 8, 1944, concerning the relationship between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief on the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovak territory.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Beneš, *Memoirs*, pp. 261 et seq.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 273, 275.

⁴⁷ Text in Ripka, *East and West*, p. 80.

It remains now to consider if or in what sense the problem of Carpathian Ruthenia was discussed in the Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations in 1943 or, for that matter, before and after that date up to the fall of 1944, when the Soviet Army crossed the Czechoslovak border into Ruthenia. To avoid any anticipation in this narrative, a distinction will be made between the facts which were known to the public, or at least to the members of the Czechoslovak Government or the State Council, and those which were disclosed only later. The rest will be discussed later in the course of the story.

In his *Memoirs*, Dr. Beneš mentions his interview of September 19, 1939, with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, in which he (Dr. Beneš) said among other things: "After this new war, we must be immediate and permanent neighbours of the Soviet Union. *That, for us, is also a lesson from Munich.* The question of Carpathian Ruthenia we will solve between us and will certainly come to an understanding".⁴⁸ (*Italics Dr. Beneš's.*)

After his trip to Moscow, Dr. Beneš had talks with members of the Polish Government in London on January 10, 1944. He informed Mr. Stańczyk that the Soviet Union cannot and will not yield in the question of Lwow (i.e., leaving it to Poland) and added: "Similarly, she will want to solve definitely with us the question of Carpathian Ruthenia".⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 139. According to Táborský, Dr. Beneš discussed Ruthenia with Maisky once more in August 1941. The result of the discussion was that, since Ruthenia could be neither Polish nor Hungarian, it could only belong either to Russia or Czechoslovakia. See Táborský, "Beneš and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945" in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XIII, p. 165.

⁴⁹ Beneš, *Memoirs*, p. 291. When returning from Moscow, Dr. Beneš had an interview with Churchill at Marrakesh in which the question of Ruthenia seems to have been also mentioned. See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 452.

There is, however, no indication in the *Memoirs* or anywhere else that any of those facts and discussions were reported by Dr. Beneš to the Government or to the State Council. In his speech of February 3, 1944, when he reported to the State Council on his Moscow trip and its results, he informed his listeners, as already mentioned, that the question of Carpathian Ruthenia was discussed "solely as a question of our home policy",⁵⁰ stating at the same time, however, that the time had not come yet "to examine concretely the matters we negotiated (in Moscow) and about which we reached mutual understanding". "These matters", he added, "will become clear and publicly known at a later date". He assured the Council, however, that "there were no secret agreements or conventions between us."⁵¹

Before and after the Moscow trip, Dr. Beneš himself and various members of his Government continued to express themselves publicly in speeches and in writing, in such a manner that there could have been no doubt about the future of Carpathian Ruthenia as a part of the liberated Republic. In the already quoted speech to the State Council, Dr. Beneš spoke about the future of Czechoslovakia as a country of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians,⁵² and devoted a few paragraphs to the constitutional position of Ruthenia within the Republic. He stressed there that, legally, Ruthenia never ceased to be part of the Republic and that the pre-Munich constitution, which was still in force, applied also to Ruthenia. "If there are to be any changes in the constitution of Carpathian Ruthenia, or if these have to be made on account of considerable changes in neighbouring countries, this will be done in agreement with the population. In any case, no

⁵⁰Beneš to the State Council, February 3, 1944 (*Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*, p.27).

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 44, 46.

obstacles will be placed in the way of fostering and development of their national culture, either with Ukrainian or Russian trends".⁵³ In his statement to the press in Moscow on December 22, 1943, President Beneš announced that the future frontiers of Czechoslovakia were discussed with the Soviet leaders "in a most general way, as the problem of frontiers will be decided by the future peace conference", repeating that the territory of Czechoslovakia "must be fully re-established".⁵⁴ This statement and the statement to the State Council, taken together, could be interpreted, at the utmost, as willingness on Czechoslovakia's part not to object to a discussion at the peace conference of the international status of Ruthenia.

However, in the same way as before his Moscow trip, Dr. Beneš continued to speak about the unity of the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenians. Thus, in his radio speech on October 27, 1944, he mentioned the Ruthenians as standing in one line with Czechs and Slovaks;⁵⁵ in his speech of December 23, 1944, discussing the future constitution of Czechoslovakia, he declared that in the "Czech provinces, the administration will be Czech, in Slovakia, Slovak, and in Subcarpathia, Ukraino-Russian".⁵⁶ Some of his collaborators in the Government spoke in a similar way.⁵⁷ Besides,

⁵³ Beneš to the State Council, February 3, 1944 (*Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*, p. 49).

⁵⁴ Beneš's statement to the press in Moscow on December 22, 1943; text in Ripka, *East and West*, pp. 129-132.

⁵⁵ Beneš, *Six Years*, p. 154.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁵⁷ See for example, Stránský, *Hořovy k domovu*, p. 472: "...the Carpatho-Ukraine as an indivisible part of the Republic, has its own special status ..." (radio speech on September 30, 1944). Ripka, *East and West*, p. 122, in his "Exposé on the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of 1943", given in the State Council on December 15, 1943.

it was stressed again and again that Czechoslovakia would and must be re-established in her pre-Munich frontiers. Since Carpathian Ruthenia, in spite of her specific character within the Republic, formed its integral part, such statements must be interpreted as including Ruthenia, even if they did not specifically mention it. This was also the only interpretation compatible and consistent with the so frequently stressed and so persistently proclaimed theory of continuity, at least in its material content.

In the spring of 1944, the Soviet armies came close to the Czechoslovak border in Poland, and it became evident that at least the eastern part of Czechoslovakia would be liberated by the Red Army. Having such a possibility in mind already in the winter of 1943, during his stay in Moscow, Dr. Beneš opened with the Soviet leaders discussions on some future arrangement of relations between the Red Army commanders and the organs of the Czechoslovak Government.⁵⁸ The discussions were then resumed in concrete form in London, between the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs and Lebedyev, the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Czechoslovak Government in exile. Their outcome was the "Agreement concerning the Relationship between the Czechoslovak Administration and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief on the Entry of the Soviet Troops into Czechoslovak Territory", signed in London on May 8, 1944, by the State Minister H. Ripka and Ambassador Lebedyev.⁵⁹

The main stipulations of the agreement were, first, that the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, upon the entry of his armies into the Czechoslovak territory, "will possess the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters essential to

⁵⁸ Minister of State Ripka in his exposé of May 9, 1944 to the State Council, on the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of May 8, 1944, in Ripka, *East and West*, p. 146.

⁵⁹ Text of the agreement is reproduced in Ripka, *op. cit*

the conduct of the war in the zone of war operations" (article 1) and, second, that a "Czechoslovak Government delegate for the liberated territories will be appointed", with the task of organizing the administration of the liberated territory to reconstitute there the Czechoslovak armed forces and to ensure active co-operation of the country with the Soviet armies (article 2). In pursuance of this agreement, President Beneš nominated, in June 1944, Mr František Němec, at that time Minister of Commerce and Reconstruction,⁶⁰ as the Government Delegate for the Liberated Territories. Since it was, however, not yet known at that time in what particular direction any further progress of the Red Army would be made and whether it would cross the Czechoslovak border into Silesia, Slovakia or Ruthenia, it was decided to send the Delegate to Moscow, where he was to keep himself in readiness and, in due time, to proceed to any liberated part of Czechoslovakia.

Besides a number of experts and officials from various ministries in London, headed by Mr. Prokop Drtina, the Delegate was given in London also a company of political advisers from the members of the State Council, chosen according to their political affiliations, so that a political replica, in miniature, of the State Council was created. The Communist Party was represented by Mr. Jozef Valo, the Czech National Socialists by Mr František Uhlíř, the Social Democrats by Mr Bohumil Laušman, the Catholic Party by Father František Hála, and the Agrarians (later the

⁶⁰ František Němec was before the war member of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies for the Social Democratic Party. After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939, he escaped to France, entered the Czechoslovak army there and was evacuated with it to England in 1940. In the same year he was nominated Minister of Commerce and Reconstruction in the Czechoslovak Government in London, in which function he remained until his appointment as Government Delegate for the Liberated Territories.

Slovak Democratic Party) by Mr. Fedor Hodža⁶¹ In Moscow, a Ruthenian Communist, Mr. Ivan Turyanitsa, joined the delegation as another political adviser and still later, two Ruthenian members of the State Council in London, Mr. Ivan Petrushchak and Dr. Pavel Cibere, were sent to Moscow; however, the two last mentioned reached Ruthenia only in January 1945. For military affairs, two Czechoslovak Generals, Rudolf Viest and Antonín Hasal-Nižborský, were also members of the delegation, the latter was nominated Military Commander of the Liberated Territories and was also to represent the Delegate in his absence. Of the above mentioned, General Viest and Messrs. Uhlíř, Drtina and Laušman never reached Ruthenia: the General was captured by the Germans during the Slovak uprising, while Mr. Laušman remained in hiding in Slovakia until the arrival of the Russian armies.

The authority of the Delegate was given by the text of the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement, especially its articles 2, 5 and 6 and by the Decree of the President concerning the Provisory Administration of the Liberated Territories of August 3, 1944. According to this decree, an Office for the Administration of the Liberated Territories was to be organized, at its head and responsible for it, was to be a member of the Government as the latter's Delegate. The duration of the office and of the Delegate's function was limited; it was to end at the moment when the

⁶¹According to the then current doctrine of the Czechoslovak Government, the members of the delegation could have been considered again as selected on a personal basis and representing only main political "trends" rather than any organized parties. The position of the Agrarian (Republican) Party between the first (1943) and the second (1945) trip of Dr. Beneš to Moscow is not altogether clear. Mr. Fedor Hodža was the son of the Slovak leader of the Agrarian Party, Mr. Milan Hodža, and became later, in 1945, when the Agrarian Party was not allowed to be revived, Secretary General of the Slovak Democratic Party

seat of the Government was transferred to the territory of the Republic. Until that time, however, the Delegate was to carry out the decisions of the Government in the liberated territory and to represent in its administration each individual member of the Government. Within the jurisdiction of the governmental departments, he was to take all measures necessary for carrying on the war, for maintaining the public order and for a speedy re-establishment of normal constitutional conditions.⁶²

The Delegate thus had in his hands all the power which would have belonged to the Government of the Republic, were they there, with the proviso of course, that he would proceed along the political lines pursued by the Government and known to him. He was naturally supposed to ask, through the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow, the President or the Government for their opinion in the more important matters as well as report to London on his activities. Purely military affairs and matters of foreign policy were practically and by oral instructions excluded from his competence. His relationship towards the political advisers was similar to that of the Government in London to the State Council. They could not, in any way, limit the Delegate in the performance of his office, yet it was expected that he would always act in a manner that would find their political

⁶²Art. 1 and 2 of the Decree of the President of the Republic, of August 3, 1944, concerning the Provisional Administration of the Liberated Territories (Decree No. 10/1944, *Úřední Věstník*). It may be of interest to note here what Mr. Z. Peška, Professor of Constitutional Law, had to say about the decree and the office of the Government Delegate, in 1945. In his book *Naše nové státní zřízení* [Our New State Organization] he commented as follows: "However, since both the President and the Government came to the Czechoslovak territory (to Košice) at the very beginning of the liberation of Czechoslovakia, *this office of the Government Delegate never began to function*". (Italics ours.)

support. Moreover, their position at home vis-à-vis the Government (or its Delegate) could now be stronger than it was in London. In the liberated territories, they would be coming into direct contact with the Czechoslovak people, of whom they were supposed to organize again in the political life and whose political support they could eventually claim

The reorganization of political life in Czechoslovakia had to proceed, in a conspiratorial way in the territories still under occupation, from below by the establishment of "National Committees"; and through elections (or subsequent elections which would confirm the "established" committees) in the liberated territory.⁶³ The national committees were to be organized on three levels: local (parish), district and, finally, a provincial (Land) committee, for each of the four provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. This corresponded to the former hierarchical division of administration in the Republic.

The corresponding decree of the President was not published until the beginning of December 1944, and the Delegate had to go by the Government's radio declaration of April 16, 1944, in which the people at home were invited to establish National Committees and their main functions were outlined. However, neither this proclamation nor the subsequent decree said anything about the manner of elections (if any), nor did it define

⁶³The Constitutional Decree of December 4, 1944, of the President of the Republic, concerning National Committees and the Provisional National Assembly, demanded the establishment of the national committees through elections; the Decree of the Czechoslovak Government, of May 5, 1945, (as amended by the Decree of August 7, 1945) speaks, however, in its art. 1 about the committees which "should be established and in as short as possible time renewed ... through elections". Text in J. Hoffmann, ed., *Nové zákony a nařízení*, vol. VII, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 291 - 311.

how much actual power was given to those (evidently new) organs and how much of it would be held by the central Government, or by the Delegate, as its representative.⁶⁴ Thus, things were left in a rather fluid state. It was hoped that, on the higher level, the political advisers - including the Communists - would always reach some sort of agreement among themselves and with the Delegate and that, on the other hand, on the local level, the population represented by the National Committees would cooperate with the Delegate and accept his authority.

The twenty odd members of the Delegation, including the political advisers, left London for Moscow on August 26, 1944. At the outset, they thought that they would be allowed to proceed to the proximity of the front but it soon transpired that the Soviet Government did not intend to allow them to progress any further than Moscow until at least a piece of Czechoslovak territory was liberated. At the end of August, it looked as if this could be Slovakia: on August 24, a military revolt broke out in Banská Bystrica against the Slovak pro-Hitlerite Government and its German tutors, and it was expected that with the help of the Allies, especially the Russian Army, the rising might be successful and Slovakia, or part of it, liberated. The Czechoslovak Delegation flew to Banská Bystrica on October 7, 1944, yet, for a variety of reasons which cannot be discussed here, the Slovak rising began to lose ground. Meanwhile, the Russian armies continued their progress westward through Poland and Rumania. On October 18, in a special order of the day, Stalin announced that the IVth Ukrainian Army had crossed the Carpathians and occupied

⁶⁴Levit, "Zemské, okresní a místní národní výbory" in J. Hoffmann, ed., *Nové zákony a nařízení*, vol. VII, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 291-293.

several villages in Ruthenia, penetrating "into the territory of Czechoslovakia some 20 - 50 kilometers deep on a front of 275 kilometers in length". During the following week, practically all the rest of Ruthenia was occupied: Mukachevo fell on October 26, and Uzhgorod on the next day.

In view of this situation, the Czechoslovak Government in London decided, "in agreement with President Beneš", that the Delegate and the members of his delegation should leave Slovakia immediately for Ruthenia, because the situation "has arisen as foreseen by the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement concerning the administration of the liberated territory".⁶⁵ Consequently, the delegation flew to Lwow whence it progressed by cars to Turka, the then headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army

There, on October 26th, the first meeting took place between the Delegate and the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army, General I. V. Petrov, as well as his political commissar, L. Z. Mekhlis. In this interview, besides meaningless generalities, only one point of importance was raised. The Delegate asked, for understandable reasons, that the seat of his office shou'd be Uzhgorod. This, however, was declined by the Russians who explained that Uzhgorod was still in the zone of military operations and that, therefore, no Czechoslovak civil or military personnel could be allowed there. The Delegate was then shown a map on which a line of demarcation was drawn, and told that he himself and the members of his delegation could move freely in the territory of Ruthenia east of this line. The line went approximately in the north-south direction through the villages of Volosianky, Keretsky and Vylok; it left the

⁶⁵ Masaryk (Czechoslovak Minister for External Affairs) to Němec, October 20, 1944 (doc. No. 1).

principal Ruthenian towns of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Berehovo under the Russian military rule and gave to the Czechoslovak authorities only the eastern corner with Sevlyush, Kralovo and Hust. The Delegate did not and could not very well insist. The fighting was in fact still going on in the proximity of Uzhgorod and Mukachevo and, on the face of it, there was no reason to expect that, with the front moving further west, the demarcation line would not be shifted in the same direction. But as long as this did not happen, the greater and the most populated part of Ruthenia was excluded from even the slightest control of the Delegate and remained completely in the hands of the Red Army, its political commissars and of those elements whose activity only they were to tolerate: the local Communists.

Another consequence of the delimitation, the importance of which was discovered only later, was the Delegate's assumption that the territory east of the line was being transferred under his full power, or in the words of article 6 of the agreement, that he would enjoy "the full exercise of public authority there". The agreement of May 8, 1944, indeed, mentioned only two kinds of liberated territories: (a) those "in the zone of war operations" where "the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters essential to the conduct of war" would be possessed by the Soviet Commander-in-Chief (article 1); and (b) those parts of the liberated territory "which ceased to be a zone of actual war operations" and where "the Czechoslovak Government will take over the full exercise of public authority" (article 6).

The Delegate thus thought, when shown the line of demarcation on the map, that it divided the two categories of territories as mentioned in the treaty, and concluded logically that the territory in which he was allowed to move freely was under

his full and exclusive jurisdiction. In this estimation he was supported by the official views of the Government, as expressed by Mr. Ripka in his "Exposé" on the agreement to the State Council. According to this statement, the "Czechoslovak state sovereignty will begin to be applied through its own organs from the very first moment that the Soviet forces enter Czechoslovak territory".⁶⁶ The supreme authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, according to the same statement, which would be exercised in the liberated territory "applies only to the sphere of military operations and only in matters connected with the prosecution of the war. In all other matters, a Czechoslovak administration will be responsible from the outset".⁶⁷ This interpretation was even broader than that accepted by the Delegate during his first meeting with the Russians. According to the former, the Delegate would have to be given freedom to enter and organize Czechoslovak administration even in the zone of military operations. But, as will be seen later, neither the Government's nor the Delegate's interpretation of the agreement coincided by far with that of the Russian Commander-in-Chief and his political commissar.

Since Mukachevo and Uzhgorod were excluded as possible seats of his office, the Delegate chose Hust, and the delegation proceeded there from Turka, and arrived at their destination on October 28, 1944. On the same day, the Delegate published, as his first official act, a declaration announcing the establishment of his office, which would be in charge of the state administration in all its departments as long as the seat of the Govern-

⁶⁶Ripka, *East and West*, p. 148 (in his "Exposé on the Subject of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of May 8, 1944, given in the State Council on May 9th, 1944").

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

ment was outside of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. The declaration then enumerated the specific tasks of the Delegation to direct the internal administration in the liberated territory through the national committees (local, district and provincial), to re-establish Czechoslovak armed forces, to ensure effective cooperation between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet high command and, finally, to take the necessary steps towards renewal and maintenance of public order and safety and to ensure that all administration and public life were purged of elements inimical to the nation and to the state.⁶⁸

On the next day, which was Sunday, a public mass-meeting took place in the town square. Several local speakers expressed their gratitude to the Red Army, Soviet Union and Stalin, and their allegiance to the London Government and President Beneš. No less outspoken in this sense was the Ruthenian Communist and political adviser, Mr. Turyanitsa, who besides the customary praises for Russia, very resolutely proclaimed that liberated Ruthenia would be and would remain a part of the Czechoslovak Republic, composed of three equal Slavic nationalities—Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians. His speech in no way differed from an article which he had written a week earlier (October 20) for the Slovak Communist paper in Banská Bystrica, and in which he had advocated a close co-operation of the three nationalities in the new Czechoslovak Republic.⁶⁹ It seemed, thus, that co-operation with the local population would move smoothly and the delegation proceeded immediately with its tasks.

⁶⁸ *Declaration of the Government Delegate concerning the Provisional Administration of the Liberated Territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. October 28, 1944 (doc. No. 2).*

⁶⁹ *The Delegate to the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine. Dec. 2, 1944 (doc. No. 39).*

Basically, they were of triple character: technical and economic reconstruction of the country, its political and administrative reorganization and, finally, the establishment of the Czechoslovak armed forces from the local population. As for the first one, it may be stated briefly that the questions of communications (railways, bridges, highways), reconstruction of buildings, supply of food and other basic consumers' goods, health care, etc., were dealt with by the delegation as quickly and as efficiently as it was possible in a country ravaged by recent fighting and with the limited resources at hand. Yet, however important those problems were at that time, their importance was diminished - both then and in retrospect - by two other remaining issues: creation of the Czechoslovak army and relations between the local national committees and the delegation. In those two questions, the troubles and difficulties started the very next day after the mass-meeting in Hust, on October 29. While the difficulties in the military questions were caused by the Red Army and other Soviet authorities and the troubles with the national committees by the local Communist Party, it was soon evident that, in both cases, the actions were part of one and the same plan.

On October 30, the Delegate signed and had printed a mobilization proclamation stating that all inhabitants of Ruthenia who were members of the former Czechoslovak Army, whether in active service or in reserve, were to present themselves to the local national committees. From these, it was intended to create as quickly as possible new Czechoslovak units, taking into account their ability and previous experience. At the same time a conscription of all other able-bodied men was to be carried out. However, the printer of the mobilization proclamation was first forbidden by

the Soviet military commander of Hust to print it and then, when he did so nevertheless, was arrested by the Russian authorities and released only after the energetic intervention of the Delegate. Shortly after that, the same commander announced to the local printer that all publications of the Delegate or from his office must be presented to the commander for approval.⁷⁰ Czechoslovak officers, who were ordered to take the proclamation to the other towns and villages of Ruthenia under the jurisdiction of the delegation, were in many cases prevented, by the Russian officers or by the police (M.K.V.D.), to post them and, in some cases, even detained and the proclamations seized. On the other hand, the Russians themselves published proclamations asking the local population to enter as volunteers in the Red Army and opened in Hust and in other places draft boards for this purpose.⁷¹ A regular competition soon developed - the Russians would try to bribe the Ruthenians by promising their families flour and meat, by telling them that, in the Red Army, they would serve only in the Ruthenian territory, while with the Czechoslovak Army, they would have to fight in Slovakia and, finally, the Russians were not averse to use force in many cases.

Thus, one day, when coming from a neighbouring village to Hust to enlist in the Czechoslovak Army, a whole group of young Ruthenians was surrounded by Red Army soldiers with tommy-guns and taken to the building where the Russian draft board was quartered. On another occasion a whole group of high-school students was treated in a similar way.

⁷⁰The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Arm (Petrov), Nov. 5, 1944 (doc No. 3). Minutes of the Meeting of the Delegate with the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov), Nov. 5, 1944 (doc No. 4).

⁷¹Ibid.

In view of those facts, on November 5, the Delegate sent to General Petrov a telegram in which he stated the essential facts concerning the ordered censure of his publications by the military commander of Hust, as well as those concerning the drafting of volunteers into the Red Army. He drew the attention of the General to the fact that the Ruthenians were Czechoslovak citizens and as such could enter foreign armed forces only after having procured the consent of the President of the Republic. General Petrov immediately gave way on the first point of the complaint and announced that the military commander of Hust would be informed that the publications issued by the Delegate and his office were excluded from any censure. On the second, however, he refused to make any change. The proclamations, said Petrov, were published on his orders: "there are Russians and Ukrainians living here (in Ruthenia), whom the Red Army does not renounce and the loyal population (Hutsuls) expressed their wish to serve in the Red Army." To the objection of the Delegate that Czechoslovak citizens can serve in foreign armies only after a previous consent of the President of the Republic, General Petrov answered that "the question is only about the Russians and the Ukrainians and that, besides, he had asked Moscow for an opinion in this matter." ⁷²

With this dilatory answer, the discussion on the volunteers was closed on November 5; yet, since the activities of the Red Army continued, it was reopened by the Delegate in another letter to General Petrov, dated November 9, 1944. The Delegate reminded Petrov of his remark concerning consultation with Moscow and asked if any, and possibly what, answer was received meanwhile. He

⁷²

The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov). Nov. 5, 1944 (doc. No. 3); Minutes of the Meeting of the Delegate with the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov). Nov. 5, 1944 (doc. No. 4).

then reiterated rather sharply his legal standpoint, stating that as the Government Delegate he had to "adhere to the Czechoslovak laws and could not assist tacitly in their transgression;" "the Delegate could not"; continued the letter, "accept responsibility for matters which are not in accordance with the said agreement (of May 8, 1944) and with the agreement of December of the previous year". This last referred evidently to article 4 of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of December 12, 1943, which stated that both contracting parties would act according to the principle of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty, as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state. After this, the letter gave some concrete examples of methods used by the officers of the Red Army for gaining recruits among the Ruthenians, and of cases in which the latter were prevented by the former from enlisting in the Czechoslovak Army.⁷³

General Petrov answered on November 14, repeating that the recruiting of volunteers for the Red Army was sanctioned by him and added that he could not understand this new intervention, since during the previous interview on November 5, the Delegate was "satisfied with [Petrov's] answer and the question was settled". The General did not mention in his letter whether or not any decision came from Moscow, nor did he react in any way to the juridical observations of the Delegate's letter.⁷⁴

On the following day, November 15, Petrov confirmed in a personal interview with the Delegate his standpoint, expressed again his surprise that

⁷³The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov), Nov. 9, 1944 (doc. No. 6).

⁷⁴Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) to the Delegate, Nov. 14, 1944 (doc. No. 9).

the matter would be discussed repeatedly and added that he had not received from Moscow any answer to his enquiries and, therefore, the issue was ended as far as he was concerned. The Delegate repeated his former standpoint, stressing that a question of such importance could not be decided on the spot and that, therefore, he had to inform his Government in London, so that it could take up the matter with Moscow.

This had been done already, on November 11, 1944, by a telegram to the London Government, in which the political aspect of the question was mentioned also the Russian drafting of volunteers led the local population to believe that Ruthenia would be annexed to the U.S.S.R. In a second telegram, of November 16, 1944, the Delegate repeated his information and added that he would not intervene any more in this matter.⁷⁵ The Government in London was, however, already informed about the whole problem by the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Moscow, General Pika. On the basis of his telegram of November 11, President Beneš informed, on November 13, Lebedyev about the problem and asked him to support in Moscow any Czechoslovak diplomatic steps which would be made. In his talk with Lebedyev Dr. Beneš stressed that such a policy of the Soviet Government could be used unfavourably for Czechoslovakia and Russia by their antagonists in the west and also by the Poles and even by some Czechs or Slovaks. Lebedyev claimed to know nothing about the matter and promised to look into it; on the next day he came back with a message from Molotov, who asked the Czechoslovak Government not to oppose the drafting of volunteers into the Red Army. Beneš repeated to Lebedyev his opinion about possible difficulties if the whole affair was somehow made

⁷⁵The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger). Nov. 11, 1944 (doc. No. 7), and Nov. 16, 1944 (doc. No. 11).

public, and asked that it be solved without any disagreements and without noise. However, he was very resolute in demanding suppression of any propaganda in the Czechoslovak territory and thought it quite impossible that any proclamations inviting volunteering for the Red Army should be published there. The volunteers who were already drafted need not be released immediately but, in the future, any agitation or proclamations had to be stopped.⁷⁶

President Beneš and his Government, without doubt, were sincerely trying to stop the practice of the Red Army in this question by intervening both in Moscow and in London. On November 29, the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, H. Ripka, informed the Delegate that both Beneš and the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs had asked the Soviet Government repeatedly for a quick and friendly solution of the difficulties arising from the drafting of volunteers into the Red Army. The standpoint of the Czechoslovak Government was given, continued the telegram, by the Czechoslovak laws forbidding such a volunteering without the consent of the President, and also by the agreement of May 8, 1944. Ripka further informed the Delegate that the matter had been taken up with the Department of External Affairs in Moscow, by Mr. Fierlinger, Czechoslovak Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., and that London hoped that the question would be soon settled favourably. Therefore, the Government asked the Delegate to keep up friendly relations with the Soviet Commander and to try to clear all present misunderstandings by patient explanations, making it clear that the Czechoslovak Government was acting in an absolutely loyal manner toward the Soviet Government. In such a way, concluded the telegram, it would be possible to advocate

⁷⁶Czechoslovak Minister of External Affairs (Kasaryk) to the Delegate Nov. 17, 1944 (doc. No 17).

at the same time the Czechoslovak standpoint based on the Czechoslovak laws and on the agreement.

This was actually the last the Delegate ever heard about the question, if any further interventions of the Czechoslovak Government were made in this matter in Moscow or if Moscow ever answered any Czechoslovak note, was never revealed to him. Actually, he did not learn about some of the telegrams, quoted above, until his arrival at Moscow at the beginning of December, when the Czechoslovak Ambassador there gave him a whole batch of copies of telegrams exchanged between Moscow and London.

Here a short digression on the delegation's means of communication with London and Moscow seems to be in order. When the delegation arrived in Ruthenia, it was arranged that communication with the London Government would have to go through Soviet military apparatus to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow and from there to London and vice versa. The Russians had, in this way and since the start, a control over any communications of the delegation with the external world and, as they refused to transmit any coded messages and insisted that all communications through them should be made *en'clair*, this control was complete. At the beginning of November 1944, it was already evident that the contact between Hust and Moscow was not smooth and later, in the second half, the suspicion grew strong that the Russians delivered to and from the Moscow Embassy only some of the telegrams and kept some back. This suspicion became a certainty when, as said, the Delegate was presented in Moscow with copies of telegrams from London which had never reached him in Hust; he was moreover told at the same time that some of his telegrams from Hust reached Moscow with a delay of several weeks. The matter was never investigated and it would be difficult to

⁷⁷ *Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Nov. 29/Dec 1, 1944 (doc. No. 32)*

say, on the present evidence, how much responsibility for this should be ascribed to the intentions of the Russians, how much to their negligence and, finally, what if any role was played by Mr. Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, who was extremely friendly with the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow and who often appeared to care more for the Soviet interests than for those of his own Government.⁷⁸ At the beginning of November, the Czechoslovak Delegate asked the Russians to allow him a direct radio communication with London and repeated this demand on several occasions during the month, but the Russians invariably refused and explained that such a practice would be dangerous if the Germans were in, or would come into, possession of the Czechoslovak cipher.

Thus, during practically the whole of November, the delegation in Hust knew only that the question of the volunteers for the Red Army was being discussed between the two Governments and that no definite agreement had been reached. Between the insistence of the London Government that the Russians must not be antagonized and yet the Czechoslovak laws observed, and the stubborn refusal of General Petrov to yield, only one course remained open to the Delegate: to let the Russians go on with their drafting and wait for a settlement between Moscow and London and, on the other hand, to carry on the Czechoslovak mobilization in Ruthenia which, it is true, was hampered in all possible ways by the local Russian authorities, but never forbidden officially by Petrov. A kind of competition then developed in

⁷⁸In a personal letter from Teheran, November 29, 1944 where he stopped on his way from Moscow to London, Mr. Drtina wrote to the Delegate: "We have just learned that London does not get enough reports from you. Fierlinger told us himself that he had plenty of your reports, so it might be perhaps necessary to ask him to have more of your reports forwarded." Mr. Drtina left Moscow for Teheran on November 26, 1944.

which, of course, the scales were heavily weighed against the Czechoslovak military authorities since not only had the Russians better technical possibilities but whenever they decided to use pressure or force, they could not be resisted in the same manner. Moreover, the activity of the delegation was limited to the territory east of the demarcation line, while the Russians recruited in the whole of Ruthenia, both east and west of the line. Owing to these handicaps, the Czechoslovak delegation was not able to recruit among the Ruthenians more than some 1,500-2,000 men

The issue of the volunteers for the Red Army was, without any doubt, a gross violation of both the letter and spirit of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of December 12, 1943, and of the agreement of May 8, 1944. Moreover, it was not an isolated event which could have been explained away by eagerness of the army commanders or by any regard for the prestige of a great power. Taken together with another and much more vital problem, it appeared in its true perspective: as a part of a well prepared plan, pursued equally with cunning and ruthless force. This other problem was the question whether Ruthenia should remain with the Czechoslovak Republic or if she should join the Soviet Union, that is, become part of the Soviet Ukraine.

As has been seen above, the Communist member of the delegation, Mr. Turyanitsa, expressed at the first public meeting his unreserved opinion that Ruthenia would and should remain an autonomous part of Czechoslovakia. This took place on October 29, but exactly the same day and during the same mass meeting, a small *coup d'état* was engineered, by which the members of the local national committee were exchanged for others who

were to prove themselves extremely pliable to Soviet wishes.

As mentioned before, the Government in London in its radio proclamation of April 16, 1944, had invited the population of Czechoslovakia to create national committees as the basis of a new democratic administration. For obvious reasons, any persons or parties which collaborated with German or Magyar occupation authorities were excluded from participation in the formation and functioning of the committees. In Ruthenia this was the case of all the former German or Hungarian parties and of the autonomist groups of Tencik and Brody, as well as the nationalistic paramilitary organization *Sich*, which were all declared to be collaborationist.⁷⁰ It may be of interest to remember here that, in pre-war Ruthenia, more than a third of the Ruthenian electorate was represented exactly by those parties and their organizations, while about a half of the rest voted Communist.

When the delegation came to Hust, there already existed a local national committee with a "pro-Czechoslovak" tendency and similar committees could be found or were being created in other localities outside Hust. However, shortly before the mass meeting in Hust on October 29, Mr. Turyanitsa and other local members of the Communist Party met in the secretariat of the Party in Hust, where they prepared a list of selected candidates for a new local committee. Later, when opening the mass meeting, the Soviet military commander of Hust, Major Krutskikh, declared that the present committee was composed of self-appointed persons and that a new committee should be elected in the democratic way. Thereafter, the names of the candidates were read and, with each

⁷⁰Cf. the *Instructions on Detaining of Persons*, Nov. 7, 1944 (doc. No. 5).

name, a question put to the meeting if there were any objections. Since no objections were made, the new committee was declared to be elected. The meaning of this manoeuvre began to become clear a few days later. Whereas in the first few days there were no doubts about the pro-Czechoslovak sentiments among the great part of the population, a wave of pro-Russian feeling kept rising, directed precisely by the new national committee in Hust and by committees in other towns and villages, where similar changes in membership after new "elections" took place. In about two weeks, most of the national committees, whether local or district, were either completely pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian (i.e., Communist) or with an overwhelming Communist majority. The new members were both trained Communists of long standing and fresh recruits, some of the latter with unsavoury political pasts, who thus hoped to expiate their previous political blunders. Typical of the second category was, for example, a prominent member of the new Hust national committee, who had collaborated during the war with the Hungarian authorities and was generally believed by the local population to have been their secret police agent.

The Communist penetration in the committees was done under the pretext of clearing them of "undemocratic" elements and of collaborators and was supported and supervised by the local Soviet organs who did not hesitate, in many cases, to arrest those who disagreed with Communist methods or ideas. The final aim of those changes was soon apparent. More and more of the committees either completely refused co-operation with the delegation or were lukewarm and dilatory even in non-political matters, such as repairs and reconstruction of highways, bridges, plants, buildings, etc.

The main interest of the committees seems to have been, during November, to foster a very active propaganda for the incorporation of Ruthenia into the Soviet Ukraine. In this, the fact that Soviet authorities organized drafting into the Red Army was of great importance and help, to a simple Ruthenian peasant, the army represented or even symbolized the state. Neglecting easily the not too clear difference between the Czechoslovak legal mobilization and the Soviet volunteering, he believed that to him belonged the country who had its army. For the more sophisticated, the Soviet attitude was a clear indication of Soviet intentions for the future and it was considered by many that the sooner they joined the band wagon, the better might be their position in times to come. Finally, there were a great many people who were undecided, indifferent and afraid, and especially those who probably - though not Communists - believed that Ruthenia should become part of the Ukraine or of Russia. After all, it was Russia which liberated the country and Russia, in 1944, seemed to have changed for the better to far more educated and experienced men than a Ruthenian peasant, village teacher or small shopkeeper. The Communist Party was able to use all these camp followers and trim with them the hard core of its policy but there is hardly any doubt that this policy would not have been different, even if those trimmings had been lacking.

Beginning with the weekend of November 4, that is, exactly a week after the delegation's arrival to Hust, meetings were arranged in many villages, at which the separation of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia was discussed and Ruthenia's union with the Soviet Ukraine advocated. The organizers, and main upholders of the proposition, were Communists with some non-Communists in their wake; more often

than not the authority of the former at the meetings was bolstered up by the presence of members of the Soviet police (N.K.V.D.). The NKVD officers never hesitated, whenever the situation indicated such step as opportune or necessary, to deliver a speech at the village meeting and to recommend warmly the union of Ruthenia with the Soviet Ukraine. Their speeches usually went along patriotic lines, not forgetting, however, the social element of the picture and sprinkling their admonishments with frequent threats to fascists, collaborationists, traitors of the people and of the nation and, of course, to the enemies of the Soviet Union and of the working masses. In any or all of these categories belonged anybody who would oppose the separatist movement - such, at least, must have been the impression in the minds of those listening to the harangues of the NKVD men. There was a peculiar and noteworthy difference in this respect between them and the regular Soviet army officers - the latter busied themselves exclusively with the drafting of volunteers from the local population and kept out of politics. On occasions, they would profess their indifference or even adhere to the idea that Ruthenia was, and would remain part of Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the respective roles had been allotted in advance.

The second week of November, between Sunday the 5th and Sunday the 12th, was filled up with numerous local, small and often non-public village meetings, as a means of preparing for November 12. On this date public mass meetings took place throughout Ruthenia, on both sides of the demarcation line, and mostly in relatively bigger centers. Again speeches were made advocating the union of Ruthenia with Soviet Ukraine, and resolutions in this respect passed and petitions signed. ⁸⁰

⁸⁰ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Nov. 11, 1944 (doc. No. 7).

Once more, a mixture of nationalism and of social and economic grievances was heard from the proponents of the union. The NKVD officers again added their bit - and the enthusiasm for Russia, the intimidating innuendoes of the speakers and the desire not to be left behind in the rush towards the promised land, did the rest. Needless to say, voting in the meetings was done by acclamation, under the supervision of armed militia men (usually on the speaker's platform and facing the audience) and, finally, the attendance was carefully checked so as to prevent participation of men known for their pro-Czechoslovak sympathies.

Even so, the results were surprising in their quickness. Not all those voting in favour of the union of their country with the Soviet Ukraine were Communists; still fewer had belonged to that party before the war. It would demand a detailed psychological and sociological study to discover the motives behind the behaviour of such men. For example, there was a young, well educated Ruthenian who had been attached to the delegation in a responsible post since its arrival to Ruthenia. He took part in one of the meetings and not only voted for the resolution but also appended his signature to it. On the morning after, realizing what had happened, he wrote a lengthy letter of explanation to the Delegate: during the whole noisy and badly organized meeting he was not able to hear or read the complete resolution and therefore did not know for what he had actually voted and what he had signed. Others were less delicate and obviously considered the situation as self-explanatory. Men who a week or ten days before insisted on coming to see the Delegate any time of the day and proclaimed openly their allegiance to Czechoslovakia, grew suddenly less conspicuous and would come only by night - to report, as they put it. Still later, their professions of loyalty

would be exchanged by silence, their nocturnal visits would stop and finally, when they decided that the Czechoslovak candle was not worth while burning any more, they would appear in the separatist camp. There the strength of their accusations of the delegation and of Czechoslovakia would be in direct relation to the time which they spent vacillating between the two camps. In any case, the whole process was never too long, generally from one to three weeks.

The change during the two weeks was so sudden and the movement so well and so openly organized by the Communist Party (whose members in London sat in the State Council and ostensibly supported the Czechoslovak Government) that, on the surface of it, events could be taken as coming from some agreement reached previously between Moscow and London. Though the Delegate did not think that this was the case, he nevertheless used the formula to better circumvent possible censure by the Russians and asked, through the Moscow Embassy, his Government for information in this sense, that is, whether "the procedure in question had been agreed between the Czechoslovak and the Soviet Governments."⁸¹ The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Fierlinger, answered on November 16, that the information about the separatist movement was forwarded to London and added: "The resolutions mentioned by you have nothing in common with the policy of the Soviet Union well known to you."⁸²

This, in view of further events, slightly Pythian answer, was taken by the Delegate at its face value⁸³ as coming from a very well informed

⁸¹The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Nov 13 1944 (doc. No. 8).

⁸²The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Delegate, Nov. 16, 1944 (doc. No. 12).

⁸³The Delegate considered this answer so important that he communicated its contents, by a circular letter, to all his political advisers and to the heads of sections in his office (see doc. No. 13)

source Therefore, the greater was his surprise when he learned that, for November 26, a general congress of delegations of all district(not local) national committees from Ruthenia had been called to Mukachevo and that the convenor of this congress was Mr. Turyanitsa who, as a political adviser, was a member of the delegation. Indeed, the behaviour of Mr. Turyanitsa was, to say the least, very independent from the beginning After spending a few days in Hust, which he used to establish new Communist-packed national committees in Hust and in the surrounding area, Turyanitsa explained to the Delegate that he wanted to visit his mother living in Mukachevo, where, in due time, he proceeded.⁸⁴ This was the last time the Delegate saw him, yet, in the following days, he had plenty of news about Mr. Turyanitsa organizing meetings, national committees and local organizations of the Communist Party beyond the line. In Mukachevo, he started publication of a newspaper, *Zakarpatska Pravda* (Transcarpathian Truth), in which he consistently advocated the union of Ruthenia with the Soviet Ukraine.

It is true that Turyanitsa was only a political adviser and in no way subordinated to the Delegate; on the other hand, he was officially announced as a member of the delegation and in this respect the Delegate considered himself responsible for him. Therefore, on November 16, he sent a letter to General Petrov, in which he announced that Turyanitsa, without the Delegate's consent, remained on the other side of the line and even developed political activities there. The Delegate at the same time apologized for this transgression of the agreement by a member of the delegation, and asked the General to kindly communicate to Turyanitsa his demand to cease immediately any political

⁸⁴ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Nov. 18, and Nov. 25, 1944 (docs. No. 19 and 27).

activity beyond the line and to return to Hust.⁸⁵ This method of communication was necessary because the delegation had no means of contact with the territory west of the line. The General's answer, which came on November 17, was martially simple and politically and logically unassailable, in view of the fact that it emanated from the supreme authority in the territory. It announced and complained that the Russian authorities had indeed proof about dozens of cases in which members of the staff of the delegation, both civil and military, entered the forbidden zone (i.e., west of the line) and acted there in various matters, even trying to found political parties. Such behaviour on the part of these persons, stressed the General, was contrary to the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement. As for Turyanitsa, the General knew only that he was elected a vice-president of the National Committee in Mukachevo and the Delegate would certainly understand that it would be unpleasant for the General to transmit to Turyanitsa the Delegate's message ordering him back: "because first, I would be giving orders to your political adviser and, second, I would be demanding the departure from Mukachevo of a citizen who was elected, by the local population, to the national committee."⁸⁶

Naturally, this exchange of letters about Turyanitsa were skirmishes on the surface covering the real situation. Both the General and the Delegate knew (and both were sure that the other knew) that Turyanitsa was not a simple citizen of Mukachevo and that the real purpose of his presence in Mukachevo and, indeed, in Ruthenia was to prepare and foster among the population a movement for separation from Czechoslovakia.

⁸⁵The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov), Nov. 16, 1944 (doc. No. 14).

⁸⁶The Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) to the Delegate, Nov. 17, 1944 (doc. No. 17).

This was apparent from his convocation of the congress of district national committees to Mukachevo, that is, into the territory lying outside the reach of the Delegate, and it became quite clear on November 19, when the Communist Party in Ruthenia (or as its official title was, "of Transcarpathian Ukraine") held its first conference in Mukachevo. There it accepted and simultaneously published a resolution asking for the separation of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia and incorporation into the Soviet Ukraine. In the historical part of the resolution, the former Czechoslovak régime was treated not too kindly. The St. Germain treaty of 1919, was termed "an injustice" which ended, in 1938, by "Transcarpathian Ukraine becoming international exchange money and the rulers of Czechoslovakia handing [Ruthenia] over . . . into the Hungarian serfdom". The people of Ruthenia believed in the final victory of the Red Army, continued the resolution, and also that after this victory the historical injustice would be corrected and Transcarpathian Ukraine would be united with the Soviet Ukraine. Thousands of volunteers who entered the Red Army, as well as numerous meetings and demonstrations, have shown the will of the people for this unification: the people of Transcarpathian Ukraine are not a small nationality needing a foreign protection but an organic part of the great Ukrainian nation. And the resolution concluded. "The first conference of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine, fulfilling the will and the national aspirations of its people, demands the rectification of a historical injustice and the unification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine."⁸⁷ After the publication of this resolution, no more proofs

⁸⁷The quotations are from a digest in Czech in which some passages were quoted verbatim

about Turyanitsa's activities were needed and both the moving spirit and the purpose of the convocation of the congress of national committees for November 26, became evident.

In view of these events, the Delegate decided on a twofold course of action: first, a formal announcement and a protest should be made to the Soviet Commander, in spite of the fact that - as the Delegate well knew - all the mentioned manifestations, meetings, resolutions and congresses were planned and realized with the knowledge and probably active support of the Soviet authorities; second, it appeared necessary that the Delegate and some of his political advisers should undertake a trip to Moscow. Only in this way could an unhampered contact with the London Government be re-established and necessary instructions in an extremely delicate situation obtained. Besides, trying to counteract Turyanitsa's plans for November 26, the Delegate convoked at Hust a meeting of district national committees east of the demarcation line, for November 21.⁸⁸ At the same time, he announced to Mekhlis that a conference had been called to Mukachevo without the Delegate's knowledge and asked him if he knew anything about it and if the invitations to the conference were issued with his consent.⁸⁹ The Delegate drew the attention of General Petrov to the proposed conference again on November 18, in another letter, and again stressed that the conference was being organized and invitations issued without his knowledge or consent.⁹⁰

After the publication of the Communist Party's resolution on November 19, the Delegate asked the

⁸⁸*The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis*. Nov. 17, 1944 (doc. No. 16).

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰*The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*. Nov. 18, 1944 (doc. No. 20).

Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to arrange for him a flight to Moscow, necessary for a direct contact with the London Government "in our internal affairs". At the same time, he asked the Soviet Commander for an aeroplane which could fly him to Moscow, when consent would be given to such a trip by the central Soviet authorities.⁹¹

On November 23, the Delegate informed Mekhlis about the activities of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine, especially about its agitation for separation and its resolution of November 19 in this sense, as well as about the prepared conference of the national committees on November 26. He stressed that invitations to this conference were issued to delegates from the territory east of the demarcation line and that these delegates - about 500 in all - received permits from the Soviet military authorities to travel to Mukachevo, that is to the normally forbidden zone, west of the line. Since this zone remained forbidden to the members of the delegation, the Delegate considered this action as discriminatory against the delegation, who were thus prevented from entering into contact with the participants of the congress or with the congress itself. As for the leaflets and posters propagating the separation of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, continued the Delegate, they were evidently printed and distributed with the knowledge of Soviet authorities: Mekhlis himself had admitted some time ago that all printed publications had to pass the Soviet military censure. Such a procedure, concluded the Delegate, appeared to him as contradictory to the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1943.⁹² On the same day (November 23), the Delegate informed Fierlinger in some

⁹¹ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Nov. 30, 1944 (doc. No. 22).

⁹² *The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis*, Nov. 23, 1944 (doc. No. 24).

detail about the separatist campaign and about the conference of the Communist Party and its resolution. He again demanded permission for an immediate flight to Moscow, where he could enter into direct communication with the London Government and obtain its instructions in the completely new situation.⁹³

During the crisis of the last two weeks, the Delegate insisted constantly that Ruthenia formed a part of Czechoslovak territory, that it should remain in that position and that no agitation for its separation was permissible. In this, he was supported by all his political advisers, including the Communist members (excepting, of course, Mr. Turyanitsa), who were no less outspoken in condemning the activities of their sister party of Transcarpathian Ukraine. For this reason, and to support the Delegate in his discussions in Moscow, the Communist political adviser, Mr. Valo, accepted willingly the Delegate's invitation to accompany him to Moscow. That the Czech and Slovak Communists were at that time of no different opinion was markedly shown by a rather sudden trip of another Czech Communist from Moscow to Ruthenia. A Mr. Krosnař, former Communist deputy in the Prague Parliament and member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was dispatched from Moscow to Uzhgorod, to have a talk with the local Communist leaders, above all with Mr. Turyanitsa. Mr. Krosnař was to keep the Ruthenian Communists on what the Czech and Slovak Communists thought to be the correct party line, i.e., to make them stop the agitation for separation from Czechoslovakia and to bring them to co-operation with the Czechoslovak Government, in the present case with its Delegate.

⁹³ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Nov. 23, 1944 (doc. No. 23), and Dec. 1, 1944 (doc. No. 36).

To his great surprise, Mr. Krosnař was fetched from the airfield in Poland where he landed, by the Soviet security police and driven directly to Mr. Turyanitsa. The latter hardly listened to what Mr. Krosnař had to say and then told him, briefly and in a rather supercilious manner, that there could be no question about any changes in the policy of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine and that the whole matter was already settled. After this, the security police whisked Mr. Krosnař quickly to Hust and deposited him, all bewildered, in the care of the Delegate. In other words, it looked as if not only the Delegate and his Communist political advisers on the spot but even the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow were told nothing by their Russian comrades about the planned campaign for the incorporation of Ruthenia into the Soviet Union.

As the crisis thus neared its climax, still another blow came from the storehouse of Russian surprises. On November 17, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow informed the Delegate that, according to the point of view of the Soviet Department of External Affairs (Narkomindyel), the Delegate must present all his demands to the military Soviet, which had to decide all political and economic questions concerning not only the front but also the immediate hinterland, even where the Czechoslovak administration functioned. In all questions which did not belong to his competence, the military Soviet would ask the Supreme Commander for decisions. He, in turn, would decide those questions with the proper authorities. The Delegate communicated this news to General Petrov⁹⁴ and, a few days later (on November 21), had a personal interview with the political commissar, Colonel-General Mekhlis, on the subject.

⁹⁴The Delegate to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov), Nov. 16, 1944 (doc. No. 15).

There the Delegate was unambiguously and for the first time told that the demarcation line did not separate a territory still in the sphere of military operations (to the west) from a completely liberated territory (to the east), which was given to the Delegate for full administration. On the contrary, to the west and to the east, the territory was still a theatre of military operations, the Delegate and the delegation functioned there only as an organ of contact between the local organs and the Soviet command and had, therefore, to obey the orders of the local Soviet military commanders. That went also for the organization of the Czechoslovak Army in the territory. The Delegate repeated the main points of his discussion with Mekhlis, in a telegram to him on November 23, and asked if he could send through the Soviet authorities a message to the conference of the delegates of the national committees in Mukachevo, since there was no possibility of his going there nor of any other means of communication.⁹⁵

In their answer of the following day, both Petrov and Mekhlis explained the situation further if not altogether. Only a small part of Czechoslovakia had been liberated and, therefore, no territory had been transmitted in the sense of article 6 of the agreement of May 8, 1944. "For normal conditions of the Government Delegate's work" said the telegram, "a line of the forbidden zone was constituted, to the east of which began to work the Czechoslovak administration . . . All questions of the internal administration in the territory east from the forbidden zone are settled by the Government Delegate; he issues orders or instructions, convokes conferences, as he sees fit." The Soviet Commander, added the telegram, was interested only in military questions in that

⁹⁵The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis, Nov. 23, 1944 (doc. No. 25).

territory; as for the establishment of the provincial committee and its co-operation with the Delegate, Petrov and Mekhlis refused to have anything to do with them, because those were not military questions but belonged in the sphere of Czechoslovak administration. Therefore, they both refused, in quite uncomplimentary language, to deliver any messages to Mukachevo. They were up to their necks in their own work and it was not appropriate for the Commander to get mixed up in civil matters which did not concern him but the Czechoslovak Delegate only.⁹⁶

Thus, the results of the interview and of the correspondence exchanged were rather dubious from the point of view of the Delegate's position. It was now certain that the territory east of the line was not transferred to his sole authority but still remained under the supreme command of the army; on the other hand, the army authorities refused to accept responsibility for anything which, in their opinion, was not of a military character. The zone to the west still remained forbidden to the delegation, yet even there the army officially considered the civilian matters as not being their concern.

This confusing picture was complicated by two more factors: complaints of the Red Army Commanders that the security measures were not strong enough in the territory under the "jurisdiction" of the Delegate. It was maintained that there were still numerous Magyar soldiers and officers, collaborationists, anti-Soviet elements and spies moving freely around. Also, many local national committees seemed still unreliable to the Russians who complained that there were many fascist elements in the committees. Nor was the Russian

⁹⁶Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate, Nov. 24, 1944 (doc. No. 26).

command content with the behaviour of some Czechoslovak officers attached to the delegation, they were accused of anti-Soviet propaganda and even of such crimes as having tried to persuade the local population not to enter the Red Army as volunteers. All those complaints were voiced in a rather sharp manner in the few days between November 16 and 26, and although the Russians repeatedly spoke about dozens of cases, they were able to produce only a few, some five or six, when asked for concrete proofs. More than half of those were shown later, upon investigation, to be either completely baseless or grossly exaggerated.⁹⁷ There seemed to have been, behind those complaints, an anxiety quite natural with men responsible for security behind the front, yet, as was evident later, many of the charges and especially the unfriendly manner in which they were presented, was also one of the means to soften the delegation into a conduct more fitting the needs of Russian policy.

Another factor which greatly complicated the position of the delegation was the growing lack of co-operation on the part of the national, both local and district, committees. As has been mentioned already, they were infiltrated or packed, step by step, by the Communists. Although many of them were willing to co-operate at the beginning, after November 12, and especially after November 19, (resolution of the Communist Party for separation) their members, whether Communists or non-partisan, became most reluctant, or even openly inimical to the delegation. Their reluctance was not lessened by the fact that, in several cases, members of the

⁹⁷ *Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate, Nov. 23, 1944 (doc. No. 26), and to the Delegate and General Hasal-Nizboraký, Nov. 26, 1944, (doc. No. 29); the Delegate and General Hasal-Nizboraký to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis, Nov. 28, 1944 (doc. No. 30).*

national committees were arrested by the Soviet authorities, usually under the suspicion of anti-Soviet activities.

The crisis reached its peak on November 26, when the conference of the delegates of national committees from the whole of Transcarpathian Ukraine took place in Mukachevo. The 660 delegates accepted unanimously the resolution of the Communist Party of November 19, asking for separation from Czechoslovakia, and demanded incorporation into the U.S.S.R. as a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In their speeches, the delegates pointed out that Ruthenia never lived its own political life and was always subjected to a foreign domination. Besides the praises of the Soviet Union, Red Army and Marshal Stalin and besides the attacks on Magyar domination, the Czechoslovak régime was one of the main objects of criticism. The Czechs, it was said, had treated the local population with disrespect, cared only for their own profits and did not try to better the economic or cultural level of the people. And even now, it was asserted, the Czech reactionaries were trying to re-establish their domination and revert to pre-war conditions, but the people of Ruthenia now had powerful friends and support in the Soviet Union and its victorious Red Army.⁹⁸

The congress at the same time elected a National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine, which was to be considered as the only supreme authority in the whole territory of Ruthenia and, further, a delegation which should be sent to Moscow to discuss, on the spot, the union of Ruthenia with the U.S.S.R.

The Delegate and his office were at first informed of the congress only indirectly, mostly

⁹⁸From digests and excerpts of Mukachevo press reports on the congress, in the files of the delegation. For the manifesto accepted by the congress, see doc. No. 34.

from reports in the *Zakarpatska Pravda* and from the posters on which the resolution of the congress was published and which, in many cases, were posted (probably due to eagerness of the local functionaries) fully twenty-four hours ahead of the congress where the actual decision took place. The Delegate informed the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow about the events of November 26 and asked for instructions from London for his further procedure. He stressed that the recent events radically endangered any co-operation between the delegation and the national committees and also that the lack of instructions from London made his situation very serious.⁹⁹ This information was sent to Moscow on November 28, and on the next day the Delegate had another conference with Petrov and Mekhlis on, among other topics, the questions concerning his jurisdiction east of the line. Also, some of the Russian complaints against members of the delegation were to be discussed. To the surprise of the Delegate, no such cases were brought forward. Both Russian commanders were, after a long time, very friendly and agreed with the Delegate that the previous troubles were caused by the not quite clear delimitation, territorial and juristic, of his powers. This would be remedied, declared Petrov, when the front reached the Vošice-Prešov line in Slovakia, at which time the territory east of the line would be handed over, completely and formally, to the jurisdiction of the Delegate. They again proclaimed that political and civilian matters west of the line were of no interest to them, and General Petrov added that the forbidden line did not bind the Delegate himself nor the Czechoslovak military commander, General Hasal.

In spite of this conciliatory attitude of the

⁹⁹The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (*Fierlinger*), Nov. 28, 1944 (doc. No. 31).

Soviet Commander, the Delegate was not in the least optimistic about the gravity of the situation and about future developments. He informed the Moscow Embassy about this and urged the consent of the Soviet central authorities to his flight to Moscow. At the same time, he informed the Embassy that the local national committees had received instructions from the National Council not to co-operate with the delegation and that, on November 30, the Czechoslovak national flags had been removed throughout Hust.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, the Delegate also instructed on December 1, all his officials and political advisers that any attempts to enter into contact with the national committees should cease for the time being.¹⁰¹ It is also to be noted that up to this time the Delegate had not received from Moscow any answers to his telegrams, particularly to his long telegram of November 23, about the separatist movement, nor did any instructions come as to how the new situation should be faced.

That his worries were not exaggerated was proved when he received a letter from the National Council, announcing that the congress of the national committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine had decided to separate from the Czechoslovak Republic and to elect a National Council as the supreme and only organ of central authority in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. According to this decision, went on the letter, the National Council suggested that the Delegate and all his civilian and military personnel leave the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine within three days. In case the Delegate would not act on this "categorical decision and demand", the Council would be

¹⁰⁰*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Dec. 1, 1944 (doc. No.37); see also *Memorandum of General Hual to the Delegate*, Dec. 2, 1944, (doc. No. 40), and *Memorandum of Colonel Hrabky to the Delegate*, Dec. 3, 1944 (doc. No. 41).

¹⁰¹*Internal Circular of the Delegate*, Dec. 1, 1944 (doc. No. 35).

obliged to "take necessary steps with all resulting consequences" for the Delegate.¹⁰² The Delegate answered the demand of the National Council on the following day (December 2) by a letter in which he refused to take cognizance of its demands to leave Ruthenia. His main and basic argument was that his position was given by the treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia and that the latter had sent him, together with his political advisers, Mr. Turyanitsa among them, to reorganize the country with the help of the national committees. This help, in spite of hopeful beginnings, did not materialize, however. Yet the Delegate could not accept the suggestion of the National Council without acting against the orders of his Government and transgressing the stipulations of the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of May 8, 1944. It would be completely out of the Delegate's jurisdiction to take any views on the decisions of the congress (of November 26) concerning the separation of Ruthenia. "Only the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, in agreement with the Government of the U.S.S.R., can express opinions on this demand." Finally, the Delegate expressed sorrow that for discussions of such important problems a form was chosen which up to now was usually met with in the undemocratic régimes. In his opinion, the Czechoslovak Government had given enough proofs of its willingness to rebuild the Republic on the principle of the equality of the three Slavic nations, each of them master on its own territory. Owing to this development, ended the letter, the Delegate would have to await instructions from his Government, especially since he could not rely on any co-operation of the national committees.¹⁰³

¹⁰²*National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Delegate, Nov. 30, 1944 (doc. No. 34).*

¹⁰³*The Delegate to the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine, Dec. 2, 1944 (doc. No. 39).*

This answer was approved by all the political advisers of the Delegate, including the Communist, Mr. Valo, and delivered by the latter personally to Mr. Turyanitsa. In a personal interview which Valo had with Turyanitsa on this occasion, Turyanitsa threatened that the delegation would be expelled from Ruthenia, in case it refused to leave voluntarily. However, nothing like that happened. Whether the letter of the National Council was an experimental balloon or whether the National Council overstepped its instructions from higher quarters is not known. However, on the following day (December 3), the Delegate was told by both Petrov and Mekhlis that for them the only authority with whom they would discuss any problems, was and would remain the Czechoslovak Delegate, and that it was his business entirely how the relations between him and the local organs were regulated.

The Delegate had meanwhile informed the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow about the latest developments and again asked for his instructions and mentioned his trip to Moscow.¹⁰⁴ No instructions came during the next four days and only on December 5, was he informed by the Embassy that it had not received his telegram of November 23, containing information on the separatist movement in Ruthenia.¹⁰⁵ However, two days later, Petrov and Mekhlis sent a message telling the Delegate that an aeroplane would be put at his disposal on December 8, for his trip to Moscow.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Dec. 1, 1944 (doc. No. 38; cf. also doc No. 36).*

¹⁰⁵See footnote 1 to doc. No. 31.

¹⁰⁶*Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and Colonel General Mekhlis to the Delegate, Dec. 7, 1944 (doc. No. 46).*

On December 5, the National Council published a decree by which all local and district national committees were ordered to sever immediately any connections and relations with the Delegate and his civil or military officials and to obey exclusively and only the orders of, and to be in contact only with, the National Council.¹⁰⁷

Yet, before leaving Ruthenia, the Delegate came once more into contact with the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine. On December 7, a letter from the Council was delivered to him, addressed to President Beneš, in which the Council announced its establishment as the only central organ of authority in the territory of Transcarpathian Ukraine and the decision about the union of Ruthenia with Soviet Ukraine. The Council expressed its hope that the President would not put obstacles to the realization of the "perennial desire of our Ukrainian people" and also the expectation that the President would order, as soon as possible, the Delegate to leave the territory of Ruthenia.¹⁰⁸ The Delegate informed the Council on December 7, that their letter would be forwarded to President Beneš and that he himself could not express any opinions on their resolution. But he still maintained that it remained his function to form a connection between the local authorities on the one side and the Soviet High Command and the Czechoslovak Government on the other, and insisted that a co-operation between the Delegate and the national committees or the National Council was necessary for the support of the military operations. The Delegate therefore asked the National Council for their point of view.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ *Decree of the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine concerning the severance of relations with the Delegate of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dec. 5, 1944 (doc. No. 42).*

¹⁰⁸ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Dec. 7, 1944 (doc. No. 44).*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

However, on the next day he left for Moscow, where the question of the future destiny of Ruthenia was taken up on a higher level and also finally decided.

Moscow

During his trip to Moscow, the Delegate was aware that his position there would not be an easy one. The Czech and Slovak Communist émigrés in Moscow might side, in any possible controversy, with the Russians and the same could be expected - if not in as open a manner - from the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Mr. Fierlinger. However, the Delegate believed that the situation in Ruthenia, although critical, was not yet irreparable. From the behaviour of some Czechoslovak Communists, whether evidenced by the visit of Mr. Krosnař or by the apparently loyal conduct of Mr. Valo, it could be assumed that the separatist campaign, led by Mr. Turyanitsa, was only of local character. The attitude of the Soviet authorities in Ruthenia could also be ascribed to the extraordinary circumstances caused by the war and to the possible insufficient knowledge on their part of the local situation as well as to their overzealousness in carrying out their functions.

If this surmise was correct, the problem could be taken up between the two Governments, the Czechoslovak Government, invoking the treaty of December 1943 and the promise given by the U.S.S.R. to guarantee the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia, could perhaps induce the Soviet Government to withdraw their indirect support of the separ-

atist cause or even refuse to acknowledge, officially and unofficially, its aims. This would clear the situation in Ruthenia at least insofar as the Czechoslovak Government would be able to appeal to the pro-Czechoslovak elements there. Even if the final outcome need not be absolutely favourable to Czechoslovakia, its cause would stand a much better chance than it had until then and under the existing circumstances.

With this appraisal of the situation, the Delegate and Mr. Valo landed on December 11, 1944, at Moscow airfield, from where they were driven by the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in the U.S.S.R., General Pika, to their hotel and then to the Embassy. There, on the same day, an informal meeting took place, in which the Delegate and his political adviser, Mr. Valo, and the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Mr. Fierlinger, participated besides the Czech and Slovak Communists and those members of the Slovak National Council who, after the collapse of the Slovak uprising in the fall of 1944, came to Moscow.

The discussion was started on a rather unfriendly note by Mr. Klement Gottwald, then President of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He began by accusing the Delegate of ordering Red militiamen to be shot dead. After a heated debate, it transpired that Gottwald had in mind the case of one Sergeant Lopojska, and the discussion on this subject was ended only when Valo, whose words his fellow-Communists could not doubt, explained what actually had happened. No militiaman was killed but only wounded, and even that happened between friends during a drunken brawl.¹¹⁰

This explanation eased the initial tension substantially. Mr. Gottwald declared that they all

¹¹⁰For Lopojska's case see doc. No. 29 and 30.

knew the difficulties with which the Delegate and his advisers had to put up in Ruthenia and that they appreciated the work done there. It was difficult for them, he went on, to judge from Moscow the situation in Ruthenia and all they wanted was to hear the truth. They were willing to support the reconstruction of the Republic if its Government continued in the policy of close friendship with the U.S.S.R., begun a year ago; he would, therefore, ask the Delegate for his frank and truthful opinion about the situation in Ruthenia and especially about the strength of the separatist movement. He and his friends, he concluded, were loyal Czechs and Slovaks, but they could not condone any actions of the London Government directed against the Soviet Union.

The Delegate explained in his answer that, in his opinion, the movement had behind it about one-third of the local population; the other third was evidently and unmistakably pro-Czechoslovak, and the remaining third either indifferent or uncommitted but willing to join the winning party. He then outlined briefly the difficulties with which his administration met in Ruthenia, especially the lack of communication with the population west of the demarcation line, and concluded by declaring that it had not been his policy to prevent anybody in Ruthenia from manifesting their political opinions but that, as a Delegate of the Czechoslovak Government, he had to insist, in accordance with the policy of that Government, on the integrity of Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich frontiers which, of course, included Ruthenia. Nobody could expect him, he added, to act differently in his function, and if he could not prevent such a movement, he certainly should not be blamed for not having supported it.

To this Mr. Gottwald remarked that, according

to his information, the movement for union with Russia was much stronger and represented probably the wishes of some 90% of the Ruthenian population; the remaining 10% were fascists, collaborationists and rich people. He and his friends could not accept any solution which would not correspond to the wishes of the people of Ruthenia, nor could they support any steps of the London Government which would weaken or even threaten to weaken the Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance. He was sure, however, that a friendly solution could be found now when the Delegate was in Moscow and could discuss the whole problem with the Soviet authorities. In concluding, Mr. Gottwald assured the Delegate that in those discussions he would have all his and his party's help and support, of course within the limits just outlined. The Delegate answered that he had not come to Moscow to start any diplomatic negotiations; his mandate was only for the administration of the liberated territory and, since Ruthenia was to be considered as an integral part of Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich frontiers, he would overstep his powers if he were to engage in any discussions concerning its constitutional status. The questions of foreign policy were outside of his mandate; his personal opinion, however, was that Russia had guaranteed Czechoslovak pre-Munich frontiers and she could not therefore retract now her previous obligations and declarations and ask for, or even discuss, the cession of Ruthenia. This was certainly the opinion of Dr. Beneš and his Government.

When the Delegate ended his explanations, Mr. Novomeský, the Communist member of the Slovak National Council, who up to this time had not taken part in the discussion, declared that the

Delegate's position was absolutely contrary to the wishes of the London Government and, above all, to those of President Beneš. He then went on, helping his memory from a small pocket book, to tell the Delegate and the others about the interview which he and Mr. Ursiny (member of the Slovak National Council for the Agrarian Party) had with Dr. Beneš during their short visit to London in October 1944. There, among other problems, the question of Ruthenia was discussed. For the Slovaks, the settlement was of great importance because of the Ruthenians living within the Slovak border. According to Mr. Novomeský, Dr. Beneš told him and his Slovak colleagues that this question had been settled during his visit in Moscow in December 1943, when he offered Ruthenia to the U.S.S.R., and Stalin accepted his offer. In the course of his narrative, Mr. Novomeský several times turned towards Mr. Ursiny, demanding his confirmation which, although with some embarrassment, was always given.

The Delegate had no doubt about the veracity of Mr. Novomeský's statement after it was confirmed by Mr. Ursiny. It also seemed to fit in with the last paragraph of the telegram of December 6, 1944, from the London Government: Although refusing to acknowledge for the time being any manifestations for the union of Ruthenia with the Soviet Ukraine (or U.S.S.R.), the London Government at the same time declared itself to be prepared to make a definite agreement about Ruthenia directly with Russia and only in a manner which "would strengthen the permanent Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance".¹¹¹

The Delegate was thus faced with a completely new and unexpected development. While in London and preparing for his trip, he had never been

¹¹¹ Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 6, 1944 (doc. No. 43).

told about the facts disclosed now by Mr. Novomeský, and the possibility of the cession of Ruthenia to the U.S.S.R. was never even hinted at in his discussions with President Beneš and with the members of the Government. At present, when he considered the actual situation in Ruthenia in the light of Mr. Novomeský's information, the problem appeared to him in a different perspective: he saw it no longer as a question of how to keep Ruthenia but how to lose it and, at the same time, save Czechoslovakia's face. As the friendship of Russia had been since 1943 a basic axiom of President Beneš's and his Government's policy, it seemed equally if not more important that the Ruthenian question must not endanger this friendship.

Furthermore, if the Soviets were opposed in a radical way, more complications could be expected, not only in Ruthenia but also in Slovakia. The Red Army was already there and nothing would be easier for the Soviet authorities than to provoke another separatist movement in Slovakia; besides, such a movement was partly under way among the 90,000 or so Ruthenians living in Slovakia along the Ruthenian border.¹¹² It was, however, not apparent from Mr. Novomeský's statement when and how the cession should take place. The deal could have been about some future arrangement after the war, at the peace conference or after a plebiscite. This, again, could be read from the telegram of December 6, 1944, of the London Government.¹¹³ In this direction also went the remarks of Mr. Gottwald and of other Czech and Slovak Communists, after Mr. Novomeský had delivered his statement. They repeated their assurances

¹¹² Among the delegates gathered at the Mukachevo congress on November 26, were some who claimed to represent the Ruthenians of Slovakia. See also docs. No. 77 and 78.

¹¹³ Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Raxa) to the Delegate, Dec. 6, 1944 (doc. No. 43).

of loyalty to the Republic and, while refusing to discuss the question of the cession itself, since it had been agreed upon between Stalin and Beneš and lately confirmed by the wish of the people, they stressed that the final solution could be left to the future and that it was now up to the Delegate and the two Governments to discuss the form of the cession.

The attitude of the Communists seemed to the Delegate to be quite consistent with the disclosed facts and he saw no reason why he should doubt their sincerity. If Mr. Novomeský's statement were true and the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow had learned about the Beneš-Stalin agreement (if not *via* London then *via* Moscow), they could have been hardly expected to oppose it, no matter whether Beneš's offer was spontaneous or elicited by Stalin in some roundabout way. The impression of their frankness and loyalty was strengthened still more by their standpoint on the problem of Slovakia. There they declared themselves absolutely for a unitary state of Czechs and Slovaks, and refused any separatist tendencies, whether they came from the political right or from their own ranks.

It is needless to say how greatly the Delegate was shaken by the disclosure of Mr. Novomeský; the fact that it was not official did not alleviate its effect: rather, on the contrary, it underlined the lack of trust on the part of those who had sent him on his mission. But, as the communication was actually unofficial, the Delegate believed that it was left to President Beneš and the London Government to inform him about it and to instruct him accordingly. He therefore declared that until further orders from the Government and the President, he was still bound by his original instructions which did not mention any such

agreement between Beneš and Stalin. To Mr. Fierlinger's question, he answered that he was willing to discuss with the Russians all actual and concrete problems concerning the administration of Ruthenia, including the relations between the Delegate and the National Council in Mukachevo. In the present state of things, such a discussion was practically unavoidable, but he still maintained that the main reason for his trip to Moscow was and remained the necessity of getting into contact with the Government, of reporting about the situation and of receiving further instructions from London. Moreover, his function was the administration of the liberated Czechoslovak territory and he could not enter into any binding discussions of a diplomatic character concerning questions of foreign policy and relations between the two states.

After the meeting, the Delegate sent his report for the Government and for the President to London. The question whether Ruthenia should belong to Czechoslovakia or to the Soviet Union was accepted there - after Mr. Novomeský's information - as already posed and as a problem which should somehow be liquidated without endangering the existing policy of friendship between the two countries. In this field also some other suggestions were made. In view of the fact that the text of the telegram had to be agreed upon with Mr. Valo, i. e., with the Communists, the separatist movement was described as "spontaneous" without, however, specifying even approximately how many Ruthenians wanted the union with Russia.¹¹⁴

On the same day, the Delegate and his political adviser, Mr. Valo, accompanied by the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Fierlinger, saw Mr. Zorin,

¹¹⁴*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 13, 1944 (doc. No. 50).*

then acting head of the Soviet People's Commissariat for External Affairs. As the Delegate intended, the meeting was of only informative character; Mr. Zorin himself carefully refrained from giving out any information about the possible standpoint of his Government on the problems in Ruthenia, and mainly kept asking questions on various concrete points. Both the Delegate and Mr. Valo explained the situation in Ruthenia, and indicated that, even if they still regarded the separatist movement as an internal affair of Czechoslovakia, the presence of the Red Army and other Russian authorities in Ruthenia, as well as the aim of the movement led by Turyanitsa, forced them to discuss these problems with the Soviet Government and possibly to seek some solution in co-operation with it. Mr. Zorin promised that the matter would be taken into consideration and asked Mr. Fierlinger to come and see him soon; he would then be able to answer at least some of the questions posed during this particular meeting.

Mr. Fierlinger saw Zorin again on December 15, but was unable to get a precise Soviet standpoint. Zorin maintained that the Soviet authorities fulfilled the treaty of May 8, 1944, that it was extremely difficult for the Soviet Government to interfere in Czechoslovak internal matters and that it was not their business how the Czechoslovak Delegate would organize his relations to the national committees. He then asked Fierlinger if he had any suggestions and seemed to accept favourably his proposal that, after the return of the Delegate and Mr. Valo to Ruthenia, a meeting should be arranged between them and Mr. Turyanitsa's National Council, with Mekhlis as a moderator. Any other more radical solution would not be welcome to the Soviet Government at that time. The interview was ended by Mr. Zorin's telling Mr. Fierlinger about yet another incident having taken place in Ruthenia between the Czecho-

slovak military mission and the Red Army authorities ¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, the first more detailed instructions came from London in the form of a personal telegram from President Beneš. In it Dr. Beneš expressed his opinion that the separatist movement was fostered in Ruthenia by the Ukrainian Communists, without any agreement with Moscow and even against its wishes, in an attempt to present Moscow with a *fait accompli*. For the future, Dr. Beneš recommended firmness, consistent adherence to the treaty (of May 8, 1944) and, in case of obstruction by the local Soviet authorities, a passive awaiting of further developments. In no case should force be used by the delegation, since any incident would be taken as a pretext and used against Czechoslovakia, the Delegate should therefore remain at his post as long as possible and in every case of infringement of Czechoslovak rights, a written statement to the Russian authorities should be made, to procure a basis for future negotiations. ¹¹⁶

In his telegram, President Beneš did not mention any previous oral agreement between himself and Stalin, nor was any such agreement mentioned in a telegram from the Government which reached Moscow two days later, on December 15. In this telegram, ¹¹⁷ the Government shared Dr. Beneš's view that the separatist movement in Ruthenia was the work of local Ukrainian elements, who acted without regard to the international needs and rela-

¹¹⁵ *Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 15, 1944 (doc. No. 53).*

¹¹⁶ *President of the Republic to the Delegate, Dec. 13, 1944 (doc. No. 51).*

¹¹⁷ *Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 15, 1944 (doc. No. 52).*

tions of both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The telegram referred to the previous communication of December 6, 1944,¹¹⁸ and confirmed the position taken by the Government therein - that is, among other things, that the question of Ruthenia should be solved between the two Governments in a most friendly way after the war. Yet, it stated also that the Government and the President would remain firm by the standpoint made by the treaty of alliance of 1943 as well as by the agreement of May 8, 1944 - in other words, that they still considered Ruthenia as an integral part of Czechoslovakia. The Government therefore asked the delegation to remain in Ruthenia, even if it meant behaving passively for the time being. The telegram also informed the Delegate that the Communist members - Mr. Nosek and "his friends" - of the State Council in London shared the Government's opinion, and finally, it empowered the Delegate to attempt to settle the question "favourably", together with the Ambassador, Mr. Fierlinger, in their discussions with the Soviet authorities.¹¹⁹

Several days later (on December 19th), the Delegate received also a message from Msgr. Šrámek, the Prime Minister in the Czechoslovak Government, asking him not to leave Moscow until the principal matters would be cleared up with the Soviet authorities.¹²⁰

To the messages and instructions of the President and the Government the Delegate reacted by his telegram of December 18,¹²¹ in which he

¹¹⁸ See above, p. 129, footnote 111.

¹¹⁹ Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 15, 1944 (doc. No. 52).

¹²⁰ Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 15, 1944 (doc. No. 55).

¹²¹ The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dec. 18, 1944 (doc. No. 54).

informed Dr. Beneš that, so far, the delegation had acted according to his instructions. He stressed that, in his view, the greatest danger in Ruthenia lay in the appeals for volunteers for the Red Army. This provoked doubts of the constitutional status of Ruthenia and a well directed propaganda could change the situation completely within a fortnight. In the Delegate's opinion, this consideration was especially important for the future of Slovakia. Disbelieving that Ruthenia could be saved for Czechoslovakia - after what he saw in Ruthenia and what he heard in Moscow - he began to concentrate on the fate of Slovakia. However, the situation there was incomparably more favourable for Czechoslovakia than in Ruthenia. Not only could no claims of ethnical affinity be raised in Slovakia and separatist tendencies in general were looked at in askance as a heritage of the Tiso pro-German régime but, no less important, the Slovak Communists proclaimed their loyalty to the unitary Czechoslovak Republic.

This attitude of the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow was not the last reason why the Delegate considered them as being true to the Czechoslovak cause as represented by the London Government. Nor did he express in his telegram any doubts about the honesty of the Soviet authorities in Moscow. If there was any (perhaps studied) coolness in their attitude, he ascribed it to their considerations in military matters: the Slovak uprising and the battle of the Dukla Pass were costly affairs for the Soviet Union and yet did not bring her any direct gains. Moreover, the Russians seemed to be suspicious of the spirit in which the new Czechoslovak Army was being built and let it be known that they did not think it democratic and friendly enough towards the Soviet Union.¹²²

¹²²*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic*, Dec. 18, 1944 (doc. No. 54). See also docs. No. 57 and No. 58.

In the subsequent days, while the Delegate waited for an already announced interview with Vyshinski and possibly also with Molotov, two more telegrams arrived from London, one from the Government (December 21)¹²³ and one from the President (December 24).¹²⁴ In both of these, the previous standpoint was repeated: the President and the Government insisted on the integrity of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia and on the fulfillment of the treaties and of Soviet declarations in this connection. It would be "a catastrophe" to yield to anybody on the formula of the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia. For this reason, the President would not answer any petitions in this matter. Besides, he had no right to make any promises, "even if it is generally known among us in what manner I personally wish to solve this question after the peace conference".¹²⁵ The Government, for its part, confirmed again that Czechoslovakia would solve the problem of Ruthenia after the war by "direct and friendly negotiations with the Soviet Government, and in such a manner that the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance would be in these negotiations strengthened".¹²⁶

Both telegrams further stressed the necessity of some temporary agreement on Ruthenia and gave as a leading principle of any negotiations the imperative need for maintaining the friendship with the U.S.S.R. This was also important with regard to Slovakia; for the rest and in spite of all difficulties, the delegation was to remain

¹²³ *Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 21, 1944 (doc. No. 56).*

¹²⁴ *President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Dec. 24, 1944 (doc. No. 57).*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate, Dec. 21, 1944 (doc. No. 56).*

on the spot even if it should behave passively, and it was to avoid any clashes with the local Soviet authorities. Finally, the Delegate was asked again to remain in Moscow and, together with Fierlinger, to continue negotiations with the Soviet authorities as they had been started at his first meeting with Zorin and continued by Fierlinger on December 15

The most interesting fact for the Delegate, in these telegrams was what he concluded to be the indirect confirmation of Novomeský's statement about the Beneš-Stalin agreement: the Government and the President were willing to effect the cession but only after the war. The thesis of the continuity demanded that up to the peace conference, the Czechoslovak Republic should be reconstituted in the full extension of her pre-Munich status. It should be needless to repeat that the Delegate was confronted for the first time with any such plans of his Government and of the President, and that he did not belong among those to whom it was generally known how the President "personally" wished to solve the problem - simply because he was never told. In consequence, when this last fact became known to him (as it did during the first meeting with Gottwald, Novomeský, etc.), he felt hurt and twice isolated. On the one hand, he had the Communists and Mr. Fierlinger, who sided with the Kremlin and reported on his every move and word, on the other, there was the Government that had sent him to administer a "liberated" Ruthenia, already earmarked, in his belief, for cession to the U S S R., and without even mentioning to him the possibility of such a transaction in the future. It is no wonder then, that his answer to the President¹²⁷ was rather cold in tone and that, in the matter itself, his suggestions were put

¹²⁷The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dec. 25, 1944 (doc. No. 58).

with a frankness and directness not always met with in diplomatic documents.

The problem of Ruthenia, said he, should not reflect upon the mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R., nor should it provoke any doubts about Czechoslovakia's will to be a loyal ally of the U.S.S.R. If this basic axiom of the Czechoslovak foreign policy was to be consistently maintained, the question of the separation of Ruthenia and its union with Russia must be solved - and the situation was grave enough to call for "a sweeping and courageous solution".

The Delegate believed he could understand why the President insisted that Ruthenia should be kept within the frame of Czechoslovakia until after the war or after the peace conference. He thought, however, that neither the local population, aroused by the patriotic propaganda of the Communist Party, nor this Party itself, nor finally the Soviet authorities, would be willing to wait much longer for the realization of the union. Even if the local elements could be persuaded to postpone the realization of their hopes, the Kremlin would hardly be inclined to keep their hooks out of the troubled waters and wait for Dr. Beneš to promise them something which they already had - or to give it to them, under different and less favourable circumstances, out of the territory of a reconstituted Republic, guaranteed by the other Powers, and after some bargaining across the green conference table. The Russians were now *beati possidentes* in Ruthenia (and soon would be in Slovakia also), and they used their position in Ruthenia to the limit. They also could claim (as they did) the "will of the people" for, however deceitful were the origins and the organization of the separatist movement in Ruthenia,

there was no doubt that it was now backed by a large mass of the population, even by non-Communists. It was highly improbable that the Soviet Government would let a good opportunity slip by without using it.

And, finally, there was the actual and strong pressure of the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow. These men were able to change their opinions with a surprising quickness, matched only by the no less surprising calm which accompanied their mental evolutions. Three or four weeks ago, they still considered Ruthenia as an integral part of Czechoslovakia (such was the position taken by Mr. Valo while in Ruthenia), and even had sent one of their members (Mr. Krosnař) to straighten Mr. Turyanitsa's path. On their first meeting with the Delegate they gave Ruthenia up to Russia, accepting, however, the Czechoslovak thesis that the cession should take place only after the war. Now they knew even better than that. They presented the Delegate with demands even more radical than those of the Kremlin. The Ruthenian problem, they said, should be solved immediately and Czechoslovakia should offer the cession of Ruthenia to the U.S.S.R. without any further delays or negotiations. In their arguments, they pointed to the Beneš-Stalin agreement of 1943, as reported by Mr. Novomeský, and reproached the Delegate because his policy opposed not only the will of the people of Ruthenia but also that of his President and of his Government. As to the manner of the cession, they were even more insistent. It was true that the Soviet authorities had not suggested, so far, any immediate formal cession - but that was exactly what the Czechoslovak Government should offer of its own will, if it wanted to show its loyalty and true friendship to the Soviet Union. This was, they stressed, a

great occasion to show Czechoslovakia as an ally, a test of Czechoslovakia's good will towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Delegate should suggest to the President and the Government that they offer to Russia an immediate cession of Ruthenia.

By all these circumstances and considerations, the Delegate was led to suggest his "courageous solution" - in other words, to recommend that in the given situation, the cession of Ruthenia to the U.S.S.R. should be decided upon and effected as soon as possible. Such a policy, he was sure, would be consistent not only with the past promises but also with the present situation and especially with the principal aims of the President and of the Government: to keep the Russian alliance and friendship, to prevent further internal crises within the state and, last but not least, to draw Czech and Slovak Communists to closer co-operation with the Government, desired by Dr. Beneš and his Government.

In this situation came the interview with Vyshinski on December 26, and with Molotov on the following day. Those who took part in the first meeting were, besides the Delegate, his political adviser Valo and Ambassador Fierlinger, and further the members of the Slovak National Council, Messrs. Ursiny, Novomeský and Vesel; on the second day, another name was added to the above mentioned: Mr. Petrushchak, a Ruthenian member of the State Council in London, who had meanwhile arrived in Moscow.

The interview with Vyshinski was opened by the Ambassador Fierlinger, who characterized the situation in Ruthenia as a "specific one", which should be discussed between the two Governments. ¹²⁸

¹²⁸*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 26, 1944 (doc. No. 59).*

To this Vyshinski replied that his Government adhered to the treaty - obviously the treaty of 1943 as well as the agreement of May 8, 1944 - and did not want to do anything against it. Nevertheless, he thought that neither Czechoslovakia nor the Soviet Union could disregard a strong popular movement such as could be observed in Ruthenia. It was not, he went on, a temporary occurrence or an opportunist movement; on the contrary, it was a national one, based on history, and the Soviet Government could not be expected to hamper or to oppose it. To this the Delegate remarked that there were no attempts from the Czechoslovak side to obstruct the movement and that the delegation had always pursued its concrete tasks and was in general, at any time, prepared for co-operation with the national committees. Ambassador Fierlinger concluded this part of the discussion by stating that the points of view of both Governments were identical. President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government could not accept today any change in the constitutional position of Ruthenia, but the two Governments would agree that the question would be settled in such a way as corresponded to the close and friendly alliance between the two countries, which Czechoslovakia wanted to see strengthened. With this Vyshinski expressed his agreement.

In further discussion, the question of the volunteers in the Red Army in Ruthenia was raised. Here the Delegate expressed his opinion that it was not important whether the able bodied inhabitants of Ruthenia served in the Red Army or in the Czechoslovak Army. To this declaration he was led not only by the actual situation in Ruthenia but mainly by the consideration that in the long run it would be futile to make the question of volunteers one of principle, since it was now evident that sooner or later Ruthenia would be-

come a Soviet territory.

Finally, the Delegate accepted Vyshinski's suggestion that all questions should be solved on the spot with the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, and declared that he was willing to try such a step and that it might succeed, given a benevolent attitude of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. The Delegate explained also that he intended to appoint Petrushchak as his representative at the Transcarpathian National Council. He himself intended to leave Ruthenia as soon as possible for Slovakia. This wish was stressed once more, later in the discussion, by both Valo and the Delegate, as well as by the members of the Slovak National Council. On this occasion, the Delegate insisted also on the necessity of direct radio communication between the delegation and London.

The meeting with Molotov on the next day went along similar lines.¹²⁹ Ambassador Fierlinger again stressed the willingness of the President and of the Czechoslovak Government to solve the problem of Ruthenia after the war, in accordance with the expressed wishes of its population, and added that a temporary solution should be found without affecting the present constitutional position of Ruthenia. To Molotov's question, the Delegate answered that in his opinion the separatist movement in Ruthenia was spontaneous and very strong and that, generally speaking, he had no complaints concerning the local Soviet authorities. If there were any incidents, he always tried to settle them directly on the spot.

In the course of the discussion, Molotov repeated the standpoint of the Soviet Government towards the separatist movement, as it had been

¹²⁹*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 27, 1944 (doc. No. 60).*

formulated the day before by Vyshinski - that is, the Russians could not be expected to "hamper spontaneous manifestations of the will of the people who felt that they belonged ethnically to the great Ukrainian nation".¹³⁰ This was confirmed by Petrushchak who, in answer to Molotov's inquiry about his opinion, stated that no difficulties could exist between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. There was only one difficulty, namely, that the people of Ruthenia wanted to unite with the Soviet Ukraine and, in Mr. Petrushchak's own words, "it was desirable that the Czechoslovak Government remove this obstacle as soon as possible".¹³¹ At the end of the discussion, Molotov declared, in reply to the Delegate's questions, that any recruiting of volunteers for the Red Army in Slovakia did not come into consideration and promised a direct radio communication between the delegation and the London Government.

This ended the official discussion. Before leaving, the Delegate had the opportunity of exchanging a few personal and unofficial remarks with Molotov. The latter mentioned first the difficulties with which the delegation had met in the territory so recently liberated and so devastated by the war, and added that the Soviet central authorities were well aware of some mistakes committed by the local organs, both military and political. Such mistakes, in his opinion, were practically unavoidable and could be explained by the great strain of the war as well as by the zealotry of some people. Molotov was sure that the Czechoslovak Government would understand and believe that the intentions in Moscow were the best. Moreover, he added, the situation was complicated by the strong Ukrainian nationalism - in Ruthenia and in the Soviet Union as well - and the Govern-

¹³⁰ *Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 27, 1944 (doc. No. 60).*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

ment in Moscow was simply not able to prevent every exaggerated expression of such feelings. The meeting thus ended in a rather conciliatory tone, and it seemed that an agreement could be reached between the two Governments. While the Soviets would not yield in the matter itself - that is that Ruthenia should ultimately go to the Soviet Union - they seemed to accept the Czechoslovak proposal that the cession should be effected later, and that they would "respect the wish of the President and of the Government to leave the question open until the moment when the discussions could be resumed".¹³²

Yet the results of the two meetings, with both Vyshinski and Molotov, and the understanding reached seemed not to have satisfied the Czech and Slovak Communists. As before, they reproached the Delegate for being less conciliatory than the President and the Government, pointed again and again to the resolution of the congress of November 26, as expressing the will of the whole population of Ruthenia, and in particular repeated the reasons why Czechoslovakia should cede Ruthenia to Russia immediately. It was not enough, they argued, to promise the cession - that would not even mean yielding to the legitimate wishes of the population. To prove Czechoslovakia's friendship and loyalty to Russia, Dr. Beneš and his Government must offer to her Ruthenia immediately. For Mr. Gottwald and his Party the fact that the Russians did not insist or even ask for such a solution meant only that the Russians were adhering strictly to the spirit of the treaties, in spite of all the difficulties which it might cause them with the Ukrainian elements at home; and more than simple adherence to the letter of a treaty was needed between friends. Since it was evident that

¹³²*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 27, 1944 (doc. No. 60).*

Russia could not and would not ask, it was obviously up to the Czechoslovak Government to offer, and to do so at once.

The discussion on this point started immediately after the Delegate's return from the meeting with Molotov and lasted for several hours. The Delegate, who originally had gone to Moscow to report to his Government and with a conviction that this Government might be able to yet save Ruthenia for Czechoslovakia, was now forced into a different position. He had to fight against the Communists (and partly even against the non-Communist members of the Slovak National Council) for a thesis of which he had learned only three weeks before.

The Delegate realized that the insistence of the Czech and Slovak Communists on the immediate cession of Ruthenia had deeper foundations than it might have seemed on the surface. It was not a simple if rather exaggerated loyalty towards their senior partners in the Kremlin or a suddenly awakened sense of justice for the national aspirations of the Ruthenians. Rather, it became evident during the discussions that it was the Politburo speaking with the voices of Messrs. Gottwald, Kopecký, Novomeský, etc. What the Russians would not (and could not) present officially as their demands in a discussion of a diplomatic character - whether the speaker was Zorin, Vyshinski, or Molotov - could easily reach its destination along the party line. Such a procedure would be even more advantageous for the Russians. First, it would not bear any stamp of officialdom and could always be denied; second, the pressure would be probably more effective if applied by the Czechoslovak Communists from within, if only for the reason that no treaties or promises of non-interference could be used as argument against it. Finally, it would be more pal-

atable internationally, since apparently the initiative would come from the Czechoslovak Government without even a suspicion of any outside pressure. And again, it seemed unthinkable to the Delegate that the Russians would allow any changes in the actual situation in Ruthenia. He considered as erroneous the idea that they would now permit any regular Czechoslovak administration to be established and to function in Ruthenia until the day when the Czechoslovak Government would consent, whether it be after the armistice or after a peace conference.

The Delegate did not have any concrete proof that his surmise about the role of the Czech and Slovak Communists was correct. Yet because their insistence was so strong and they seemed as if they wanted to make this particular problem practically a question of their present and future support of the Government, the Delegate could not avoid this conclusion and saw no other way than to communicate this viewpoint to President Beneš and the London Government. In two telegrams, he tried to explain the situation to London. When reading them, it must be borne in mind that not only was the Delegate under the pressure of the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow, but also that he was aware that the text of all his telegrams was known to the Kremlin before they reached London. He, therefore, was greatly limited in his freedom of expression and had to hope that London would understand his extremely difficult position in this regard.

The first telegram¹³³ suggested that the Czechoslovak Government should announce to the Soviet Union its willingness to cede Ruthenia and ask for an opening of negotiations in this regard.

¹³³*The Delegate and the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs, Dec. 29, 1944 (doc. No. 61).*

This suggestion was motivated by the existence of the separatist movement which "has to be characterized in its present stage as a popular and spontaneous movement",¹³⁴ and which was regarded as such by Soviet Russia. It would be impossible, continued the telegram, to try to establish Czechoslovak administration in Ruthenia. That would mean governing there against the will of the people and against the intentions of the Soviet military organs. The Delegate further warned in his telegram against interpreting the separatist movement as anything else than "a result of the popular and national consciousness in the Carpathian Ukraine as it developed, step by step, after the liberation of the country".¹³⁵ Finally, the Delegate explained that these suggestions resulted from a common discussion which he had held with the members of the Slovak National Council (Ursiny, Novomeský, Veselý), Mr. Petrushchak, Messrs. Gottwald and Kopecký, Ambassador Fierlinger and the political adviser Valo.

In the second telegram,¹³⁶ the Delegate gave in some detail the reasons underlying the suggestions of his previous message. He repeated that the separatist movement in Ruthenia, even if it developed step by step, was now a "popular movement and is being recognized as such today".¹³⁷ This fact determined the relationship of Soviet Russia toward the movement and to try to suppress it would mean, in the Delegate's opinion, the creation of "unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Un-

¹³⁴*The Delegate and the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs. Dec. 29, 1944 (doc. No. 61).*

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Dec. 30, 1944 (doc. No. 62).*

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

ion".¹³⁸ The Delegate was afraid and had reason to believe that any doubts expressed about the spontaneity of the separatist movement would have been followed in Slovakia, on the part of the Russian authorities, by procedures similar to those used in Ruthenia: drafting of volunteers into the Red Army, support of separatist tendencies from above and a practical exclusion of the delegation from exercising any influence on the events. The Delegate then declared openly his awareness of the fact that he had not adhered fully to his instructions and that he was taking all responsibility, politically and personally, for what he did. He also repeated that the previous message was read and agreed with by Gottwald and that it expressed the Delegate's personal opinion.

To anybody who would read the two reports of Fierlinger on the meeting with Vyshinski and Molotov, and then the two reports and suggestions of the Delegate, the apparent discrepancy would seem almost incomprehensible. Yet, as has been attempted to explain, the discrepancy was only on the surface. Officially, there was no connection between the Soviet diplomacy and the Czech and Slovak Communist refugees and party leaders in Moscow; yet in the Delegate's mind there was no doubt that the demands of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were the demands of the Soviet Politburo and hence of the Soviet Union. If Mr. Gottwald threatened to deprive the London Government of the support of his Party, it had to be interpreted as a threat to eventually establish a separate Communist dominated, Czechoslovak Committee in Moscow, patterned on the Polish Lublin Committee. If Mr. Kopecký insisted that Czechoslovakia should offer Ruthenia to the Soviet Union immediate-

¹³⁸The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dec. 29, 1944 (doc. No. 61).

ly and added that it was up to the latter to decide whether or not the present time was opportune for her, it had again to be understood that this was not Mr. Kopecký's personal opinion, but that he simply voiced the wishes of the Kremlin. Those wishes seemed to be unmistakably simple: the Russians wanted Ruthenia right away and wanted the Czechoslovak Government to offer it. If the Russian friendship had to be kept, if the unity of Bohemia and Moravia with Slovakia had to be preserved and if the Communists in Moscow were to be prevented from creating any counter-government there, the wishes of the Kremlin were to be at least taken into account.

The Delegate tried to convey these considerations to London with the limited means he had at his disposal. He could not speak openly in his telegrams but could only hope that his Government would see, through his suggestions and formulations, the real kernel of the problem.

The President and the Government received meanwhile the first two telegrams of December 26 and 27, from Ambassador Fierlinger, concerning the meetings of the Delegate with Vyshinski and Molotov respectively. The first reaction to them came from the President himself on December 31, in a telegram which accepted the understanding reached in the two meetings. The question of Ruthenia "has been postponed for the time being and it was agreed that at the given moment it will be settled in a friendly way without affecting the friendly relations between the two states".¹³⁹ The President supposed that this "point of view agreed upon with Molotov could be rendered more precise between the two Governments",¹⁴⁰ when Dr. Beneš

¹³⁹ *President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Dec. 31, 1944 (doc. No. 63)

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

would be passing through Moscow on his way to Czechoslovakia.¹⁴¹ For the rest, Dr. Beneš recognized that, under the circumstances, the Delegate and the Ambassador had done, in general, everything that could have been done.

Since the Government and the President did not seem to have yet received the two telegrams from the Delegate (of December 29), it was considered necessary to attract the President's attention to them and especially to the fact that as regarded Ruthenia, his negotiations on the occasion of his stay in Moscow could be concerned only "with the definite settlement of the whole Subcarpathian problem".¹⁴²

Yet, as was shown in two subsequent telegrams from the President, one of them addressed to Ambassador Fierlinger and to the Delegate (of January 4, 1945) and the other to the Delegate only (of January 5, 1945), the President did not want either to understand or to accept the full meaning of the Delegate's suggestions. In the first telegram,¹⁴³ Dr. Beneš maintained that he could agree only with the understanding reached on the official platform between the Delegate and Vyshinski and Molotov; he had talked over the question with Chichayev and, since "Moscow understands well our need to have the final solution in Carpathian Ruthenia postponed",¹⁴⁴ he considered the matter as closed for the time being. Besides,

¹⁴¹ As is apparent from the documents (especially Nos. 60, 63 and 65), the Soviet Government suggested at that time that the President and the Government should move, as soon as possible, from London to the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia, or at least near to it, *via* Russia. The suggestion was accepted in principle, although with some qualifications.

¹⁴² *The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Jan. 2, 1945 (doc. No. 64).*

¹⁴³ *President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Jan. 4, 1945 (doc. No. 65).*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

he stressed at the end of his message, "the idea must be *a priori* excluded, that the President of the Republic or the Government and the President could pass some official resolutions that they gave up this or that territory".¹⁴⁵

The second telegram from Dr. Beneš,¹⁴⁶ dated one day later than the previous one and addressed to the Delegate only, contained the President's answer to the suggestions sent by the Delegate on December 29. Dr. Beneš pointed out, first of all, the discrepancies between the solution accepted in the diplomatic negotiations with Zorin, Vyshinski and Molotov on the one hand, and the suggestions which issued from the discussions with the Czech and Slovak Communists on the other. He considered the first solution as a settled matter, because it was confirmed to him by the Soviet chargé d'affaires, Chichaeu; he believed that the Soviet Government understood that neither the President nor the Czechoslovak Government had the right to proceed along the lines suggested by the Delegate.

From the point of view of international politics, the telegram attacked the idea expressed by the Delegate, that it was up to the Soviet Union to decide whether or not an immediate solution of the problem would cause any difficulties. Not only Soviet Russia but Czechoslovakia, too, had the right and the duty to examine this point. There was no doubt, in Dr. Beneš's opinion, that immediate cession would cause international difficulties, and relatively greater ones for Czechoslovakia than for Russia. It would create a precedent for her with respect to the Poles, Hungarians and Germans and it would seriously and negatively

¹⁴⁵*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Jan. 4, 1945 (doc. No. 65).*

¹⁴⁶*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate, Jan. 5, 1945 (doc. No. 66).*

affect Czechoslovakia's international prestige. The world would see, in such a solution, the defeat of Czechoslovakia's policy towards the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia did not intend to make any trouble about Ruthenia but she had to ask Russia, in turn, to not disregard her difficulties. If the treaty of May 8, 1944, could not be fulfilled, Czechoslovakia would remain passive; she would not object to the moving of the delegation to Slovakia nor to the amendment of the treaty, but it would be "a fundamental psychological and diplomatic error" to accept the procedure suggested by the Delegate. There was also the problem of the frontier between Ruthenia and Slovakia and this had to be settled first of all. Therefore, concluded the telegram, the President regarded the question as having been postponed until his arrival in Moscow; up to that time, the delegation should remain passive while in Hust and move as soon as possible to Slovakia.

On the face of it, the reasoning in the telegram was unassailable and its conclusions consistent with the known facts and with the outcome of the discussions with Vyshinski and Molotov, as reported by Fierlinger. However, the Delegate could not but remain apprehensive concerning further developments. The Czech and Slovak Communists kept insisting that something should be done immediately about Ruthenia; the Delegate's answer that the problem was now out of his hands and had to be solved by negotiations between the two Governments failed to satisfy them completely. Only when they were informed by the Delegate (and when the Soviet Government was so informed by Fierlinger) that the President and the Government intended to go to Czechoslovakia *via* Moscow as soon as possible, did they become less insistent, especially when told also that the President

wanted to settle the question there and that the Delegate did not intend to stay in Ruthenia but planned to move immediately to Slovakia.

Today it will probably be pointed out that the Delegate's interpretation of the Russian policy was not faultless, that his fears were exaggerated and his suggestions precipitous. They may have been so. After all, it may be argued, the Russians themselves did not - neither in December 1944 nor later - insist on the immediate transfer of Ruthenia. Evidently, Zorin was speaking the truth when he said that such a transfer would not be considered opportune by the Soviet Government. If that was really so, the Delegate was mistaken when he thought that the Russians actually wanted an immediate transfer of Ruthenia and when he made suggestions in this sense.

However, the insistence of the Czech and Slovak Communists on this point was a fact. It could be perhaps explained by their zealousness or by their desire to make amends for the blunder committed by upholding until November 26, the Czechoslovak line in Ruthenia. But the blunder (if any) was caused by their wrong (possibly because independent) assessment of the party line; it could be scarcely expected that they would have risked such a mistake again. In other words, the Russians knew about and approved the pressure exerted by the Czech and Slovak Communists on the Delegate and through him on the London Government. But why did the Russians allow this pressure to be brought upon the Delegate and upon London, if they themselves, as one could assume today, did not really want immediate transfer of the territory?

The reconciliation of the contradiction seems simple in retrospect than it must have appeared

in 1944. What the Russians needed at that time was a clear recognition of their title to Ruthenia and its undisturbed actual possession. They also needed to get the delegation out of Ruthenia as soon as possible. Further than that they did not want and did not need to go. The settlement which would give them all this (and it was practically everything save the formal transfer) would look much better if the Czech and Slovak Communists were to ask for even more - there would be the feeling that a compromise has been achieved when actually the demands of one side were fulfilled completely. A method reminiscent of the oriental bazaar bargaining, where the shopkeeper asks for twice as much as he expects to get; only here the bargaining was done by the shopkeeper's clerk.

It is not surprising that the Delegate saw things in another, much more alarming light in 1944. After all, the possibility of a split with the Czech and Slovak Communists (who would have been certainly backed by the Soviets) was always there - and no doubt, any veiled threats in this respect and in the circumstances, had to be taken very seriously. If the Delegate partly misinterpreted the situation it was rather because of abundance than because of lack of care for the well-being of his country; more for being overzealous than indifferent.

The Delegate sent one more telegram from Moscow to the President, in which he did not try to change the latter's opinion but did attempt to explain and justify his previous attitude and his suggestions.¹⁴⁷ As for his future conduct, he announced that he would try to come to some agreement with the National Council of Mukachevo, with-

¹⁴⁷*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Jan. 5, 1944 (doc. No. 67).*

out touching upon the question of the state allegiance of Ruthenia. Otherwise, he would ask for the transfer of the delegation to Slovakia - which would mean, of course, leaving Ruthenia to her fate.

This last sentence was no exaggeration. Ruthenia was lost and the Delegate knew it. It was indeed with a feeling of resignation that he was leaving Moscow on January 14.¹⁴⁸ He had come to Moscow some six weeks earlier, prepared to fight for Ruthenia, if necessary, he ended by suggesting that it be given up right away and by antagonizing, through his suggestions, exactly those whose political concepts he was willing to defend. He satisfied neither the Czech and Slovak Communists. They could not forget that he had opposed the Soviet authorities while in Ruthenia and, even worse, that he witnessed and saw through their quick changes of opinion and guessed their obedience to Moscow. He realized that he had made mistakes - different mistakes in the opinion of different people - in Hust, when trying to maintain the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia against the encroachment by the Soviet authorities, when he was expected and later told, to behave passively; and in Moscow, when suggesting to do at once and openly something which he believed was planned to be effected later and confidentially. Thus, the Delegate, who came to Ruthenia and to Moscow to serve his country, its Government and its President, and who believed in the possibility of co-operation with the Communists at home and in the necessity of friendship with Russia abroad, was leaving Moscow disappointed in all three respects.

¹⁴⁸The Delegate was scheduled to leave Moscow shortly after Christmas of 1944 or at the beginning of the new year; however, he had to wait for favourable flying weather until January, 14, 1945.

Epilogue

On the 14th of January, the Delegate and his company¹⁴⁹ left Moscow; on the 16th, they landed in Mukachevo from where they were to proceed by cars to Hust.¹⁵⁰

In Mukachevo, the welcome was not exactly cheerful. A few minutes after the delegation had settled itself in two hotel rooms to wait for further transportation, they received a visit from a lieutenant of the local N.K.V.D. He asked who they were and when the Delegate introduced himself, the lieutenant declared with a great show of energy, that no foreigners - whether ministers or not - had any business in the territory of the Soviet Ukraine and that they would be arrested immediately. After his departure, however, the military commander of the town (a General of the Red Army) and several of his aides came to pay an official visit to the Delegate; when the zealous N.K.V.D. lieutenant reappeared, he was thrown out of the room by a single and furious "out" from the General who apologized for the "stupidity of a meaningless subordinate".

In the evening of the same day, the Delegate

¹⁴⁹ Political adviser Valo, two Ruthenian members of the State Council, Ivan Petrushchak and Dr. Pavel Cibere, and three members of the Slovak National Council, Messrs. Ursiny, Novomeský and Vesel, and several officials of the delegation.

¹⁵⁰ *The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*, Jan. 17, 1945 (doc. No. 72).

proceeded in a Russian jeep towards Hust and was met by General Hasal a few miles beyond Mukachevo. From the General the Delegate learned about another incident which had taken place in Hust three days before. On January 14th, around ten o'clock in the morning, about twenty members of the local militia, armed with rifles, tommy guns and revolvers had begun to occupy buildings in which Czechoslovak military units were quartered; later, shortly after noon, they attempted also to penetrate into the offices of the delegation. In this last endeavour, they were not successful, because of the presence of a Red Army sentry, in the remaining buildings they succeeded, since both the military and civil Czechoslovak authorities had issued strict orders not to use weapons against the militiamen. Several fruitless attempts were made by telephone to reach the Russian liaison officer, Lyashko, or the military commander of Hust, Major Krutskikh. When finally found, the latter kept declaring that the whole incident was an internal affair of the Czechoslovak administration and that unless there was any shooting, he saw no reasons for intervening. The members of the delegation protested very energetically to him and announced their intention of contacting General Petrov, to ask him for protection. In the absence of General Hasal, the commanding officer, Colonel Hrabovský, sent a telegraphed message to Petrov, in which he outlined the situation and demanded protection:¹⁵¹ Petrov replied on the next day (January 15) that necessary orders had been given to Lyashko and Krutskikh, but maintained that the critical situation was caused by provocations on the part of the delegation's officials and by their meddling in the affairs of Hust National Committee.¹⁵² On the same day, around

¹⁵¹ Colonel Hrabovský to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov), Jan. 14, 1945 (doc. No. 69).

¹⁵² Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to Colonel Hrabovský, Jan. 15, 1945 (doc. No. 70).

3 p.m. the militiamen were bidden to leave all the occupied buildings save one and to abstain from further demonstrations. Meanwhile, still on January 14, two members of the delegation were negotiating with Sikura, the President of the District National Committee. He finally handed them, in the form of a letter, the conditions under which the District National Committee would be willing to stop any further actions against the delegation.

The letter¹⁵³ was signed by Mr. Sikura in his capacity of President of the District National Committee in Hust, and demanded the following: (1) the delegation should immediately stop all its activities and refrain from interfering in "our" internal administration"; (2) all military and police units should be disarmed and sent to the front; (3) the frontier guards should be recalled and also disarmed and, finally (4) the delegation should leave "our territory" within one week's time, i.e., not later than the 21st of January. In case the delegation would fulfill these demands completely and at once, the District National Committee was willing to guarantee "to all its members their personal inviolability including their personal property".¹⁵⁴

The acting head of the delegation, Mr. Pollak, answered the letter of the District Committee on the next day (January 15th) by informing the Committee that, beginning with January 16th, all administrative activity of the Delegate's office would be stopped. As for the rest of the demands, the answer informed the District Committee that they could not be fulfilled in the absence of the Delegate and by a simple decision of the delegation but must also be agreed upon with the

¹⁵³*District National Committee in Hust to the Czechoslovak Government Delegation, Jan. 14, 1945 (doc. No. 68).*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*

Russian Commander-in-Chief.¹⁵⁶ With this last point in mind, General Hasal, who returned to Hust on January 15, on the same day asked Colonel Mekhlis for an interview which was granted. But meanwhile the Delegate arrived from Moscow and the discussion of the Hust incident was merged into one of a much broader and basic aspect, namely that of the evacuation of the whole delegation from Hust to Slovakia.

After his experience in Mukachevo and after learning about the new tension in Hust, it seemed to the Delegate that it had become quite imperative that he and his colleagues leave Ruthenia in the shortest possible time. On the day after his arrival in Hust (on January 17th), he therefore asked Petrov and Mekhlis for an interview, which took place in the headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army at Michalovce, on January 18, 1945.

The discussion was started by the Delegate, who gave a brief summary of his visit to Moscow and of the results of his talks there.¹⁵⁶ He mentioned especially that in Moscow he had discussed with Vyshinski and Molotov the present situation and the separatist movement in Ruthenia, the possibility of the President's moving with the Government into the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia and, finally, informed Petrov and Mekhlis that Molotov had agreed to permit the delegation a direct radio communication with London. To this last point, however, Mekhlis declared that they had not yet had any instructions from the Supreme Command and, therefore, could not make any decisions before such instructions came from Moscow.

¹⁵⁶ *Minutes of the Conference at the Headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army, Jan. 18, 1945 (doc. No. 73).*

Further, Mekhlis asked if the Delegate would interfere in the activities of the national committees and received a negative answer. The Delegate repeated that the President and the Czechoslovak Government were informed by him about the situation and received his suggestions but that they had not yet, however, expressed their opinion. But in no case would the Delegate interfere with the activities of the committees. This was accepted by both Petrov and Mekhlis with great satisfaction; to a further question from Mekhlis, the Delegate stated that the problem of Ruthenia would have to be solved in a manner which would not endanger the good relations of Czechoslovakia with the U.S.S.R. Consequently, there remained only the question when the problem should be solved. To this Petrov remarked that the best time would be naturally after the war and provoked thus a rather violent reprimand from Mekhlis. The latter reminded him sharply that this was a political question and that it was not his (Petrov's) business to talk politics, such things were to be decided in and by Moscow.

Finally, the question came up as to where the Delegate would like to move the delegation from Hust and who, if anybody, would be left behind from the delegation or other Czechoslovak organs. The Delegate answered that he intended to leave Petrushchak, who was a Ukrainian and whose presence would not threaten the political tranquility of the country. General Petrov then announced that the move of the delegation and of the members of the Slovak National Council could be effected simultaneously - it was all a question of only a few days.

There the conference ended. The original suggestion, made in Moscow during the negotiations, that some kind of compromise between the delegation and the Uzhgorod National Council or Mr.

Turyanitsa be reached under the auspices of Mekhlis, was not even mentioned. The behaviour of the District National Committee in Hust on the 14th of January - whether spontaneous or staged on some orders from Uzhgorod or even higher up - as well as Mekhlis' open assumption during the conference that the delegation would (and should) leave Ruthenia, prevented the Delegate from even mentioning the possibility of such a compromise.

The next two weeks the Delegate and his advisers and officials spent in relative inactivity, waiting for the time to move from Hust. Meanwhile, however, two more things happened which, besides their historical interest, convinced the Delegate that any attempt on his part to fight against the separation of Ruthenia would have been hopeless.

The first was a letter addressed to President Beneš, dated January 24, 1945, and signed by the members of the Slovak National Council then in Hust, Messrs. Dr. Vavro Šrobár, Jan Ursiny, Laco Novomeský and Dr. Jan Púll. The letter stated that the undersigned members¹⁵⁷ wanted to acquaint the President with their standpoint on the situation in Ruthenia, as it had developed after the Congress of the Delegates of National Committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine on November 26

The letter opened with the thesis that the consequences of the decision of the Congress - that is, its demand for union of Ruthenia with the Soviet Ukraine - could not be regarded as a simple question of frontiers between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. but, above all, as a "natural right of the people of Transcarpathian

¹⁵⁷ Letter of Dr. Vavro Šrobár, Jan Ursiny, Laco Novomeský, and Dr. Jan Púll to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Jan 24, 1945 (doc. No. 74). Novomeský and Púll were Communists, Ursiny former Agrarian and, later a prominent leader of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Šrobár without specific party affiliation but always considered a liberal and non-Communist.

Ukraine, belonging ethnically to the Ukrainian nation, to decide freely to what state organization they want to belong.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, continued the letter, the problem could not be solved in international treaties, since it was a problem of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine and of the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and of Czechoslovakia. The principle of self-determination had been recognized for Ruthenia by Minister Ripka in October 1944, in London, in his speech at a meeting of Transcarpathian Ukrainians. Further, it was the President himself who, in the presence of the Delegates of the Slovak National Council in London, expressed his opinion that "the retention of Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia could not be considered permanent."¹⁵⁹ The letter then recommended that the President should take the decision of November 26, as a basis for immediate negotiations with the Government of the U.S.S.R., aiming at the incorporation of Ruthenia in the Ukrainian S.S.R. The argument that an immediate solution could create a precedent in relation to the rest of the Republic, concluded the letter, had no standing, since the problem of Ruthenia was an historical problem of unification of all Ukrainians; on the other hand, any procrastination could affect the good relations of the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia which, in its turn, could have an unfavourable influence on the stability of the pre-Munich frontiers of Slovakia.

If we leave aside the eagerness of the Slovak Communists to oblige the Kremlin, which did not differ from the zeal manifested by Mr. Turyanitsa or by Messrs. Gottwald or Kopecký, we can easily discover why the letter was written. The Slovaks were afraid that in case of Russia's discontent, the integrity of their own territory with regard

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. See footnote 157, *supra*.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

to Hungary could be threatened and that they could easily lose to Ruthenia, or to the U.S.S.R. for that matter, the territory on the eastern border of Slovakia, inhabited in the majority by Ruthenians. The events of March and April of 1939 when Slovakia had been forced to cede some territory on its eastern frontier to the "autonomous" Ruthenia under Hungarian rule¹⁶⁰ could be easily repeated now, and on an even larger scale. There was no lack of evidence that a separatist movement was being organized among the Ruthenians in the Slovak territory around Prešov and nothing would have been easier for the Soviet authorities than to give it their encouragement and support, in the same way as they had done in Ruthenia.¹⁶¹

On the other hand, one cannot help wondering why the Slovaks stressed so much the natural right of the Ruthenians to ethnical self-determination, and whether or not they realized that this very principle could be appealed to, for example, by the Magyar minority within the Slovak borders. These too could speak about a historical problem of the unification of all Magyars. And even if this right were denied to the Magyars (because they were not Slavs or because they had lost the war), there was no reason why its operation should stop at the Slovak-Ruthenian frontier and why it should not include also the Ruthenians in Slovakia - especially if the problem was one of the unification of *all* Ukrainians. In this respect Dr. Beneš saw much more clearly what danger the idea of self-determination would mean to the pre-Munich integrity of the Republic and to the thesis of its continuity, which claimed its validity more from historical than so-called natural rights.

A few days after the letter from the members of the Slovak National Council, the Delegate

¹⁶⁰ See p. 54, *supra*.

¹⁶¹ See documents No. 77 (*Memorandum concerning the separatist movement among the Ruthenians in Slovakia, Feb. 15, 1945*) and No. 78 (*Letter of the National Ukrainian Council of the Prešov region to the President of the Republic, March 3, 1945*).

received another no less interesting document. As an enclosure of his letter, dated January 26, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Fierlinger, sent him a copy of a message, dated January 23, and addressed by Stalin to President Beneš.¹⁶² Stalin's letter stated in its introduction that, according to information received from Gottwald, the Czechoslovak Government felt uneasy about the situation in Ruthenia and assumed that the Soviet Government intended to solve the problem single-handedly. Such ideas, continued Stalin, would be based on a misunderstanding; the Soviet Government could not and did not prevent the population of Transcarpathian Ukraine from expressing their national will. This was the more understandable, considering that Dr. Beneš himself, while in Moscow, had told Stalin that he was prepared to cede Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. On that occasion, the letter reminded, Stalin had not given his approval to the offer. However, the fact that the Soviet Government did not prevent the Ruthenians from expressing their will cannot be interpreted as if they had decided to transgress the treaty between the two Governments - such an assumption would be an offence to the Soviet Government. The problem of Ruthenia would have to be solved, of course, but this could happen only in agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, either before the end of the war or after it, when the two Governments would think it opportune. Stalin then ended his letter with assurances that the Soviet Government did not want to harm the interests or the prestige of Czechoslovakia but, on the contrary, wanted to extend to her all possible help in her liberation.

The covering letter of Ambassador Fierlinger explained under what circumstances Stalin's

¹⁶²The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger) to the Delegate. Jan. 26, 1945 (doc. No. 75).

message had originated. Evidently, the problem had been discussed by Molotov and Stalin with Gottwald, and it was decided that the conduct of the Soviet authorities in the whole affair had been considered a little harsh by President Beneš, some members of his Government and probably by some other observers. The letter thus had, as its main purpose, the allaying of any possible fears of the President and of the London Government that Russia would do anything single-handedly concerning Ruthenia's constitutional position before the end of the war and thus publicly undermine the Czechoslovak formula with respect to its pre-Munich frontiers. It was, however, also a reminder that the matter itself, i.e., the final cession of Ruthenia after the war, had to be considered as settled - not only because the population desired it but also because President Beneš had promised it in 1943.

Fierlinger's letter contained one more piece of information on Russian policy. "Marshal Stalin desires that our Government should recognize the Polish Government [the Lublin Committee] as soon as possible", Fierlinger stated bluntly, and added that the Czechoslovak claims on Těšín (Teschen) were endangered by any postponement of the recognition. The connection between the Soviet demands for recognition of the Moscow Polish Government on one hand and their hints at the probable loss of Teschen on the other seems to be quite obvious. It would be, however, less easy to claim any similar connection between the Ruthenian question and the Soviet demands in favour of the Polish Government. Still, it was interesting that the two problems were discussed with Fierlinger on one and the same occasion, and that he thought it necessary to inform the Delegate about the Polish problem at all and at that particular opportunity.

The preparations for moving the whole delegation were completed at the end of January 1945, and on February 2nd¹⁶³ the Delegate was able to announce to the Government that he himself and the delegation had moved from Hust to Košice, in Slovakia. In Ruthenia, only Petrushchak and a few minor officials were left, in agreement with the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine. Petrushchak, acting as a plenipotentiary of the Delegate, was to sit in Uzhgorod and to take care mostly of the family allowances of those Ruthenians who had enlisted in the Czechoslovak Army, and of other sundry matters which would possibly require the co-operation of the - now former - Czechoslovak authorities. For all practical purposes, Ruthenia was now completely out of the reach of the Czechoslovak Government and the Delegate's mission there was at an end.

The rest of the story, in which the Delegate did not play any part, may be briefly outlined. On April 3, 1945, the President of the Republic and some of the members of his Government - these latter *in statu demissionis* - arrived at Košice. On the next day, a new Government was nominated by the President, this time with the Communist Party represented in it, as had been agreed in Moscow. The Delegate was not a member of this new Government and since, by the arrival of the President and of the Government on Czechoslovak territory, his function automatically ended, he went back again, as a sergeant, to the Czechoslovak Army.¹⁶⁴ His last official act was to present the new Government with a report on the events in Ruthenia and Moscow for the period of his

¹⁶³The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger), Feb. 2, 1945 (doc. No. 76).

¹⁶⁴Later in Prague, he was appointed Czechoslovak Delegate to the UNRRA mission in Czechoslovakia and in 1947, Czechoslovak Minister to Canada, from which post he resigned after the February, 1948, Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia.

function. In it he told the cabinet in detail and fully about his experiences with the Russian authorities both in Ruthenia and in Moscow, adding copious verbatim quotations from the correspondence between Hust and the Soviet Headquarters, Moscow and London. Certainly, after reading this report, no member (Communist or non-Communist) of this new Government which in May 1945 came from Slovakia to Prague could have complained of lack of information concerning Ruthenia.

Seven weeks after the complete liberation of Czechoslovakia and after the end of the war, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Fierlinger, and six members of his cabinet¹⁶⁵ went to Moscow to discuss various political and economic problems with the Soviet Government. On this occasion, a treaty was signed between the two Governments on June 29, by which "Transcarpathian Ukraine . . . in concurrence with the wishes manifested by [its] population and on the basis of a friendly understanding between the two High Contracting Parties, is being united with . . . Ukraine and enters in the frame of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic".¹⁶⁶ The frontier between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. was to remain, according to the second paragraph of Article 1 of the treaty, the same as it was between Slovakia and Ruthenia on September 29, 1938, with a few minor local changes. The treaty had to be approved by the Czechoslovak National Assembly and by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (Article 2).

¹⁶⁵ Messrs. Dr. Vlado Clementis, Dr. Zdeněk Nejedlý, Dr. Adolf Procházka, Dr. Hubert Ripka, General Ludvík Svoboda and Jan Ursiny.

¹⁶⁶ Art. 1 of the *Treaty between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Transcarpathian Ukraine*, signed on June 29, 1945, in Moscow. The English text of the treaty may be found in the *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. V. pp. 291-292.

Simultaneously, a "Protocol" to the treaty was signed on the same date, containing stipulations concerning the actual delimitation on the spot (article 1), establishment of a "Liquidation Commission" for property claims (article 3), and a right of option for Czechoslovak or Soviet citizenship, given respectively to the Slovaks or Czechs living in Ruthenia, and to Ruthenians living in Czechoslovakia. It was also agreed that the Ruthenians who served in the Czechoslovak Army would have the same right of option for Czechoslovak citizenship as the Czechs and Slovaks. By a Government Decree of August 24, 1945, No. 61 of the Collection of Laws and Decrees, concerning the preparation of option according to the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.; etc., the right to choose Czechoslovak citizenship was given - besides persons of Czech or Slovak origin, living in Ruthenia - also to "military personnel (according to the status of June 29, 1945) of Russian or Ukrainian nationality [i.e., ethnical origin] who took part, in the ranks of the Czechoslovak Army, in the war against Germany for the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and members of their families living in the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine".¹⁶⁷

The treaty was signed in Moscow, for Czechoslovakia by its Prime Minister, Fierlinger, and by Mr. Clementis, State Under-Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, and for the U.S.S.R. by Mr. Molotov. Both Mr. Fierlinger and Mr. Molotov made short speeches on the occasion. In his speech, Mr. Fierlinger expressed his conviction that the treaty "will be unanimously approved by our National Assembly . . . since it expresses

¹⁶⁷ Art. 1, par. 2, of the Decree of the Czechoslovak Government, August 24, 1945, No. 61 of the Collection of Laws and Decrees.

the true sentiments of all Czechs and Slovaks."¹⁶⁸ He further mentioned the favourable development which Ruthenia "temporarily torn away from its fatherland" underwent in the "temporary care" of Czechoslovakia and ended by expressing the hope that the union of Ruthenia with its fatherland would strengthen the tie of friendship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

Molotov, in his speech, went further back in history. According to him, "Transcarpathian Ukraine was separated from its fatherland already in the IXth century, when she was subjected to the oppression of the Hungarian aristocracy and capitalists. . . ."¹⁶⁹ It had been a perennial dream of all Ukrainians, he went on, to join their brothers in the Ukraine and it was not until the Red Army began the liberation of Czechoslovakia that the people of Ruthenia gained the possibility of deciding their own fate. This happened on the 26th of November 1944, at the congress of the delegates of national committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine at Mukachevo, which accepted unanimously the resolution for union with the Soviet Ukraine. The President of Czechoslovakia and its Government welcomed the "unanimous wishes" of the Ruthenian people, the Soviet Government registered thankfully this friendly act, and the treaty became thus a "demonstration of sincere friendship between the Slavic peoples and of brotherly co-operation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia".¹⁷⁰

After his return from Moscow, Mr. Fierlinger, the Prime Minister, in a radio speech on July 2nd, explained to his listeners what he and his colleagues were doing in Moscow and mentioned also that the Government "estimating correctly

¹⁶⁸ Taufer, editor, *Dokumenty sovětsko-československého přátelství*, no. 74-75.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

the opinion of our [i. e., Czech and Slovak] people",¹⁷¹ had signed the treaty concerning the cession of Ruthenia to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, on June 29, 1945, the Czechoslovak Government met in an extraordinary session and unanimously approved the draft of the treaty. The treaty itself was presented in the form of a Constitutional Law to the Provisional Czechoslovak National Assembly, which approved it unanimously on November 22, 1945. The treaty was then ratified by the President and promulgated in the Collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Czechoslovak Republic under No. 2, year 1946.

Thus with all required formalities completed, Ruthenia ceased to be part of Czechoslovakia.

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 66.

Postscript

To set out an array of conclusions at the end of this narrative seems both redundant and premature. The first because, in the authors' opinion, many of the facts recorded speak clearly enough in themselves and to apply abstract formulas would only weaken their message; the second because it would be impossible even to attempt a final judgement from a picture which is not yet complete in all details. However, a few general remarks, a retrospective glance over the ground covered, seem to be in order.

The inevitable question that will be asked is whether Dr. Beneš did or did not offer or promise Ruthenia to the Russians. As has been seen, Stalin has squarely charged him with having done so, and so did the Slovaks (Novomeský) - even though the latter when putting it down in writing have attributed to Dr. Beneš merely a statement that the retention of Ruthenia by Czechoslovakia could not be considered as permanent. Against this there is the strong testimony of Mr. Táborský, Dr. Beneš's war time secretary: to him Dr. Beneš "most emphatically" denied ever having made such an offer to Stalin.¹⁷² The choice between the two extremes may appear easy and obvious.

¹⁷²Táborský, "Beneš and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XIII, p. 173, footnote.

What the Slovaks said and wrote could be attributed to their misinterpretation of one of Dr. Beneš's theorizing discourses, particularly if we remind ourselves by what circumstances the recollection might have been coloured and who the men were: a Communist who considered his first duty to be to Russia rather than to his own country, non-Communists who feared for the future of Slovakia at a time when Ruthenia must have seemed lost to them in any case. Similarly, Stalin's claim could be dismissed as untrue¹⁷³ - one of those big lies so favoured by the authoritarian minds. Such an explanation, however, would take no account of Dr. Beneš's own statements and pronouncements in the matter. It has been seen that already in 1939 he had assured Maiski of his willingness to come to an arrangement with Russia about Ruthenia.¹⁷⁴ Two years later he told Maiski again that Ruthenia could not belong to Poland or Hungary but only to Czechoslovakia or Russia.¹⁷⁵ After two more years (and after his visit to Moscow) he repeated more clearly, this time to a Polish diplomat, that Russia would want to definitely "settle" with Czechoslovakia the question of Ruthenia.¹⁷⁶ Finally, in 1946, in an article in *Foreign Affairs*,¹⁷⁷ Dr. Beneš explained that as far back as 1918 both he and President Masaryk regarded Czechoslovakia as a trustee of Ruthenia and were willing to relinquish this trusteeship when the Ukrainian people became nationally united. This occurred when Eastern Galicia was absorbed into the Soviet

¹⁷³ Táborský, *loc. cit.* It could be noted, however, that Mr. Táborský does not describe Stalin's charge as untrue but merely as 'inaccurate'. He then explains that in the discussions with the Russians Dr. Beneš always maintained that Ruthenia could be only either Czechoslovak or Russian.

¹⁷⁴ See p. 79, *supra*

¹⁷⁵ Táborský, *op. cit.*, p. 165

¹⁷⁶ See p. 79, *supra*

¹⁷⁷ Dr. E. Beneš, "Post-war Czechoslovakia", *Foreign Affairs* vol. 24, 1945-1946, pp. 397-398.

the Soviet Ukraine. This last statement can be perhaps disregarded as a polite rationalization *ex post* because it stands too sharply in contradiction to Dr. Beneš's prewar opinions and utterances in the matter.¹⁷⁸ However, his views on and discussions of the problem during the war cannot be bypassed so easily if only for the reason that they all appear to point in one and the same direction. It would seem that from the very beginning of the war Dr. Beneš was prepared for (and indeed desired) the expansion of Russia westward so that she and Czechoslovakia would become neighbours. The interview between Dr. Beneš and Maiski, when the problem was mentioned for the first time, took place on September 19, 1939, exactly two days after the Soviet armies had entered Eastern Poland. About a year later, the Russian annexation of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia left Ruthenia as the only territory inhabited by people of Ukrainian stock beyond the Russian frontiers. Still a year later, the period of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship was started, culminating in Dr. Beneš's visit to Moscow and in the treaty of the same year. This period was later marked by spectacular successes of the Russian armies on the battlefield and it soon became evident that Europe would hardly revert to its prewar balance and that Russia would be the decisive power, at least in the Balkans and in the Central Europe. Apparently, only Russia could and would help Czechoslovakia against any future possible aggression by Germany. At the same time, the Ruthenians had not manifested, in general, any marked attachment to the rest of the Republic and their strong Ukrainian nationalism shown in 1938-1939, was no favourable omen for the future. In a Czechoslovak Ruthenia, now bordering on the Soviet Union, an irredentist movement could be expected to develop, with radiation to eastern Slovakia.

¹⁷⁸Cf. pp. 28, 29 and 45, *supra*.

The basic idea of these plans was simple and could be easily carried out owing to the fact that the plans were put into operation at a time when the Red Army was in actual possession of Ruthenia. Under Russian supervision and control, an apparently popular, spontaneous and unanimous movement was to be organized; it would culminate in a demand for the separation of Ruthenia with Czechoslovakia and for the union of the province with Russia. It has been seen by what means the Russians had achieved these aims in a relatively short time and guided by two basic rules. First, the necessary steps and measures were camouflaged by hanging on them ostensibly legitimate justification; second, the whole process was undertaken in the greatest possible isolation from the outer world, including the Czechoslovak Government in London and its Delegate himself.

Thus, for example, the establishment of the forbidden zone or the prohibition of direct radio communication between Hust and London were attributed to the demands of the war and of the security in the rear. Even steps like interference with the Czechoslovak mobilization or the appeals for volunteers for the Red Army were explained away in a similar manner. It was naturally difficult or even impossible to counteract most of these measures because of their apparent justification and because there was no sufficient proof of their real aims.

These and other measures simultaneously limited the Delegate's field of action to the minimum and cut him off from both his Government in London and the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow. The Russians, obviously, could not very well object to the Delegate's coming to Ruthenia. But once they had assured themselves of his isolation

and that he could not get out of hand (and with him his Government), they may even have considered his presence in Ruthenia desirable. It fitted the pattern of their ostensible moves and helped to conceal, in the critical period, their real goal from the rest of the world. Barely ten days after the Red Army had crossed the Czechoslovak frontiers into Ruthenia, the Delegate was installed in Hust, complete with his office. If a proof of Russian correctness and sincerity was needed, then there, in the person of the Delegate, was its living exhibit. No one realized, and for a time not even the Delegate himself, that from the Russian point of view this was his only function and that as such he had to be carefully limited in his rights and screened from the contact with the outside world, including his own Government.

Once the objective of the Russian plans had been achieved, that is when the Mukachevo resolution had been passed on November 26, the sailing was fairly plain for the Russians. Dr. Beneš's assurances of future friendly arrangement were no longer needed, since their value was, if not lost, certainly considerably diminished. One could actually consider the Mukachevo "plebiscite" as the Russian answer to Dr. Beneš and to his suggestions about some future agreement. If he had ever hinted at or expected some compensation for Ruthenia, be it only in the form of Russian friendship and goodwill, he was now as much as being told that the Russians could get the province without anybody's help and without binding themselves by any obligations towards anybody. On the contrary, on the face of it the Russians now had as strong and independent claim to Ruthenia as Czechoslovakia and possibly stronger, if the most recent expression of the

will of the people were to be taken for a sort of *lex posterior*.

The change in the situation and in the position of the two partners was quite fundamental. By the decision of the Mukachevo congress the Russians succeeded in putting the problem on an entirely different plane: while previously it had been discussed only as a question pending between the heads or Governments of the two states, now one of the admittedly highest constitutional principles, the will of the inhabitants, had been invoked.

The implications and advantages of the new situation for the Russians were obvious. The new title to Ruthenia which they had thus gained was evidently and as such the best procurable and in itself unassailable. In its merits it superseded the diplomatic negotiations pursued hitherto by Dr. Beneš and pushed them into relative insignificance. The Russians themselves were exonerated from past promises or obligations, since nobody could ask them to disregard the will of the people.

Nor could the Mukachevo resolution be questioned because of the methods by which it was brought about: the Russians would have interpreted such an act as casting aspersions on their friendship and sincerity. Any criticism in this respect could lead to a break with both the Russians and the Czech and Slovak Communists in Moscow, and open the road to a split in the Czechoslovak camp, something which Dr. Beneš wished to avoid at almost any price.

It was no wonder then that after the Mukachevo congress the Russians allowed, without any qualms and apprehensions, the Delegate to come to Mos-

cow and, after some heel-cooling, to open negotiations there. However, they made it quite clear right at the beginning that they considered the matter itself as practically settled. And once the Mukachevo resolution had been accepted as a genuine manifestation of the will of the people, the only remaining decisions to be made could have been only those of the time and manner in which the cession should be effected. Since most of other problems had been settled *via facti* by the Russian authorities in Ruthenia and by its National Council or local committees, the Moscow negotiations finally boiled down to two questions: when and how the Delegate should leave Ruthenia, and when its actual possession by the U.S.S.R. should be sanctioned in a formal treaty between the two states.

In comparison with other achievements of the Soviet policy during the past ten years, it would be certainly an exaggeration to call the Russian handling of the Ruthenian question a master stroke. Yet it was certainly executed with deft quickness, singleness of purpose and careful attention to details. Admittedly, all advantages including freedom of action were on the Russian side; the Czechoslovak President and Government were led up (and for quite a time followed with invincible trust) a path suddenly blocked by a wall which they could neither climb nor remove nor bypass. And needless to add, it was impossible and too late to turn back. Having gone as far as that they could but graciously agree with the Russian suggestions, presented now in no less friendly a fashion than before. The more so, that the Russians, at least on the surface, gave as their unselfish aim their only desire to see satisfied the Ruthenians' right to national self-determination. While Dr. Beneš was talking

about and preparing for some future arrangements concerning the cession of the province, the Russians came up with a *fait accompli* and with an idea which in itself was unimpeachable.

This seems to be typical of Russian methods. It could have been observed already on a smaller scale in their dealings with the Delegate before the actual showdown came. Innocuous and legitimate labels were pasted on actions and measures only to conceal their true character. Finally, a high sounding moral principle had been used for purely material and selfish purposes - increase in power and territory. The trick worked perfectly, especially as it had been performed quickly and under controlled conditions. Before the observers had time to sit back and think about it, the result of the hocus pocus had the force of reality.

There is no doubt that in comparison with the Soviet the Czechoslovak diplomacy was extremely handicapped at the time of the Ruthenian crisis. We may leave aside the difference in the power backing it in each case, we may discount the recklessness and the duplicity of the Soviet and the trustfulness and simple faith of the Czechoslovak statesmen - there still would be so many trumps in the Russian hand that one cannot even begin to enumerate them. President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government were definitely less fortunate in their supply. They might have spent some of them unnecessarily or at wrong time or not at all; but when all is said and done, they need not be criticized too harshly. After all, they were dealing with the Russians regarding an important and substantial problem for the first time.

But a first time comes only once. The interesting thing would be to ascertain whether any and what lessons were drawn by Dr. Beneš and his ministers from their experience with Ruthenia, and if in the affirmative, whether and to what extent have they imparted their knowledge to the rest of the nation.

PART TWO

Translator's note

The documents that follow are a selection from the collection of papers now in possession of František Němec, the former Czechoslovak Delegate for the Liberated Territory. The papers were acquired by him while exercising his function in Ruthenia and were brought subsequently by him to this continent.

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of the documents, principally, of course, because of the above mentioned facts. Besides, some of the papers are originals and many are unmistakably carbon copies of originals. There are no external signs indicating that any of them has been altered or tampered with in any way. Two of them have been already published, coming from an independent source and the texts (barring minor differences due to translation) agree completely.¹⁸²

From the documents printed here, 78 in all, nine are originals, fifteen carbon copies of originals, two printed publications and the rest are copies made from originals. There are also two enclosures, one of which is a printed publication, the other either a carbon copy of the original or a copy made from the original by the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow (see footnote to

¹⁸²In E. Táborský's articles "Benes and the Soviets", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, 1948-1949, and "Benes and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XIII, 1953.

doc. No. 75 - Enclosure). The papers which here are called copies of originals are copies made from the originals on the spot and practically immediately, upon the Delegate's instructions, for his personal archives and mostly under his personal supervision.

Each document printed here has been clearly marked (in the left hand upper corner) to which group it belongs - such as *Original* or *Copy*, etc. Doubtful or ambiguous cases are indicated in footnotes.

The papers in the possession of F. Němec do not represent even an approach to the complete archives of the Czechoslovak Delegation in Ruthenia. There are quite a number of gaps, the two most remarkable of them concerning the economic and financial questions and those of the Czechoslovak military organization and service in Ruthenia. These gaps are explained by the fact that in some aspects of the delegation's business, the Delegate had contented himself with a general political co-ordination and supervision, leaving the actual execution of the policy to experts. The military matters, moreover, insofar as they did not have political character, were outside of his jurisdiction.

Some of the minor gaps, especially those caused by missing individual pieces, can be explained by lack of time or care, forgetfulness or by the hectic circumstances under which the collection came into being. Nor must it be forgotten that it was not intended to provide the Delegate with a complete duplicate of the delegation's files or that, necessarily, yardsticks used for selection in 1944 may differ from those which would be used today.

In a way, these facts have simplified and, to some extent, influenced the selection of the material to be printed. The documents published here represent numerically about a half of all papers concerning Ruthenia found in the collection. When selecting them, a number of papers concerning small administrative or personal details were excluded first, as unimportant or irrelevant. The same was then done with the few stray documents referring to the financial or military matters mentioned above. This group was left out because the documents were very few and far between and because, judging by their contents, they were clearly of peripheral significance and would not throw any light on the problems in question.

When this elimination had been completed, it appeared that practically all the remaining documents would have to be published, bearing as they did upon some aspect of the events in Ruthenia - the jurisdiction of the Delegate, the volunteering in the Red Army, the separatist movement, etc. The documents relating to Moscow negotiations formed a separate group in themselves and there again no special effort in making the selection was needed. With the exception of a few formal messages exchanged around the New Year, all of them had to be considered as important enough to be published.

Finally, some easily distinguishable papers were included simply because they help to pin down dates or places, others, because they throw some light on the background of the problem, although they are not in a direct connection with the events in Ruthenia in the critical period.

Thus there was actually no problem of selection and it can be said that all important papers from the collection concerning Ruthenia are being pub-

lished here in their full extent. In the latter respect only a very few omissions were made and this only in cases of undeniable irrelevancy. The paragraphs left out are marked and their subjects indicated in a footnote.

In fact, the authors felt as sometimes rather leaning in the opposite direction, when they decided to publish lengthy documents of limited interest, such as detailed Russian complaints on various small incidents and no less detailed Czechoslovak replies. But these documents seemed to illustrate well the specific atmosphere in which the delegation had to work.

The documents - sometimes even the originals or the carbon copies - often lack many of the outward markings usually met with in properly filed official correspondence: the numbers, reference numbers, the designation of the subject, the date of reception, place of origin, etc. This is explained by various reasons in various types of documents. Thus, for example, in the correspondence exchanged between the Delegate and the Russian Army Command (and relayed through the field telegraph or telephone) mostly dates and delegation's file numbers only appear. Everything else including the place of origin has been left out. One reason for this is that in the close and everyday contact which existed between the two offices, simple reference to a date was considered sufficient.

We are met with a similar situation when examining the carbon copies of the Moscow telegrams; there, too, we have only dates and Moscow cipher-file numbers and sometimes reference numbers, when included in the text of the telegram. This is understandable if we remember that the Delegate, while in Moscow, received the typed copies of the

telegrams as they came out from the cipher clerk and before they were properly entered in the Embassy files.

No attempt has been made to supply the missing data, if only for the obvious reason that it would have been a hopeless task. The place of origin was, however, added for readers' convenience whenever it could be assumed as obvious, such as Moscow, Hust, London. On the telegrams sent by the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) to the Delegate, no place of origin has been marked. The seat of the headquarters had been shifted several times during the period and, although the successive localities are known, the dates of the change could not be established with any precision.

There were, in general, very few minor interpolations, additions or corrections which seemed necessary. Those were mostly in cases of obvious typist's or translator's errors.

In the latter connection the authors were often faced with difficulties when preparing for publication documents which were originally couched in Russian, but were found in the collection only in their Czech translations. After their careful reading, it was evident that the delegation's translator must have been often pressed with time and not always able to present a satisfactory Czech replica of the Russian original. Sometimes this led only to an awkward style and grammar of the Czech rendition (supposing that the Russian original was better in this respect), but in a few cases it made the Czech text rather confusing. There were also cases, as indicated, where the translator's lapses were obvious; thus, for example, when he translated - more often than not - the Russian word *narodnyi* as *national*

instead of the correct *people's* (e.g., "people's commissar"), most probably under the influence of the homonymous Czech *narodni* meaning *national*. The very few mistakes of this type were corrected in the English version without being indicated; for the rest, however, the text has been translated as it stood and no attempts were made, as a rule, to give it a clearer form, and thus meaning, in English where this was lacking in the Czech version.

This has been, in general, the principle followed throughout when translating the documents, whether the original was in Czech, Russian or Ukrainian, and precision was sought rather than elegance of style. Nor was more than incidental effort made to recreate in English the various styles of various authors: the plodding, dull and often pompous style of Messrs Petrov and Mekhlis, the sometimes nervous and disconcerted manner of the Delegate's letters, or the formally logical way in which Dr. Beneš sought to present his ideas, surrounding them cautiously with numerous qualifying adjectives, adverbs and nouns. Also, it must not be forgotten that a great part of the documents were composed in haste and under stress of conditions unfavourable to literary achievements. The difficulties of capturing the flavour of an original in a translation are well known; nothing like that was attempted here for fear that the precise meaning might be lost in the process.

On the whole, however, and with the mentioned exceptions, the translation of the documents did not present any special difficulties. Here and there, it was found difficult or impossible to render exactly into English a Czech or a Russian term whose subject has no counterpart in the life of the English-speaking world (e.g., "Army Soviet"

or some Russian military denominations). These and similar difficulties were overcome usually by choosing an English expression coming nearest to the Russian or Czech meaning; such instances are easily recognizable and, since they are not numerous, should not cause any difficulties to a reader who has been warned in advance.

The original language of the papers was Czech, Slovak, Russian or Ukrainian. On each document it has been indicated to which of these groups it belongs (in the left hand upper corner). The papers which were originally in Russian or Ukrainian, but are found in the collection only in the Czech translation are marked: "Czech translation from the Russian (Ukrainian)".

List of documents

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Oct. 20	<i>Czechoslovak Minister of External Affairs to the Delegate</i> The Delegate is instructed to proceed to Ruthenia.	1
Oct. 28	<i>Proclamation of the Government Delegate</i> Public announcement by the Delegate that he has taken over the administration in Ruthenia; outline of the Delegate's jurisdiction.	2
Nov. 5	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Complains about the censure of his publications by Soviet organs and about the Soviet campaign for volunteers for the Red Army.	3
Nov. 5	<i>Minutes of the Meeting between the Delegate and the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> The Delegate's complaints of the same day concerning censure of his publications and the drafting of volunteers into the Red Army discussed.	4
Nov. 7	<i>Instructions on Detaining of Persons</i> Categories of persons to be detained enumerated; procedure outlined.	5

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Nov. 9	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i>	6
	Repeats his standpoint on the Soviet campaign for volunteers for the Red Army; asks whether any answer has been received from Moscow	
Nov. 11	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	7
	Asks for establishment of radio communication; informs about public meetings demanding unification of Ruthenia with the USSR.	
Nov 11 /13/	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	8
	Reports on the meetings of previous day where union of Ruthenia with the USSR demanded and corresponding resolutions passed Asks whether this is a course agreed upon with the USSR in advance	
Nov. 14	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army to the Delegate</i>	9
	Considers the question of volunteers for the Red Army as settled on the strength of the interview of November 5.	
Nov 16	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	10
	Repeats his demand for the establishment of radio communication	
Nov 16	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	11
	Reports his intervention in the question of the volunteers for the Red Army and the answer of the C-in-C. of the IVth Ukrainian Army The Delegate will not intervene any more in the matter.	
Nov 16	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the Delegate</i>	12
	Advises that the demands for union of Ruthenia with the USSR have nothing in common with the policy of the USSR.	
Nov. 16	<i>The Delegate's Circular</i>	13
	Informs the political advisers and the heads of sections in his office that the de-	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944	mands for union of Ruthenia with the USSR have nothing in common with the policy of the USSR.	
Nov. 16	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Informs the C. -in-C. about and apologizes for Turyanitsa's activities west of the demarcation line. Asks that message be delivered to Turyanitsa to return to Hust.	14
Nov. 16	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Informs the C. -in-C. about instructions received from the Embassy in Moscow, concerning the contact with the headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army.	15
Nov. 17	<i>The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis</i> Informs about the conference of delegates of national committees being convoked to Mukachevo for Nov. 26, without the Delegate's knowledge.	16
Nov. 17	<i>Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army to the Delegate</i> The C. -in-C. refuses to transmit any messages to Turyanitsa. Enumerates cases where Czechoslovak officials and officers were active west of demarcation line without the consent of Soviet authorities.	17
Nov. 17	<i>Czechoslovak Minister of External Affairs to the Delegate</i> President Beneš discussed the question of volunteers for the Red Army with Lebedyev and informed him about the objections of the Czechoslovak Government. Lebedyev transmitted a message from Molotov asking to not oppose the drafting of volunteers.	18
Nov. 18	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Informs about Turyanitsa's being west of demarcation line. Mentions suggestions for exchange rate for pengö.	19
Nov. 18	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Answers in some detail complaints of the C. -in-C. on the crossing of the demarcation line by Czechoslovak officials and officers.	20

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Nov. 19	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army to the Delegate</i>	21
	<p>Informs the Delegate that his telegram of Nov. 17 to Mekhlis could not be delivered since the latter has left on an official journey.</p>	
Nov. 20	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	22
	<p>Demands that a trip to Moscow be arranged for him.</p>	
Nov. 23	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	23
	<p>Informs in detail about the separatist campaign and the conference of delegates of national committees convoked to Mukachevo for Nov. 26. Asks for the Delegate's trip to Moscow to be arranged.</p>	
Nov. 23	<i>The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis</i>	24
	<p>Informs Mekhlis about the conference convoked to Mukachevo for Nov. 26; explains the Delegate's standpoint.</p>	
Nov. 23	<i>The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis</i>	25
	<p>Repeats main points of the interview of previous day concerning the Delegate's jurisdiction. Asks if the Delegate could send a message to the Mukachevo conference through headquarters.</p>	
Nov. 24	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate</i>	26
	<p>Restate the issues concerning the Delegate's jurisdiction. Refuse to take any messages for the Mukachevo conference.</p>	
Nov. 25	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	27
	<p>Gives detailed information about the activities of political adviser Turyanitsa.</p>	
Nov. 26	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i>	28
	<p>Accepts the C.-in-C.'s correction of the Delegate's interpretation of his jurisdiction. Explains why the Delegate asked for a message to be delivered to the Mukachevo conference.</p>	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Nov. 26	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate and to General Hasal</i>	29
	Enumerate complaints against the behaviour of Czechoslovak soldiers and officials west of the demarcation line; ask for countermeasures.	
Nov. 28	<i>The Delegate and General Hasal to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army and to Colonel-General Mekhlis</i>	30
	Answer in detail the complaints against the behaviour of Czechoslovak soldiers and officials west of the demarcation line.	
Nov. 28	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	31
	Reports about the congress of delegates of national committees in Mukachevo on Nov. 26. A National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine elected; resolution for union with the USSR passed.	
Nov. 29	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate</i>	32
	The Czechoslovak Government is trying to settle with the Soviet Government the question of volunteers for the Red Army; the Cz. Government insist that the volunteers must have the consent of the President of the Republic.	
Dec. 1	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate</i>	33
	(Continuation and end of the preceding telegram.) The Czechoslovak Government think that the Delegate while on friendly terms with Soviet authorities may defend his Government's point of view.	
Nov. 30	<i>The National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Delegate</i>	34
	The Council announces to the Delegate the decision of the congress of the delegates of the national committees in Mukachevo on Nov. 26, to secede from Czechoslovakia; encloses the manifesto accepted by the congress; asks the Delegate and his whole staff to leave Ruthenia within three days.	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Dec. 1	<i>The Delegate's Circular</i>	35
	The Delegate asks heads of sections in his office to discontinue their communications with the national committees.	
Dec. 1	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	36
	The Delegate reminds of his wish to fly to Moscow; the situation is serious.	
Dec. 1	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	37
	Informs that the national committees refused to co-operate with the delegation; Czechoslovak flags removed. Complains of not having received any instructions or answers to his reports.	
Dec. 1	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	38
	Transmits letter of the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine; the Delegate will discuss it with the C.-in-C. of the IVth Ukrainian Army.	
Dec. 2	<i>The Delegate to the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine</i>	39
	The Delegate informs the Council about his position to their demand that he and his staff leave Ruthenia.	
Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by General Hasal to the Delegate</i>	40
	District National Committee in Hust has issued an instruction that Czechoslovak flags should be taken down.	
Dec. 3	<i>Memorandum by Colonel Hrabsky</i>	41
	The Soviet town commander of Hust advised that the order to take down Czechoslovak flags has been issued by the District National Committee of Hust.	
Dec. 5	<i>Decree of the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine</i>	42
	Concerning the severance of relations between the national committees and the Delegate.	
Dec. 6	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	43
	Reviews the present stage of negotiations	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944	between Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments re volunteers for the Red Army and manifestations for the union with the USSR.	
Dec. 7	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Transmits text of letter of the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine to President Beneš, asking the latter to recall the delegation from Ruthenia; the Delegate's answer.	44
Dec. 7	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Repeats the Delegate's demands for flight to Moscow.	45
Dec. 7	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army to the Delegate</i> Announces that the Air Force has been ordered to put a plane at Delegate's disposal.	46
Dec. 7	<i>Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate</i> Informs the Delegate that he may not send telegrams over the Army telegraph to the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine.	47
Dec. 7	<i>The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> The Delegate will arrive at the headquarters on Dec. 8, at 2 p.m.	48
Dec. 7	<i>The District National Committee in Hust to the Delegate</i> Demands an immediate evacuation of all Czechoslovak soldiers and officers from the district of Hust, because of their inimical attitude towards the Red Army.	49
Dec. 13	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs</i> Reports in detail about the developments in Ruthenia before and after the congress in Mukachevo on Nov. 26.	50
Dec. 13	<i>President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate</i> Thinks the separatist movement caused by strong Ukrainian nationalism and not welcome to Moscow. The Delegate should remain at his post and adhere to his rights.	51

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Dec. 15	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	52
	The difficulties in Ruthenia probably caused by local elements; the Soviet Government believed to desire a speedy settlement of the problem. Delegate should stay at his post and attempt to perform his duties.	
Dec. 15	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs</i>	53
	Reports his interview with Zorin; the latter did not yet know the opinion of his Government, but did not think that it would welcome any radical solution at present.	
Dec. 18	<i>The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic</i>	54
	The danger in Ruthenia lies in the appeals for volunteers for the Red Army. Mistrust of the Soviet Government in the Czechoslovak Army. Lack of direct (radio) communication great handicap for the Delegate.	
Dec. 19	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	55
	Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Šrámek, asks the Delegate not to leave Moscow before the issues in question are settled.	
Dec. 21	<i>Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	56
	Czechoslovak Government will insist on the fulfillment of treaties; is, however, prepared to settle the problem of Ruthenia in the most friendly manner after the war.	
Dec. 24	<i>President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	57
	Czechoslovakia insists on the treaties; the President has no right to give promises about Ruthenia. Mistake committed by not clarifying the jurisdiction of Delegate at the very beginning. The Delegate is to remain at his post, even at the price of behaving passively.	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1944		
Dec. 25	<i>The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic</i>	58
	The poor relations between the delegation and Soviet authorities ascribed to doubts on the latter's side about Czechoslovak military and foreign policy. The problem of Ruthenia has been posed and must be solved.	
Dec. 26	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs</i>	59
	Vyshinski told the Ambassador and the Delegate that the separatist movement was not opportunist; Soviet Government cannot oppose it. He agreed that the problem should be settled after the war.	
Dec. 27	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs</i>	60
	Molotov told the Ambassador and the Delegate that the Soviet Government could not oppose the will of the Ruthenian people; did not insist on immediate settlement.	
Dec. 29	<i>The Delegate and the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs</i>	61
	Suggests that Czechoslovakia should open immediately negotiations with the USSR regarding the cession of Ruthenia.	
Dec. 29 /30/	<i>The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic</i>	62
	Gives additional explanations of his suggestion that the problem of Ruthenia should be solved immediately.	
Dec. 31	<i>President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i>	63
	Welcomes the result of interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov; considers the question settled for the time being.	
1945		
Jan. 2	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic</i>	64
	Reminds the President that on the occa-	

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1945	sion of his passing through Moscow the Ruthenian problem will have to be settled finally.	
Jan. 4	<i>President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Discussed with Chichaeu the results of interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov; considers the problem as temporarily settled. Neither the President nor the Government can pass any resolutions giving up territory.	65
Jan. 5	<i>President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate</i> Disagrees with the Delegate's suggestions that negotiations on Ruthenia should be opened immediately; in his opinion the question was temporarily settled in the interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov.	66
Jan. 5	<i>The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic</i> Justifies his suggestions that negotiations with the USSR on the cession of Ruthenia be opened immediately.	67
Jan. 14	<i>The District National Committee in Hust to the Czechoslovak Government delegation</i> Demands that the delegation stop all activities in the district of Hust, disarm all Czechoslovak units there and leave the district within one week.	68
Jan. 14	<i>Colonel Hrabovsky to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Demands protection against the militia of Hust who have begun to occupy the Government delegation's buildings.	69
Jan. 15	<i>The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army and Colonel-General Nekhlis to Colonel Hrabovsky</i> Necessary measures against the illegal actions of the Hust militia have been taken.	70
Jan. 15	<i>The Office of the Czechoslovak Government delegation to the District National Committee in Hust</i> Informs the Committee that the delegation	71

DATE	SUBJECT	NUMBER
1945	will refrain from further activities; other demands of the Committee must be discussed with Soviet authorities and with the Delegate.	
Jan. 17	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Reports landing at the Mukachevo airfield	72
Jan. 18	<i>Minutes of the Conference at the Headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army</i> Arrangements for the delegation's transfer to Slovakia discussed.	73
Jan. 24	<i>Address of Four Members of the Slovak National Council to the President and to the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic</i> Negotiations with the USSR regarding immediate cession of Ruthenia should be started.	74
Jan. 26	<i>Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow to the Delegate</i> Encloses copy of Stalin's letter to President Benes; the latter is reminded of his offer in 1943 to cede Ruthenia, but assured that the cession can be effected after the war.	75
Feb. 2	<i>The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow</i> Announces that the delegation has moved from Hust to Slovakia.	76
Feb. 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum on the Ukrainian Movement in Eastern Slovakia</i> Gives information about the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia and some of its leaders.	77
Mar 3	<i>Address of the Ukrainian National Council of the Prešov Region to the President of the Republic</i> Announces establishment of the Council, asks that its representatives be invited to the forthcoming political talks in Moscow.	78

Documents

No. 1

Original
In Czech

*Czechoslovak Minister of External Affairs
(Masaryk) to the Delegate*

Telegram

London, October 20, 1944.

For Minister Němec:

In agreement with the President, the Government has decided today that you and the members of the delegation should proceed immediately into the liberated territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in consideration of the fact that a situation has arisen as foreseen by the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement concerning the administration of the liberated territory.

I am asking simultaneously the Soviet authorities to make possible the immediate departure of the Government delegation. Applies equally to General Nižborský.¹

MASARYK

¹General Antonín Hasal-Nižborský.

No. 2

Printed publication
Ukrainian and Czech

**PROCLAMATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATE
concerning
THE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE LIBERATED TERRITORY
OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC**

Pursuant to the Constitutional Decree of the President of the Republic concerning the Provisional Administration of the Liberated Territory of the Czechoslovak Republic,

I HEREBY PROCLAIM

that there is established in the liberated territory of the Republic an Office for the Administration of the Liberated Territory with the Government Delegate as its head. This Office has the authority to conduct the internal administration of the state in all its departments so long as the seat of the Government is outside of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

As the Government Delegate I have been given authority especially: (1) to carry out through the national committees - local, district and provincial - the internal administration in the liberated territory, according to the laws and decrees of the Czechoslovak Republic, published before September 30, 1938, further according to the decrees of the President of the Republic and issued by the Czechoslovak Government in exile; (2) according to the Agreement of May 8, 1944, between the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the USSR, (a) to re-establish

the Czechoslovak armed forces, (b) to ensure an effective co-operation between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, and especially to issue proper instructions to the local authorities, on the basis of the needs and wishes of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief; (c) to ensure that public order, peace, safety and public morality should be re-established and preserved in the liberated territory, and to work towards the end that the re-established army, public service, justice, state and other public institutions, establishments, corporations and in general all Czechoslovak public life are purged from elements inimical to the nation and to the state.

There will be separately published regulations concerning the organization of the armed forces, the protection of food supply, employment and health of the population, further regulations in the interest of uninterrupted production, reconstruction and organization of communications, measures concerning the Czechoslovak currency as well as other regulations necessary in the public interest.

Pursuant to article 1 of the Agreement of May 8, 1944, between the Czechoslovak Government and the Government of the USSR concerning the relationship between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, in the parts of the liberated territory which are in *the zone of the military operations*, the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters essential to the conduct of the war belongs to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army.

HUST, OCTOBER 28, 1944.

GOVERNMENT DELEGATE:
FRANTIŠEK NĚMEC

No. 3

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

No. 107.

Hust, November 5, 1944.

My dear General:

In the territory which you have transferred to the administration of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate according to the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of May 8, 1944, concerning the transfer of power to the Czechoslovak Government authorities in the liberated territories of the Czechoslovak Republic, there occurred various events which force me to address this letter to you.

There were the following principal cases.

1) The Soviet Commander of the town¹ announced yesterday to the printing shop where I have all official publications and proclamations printed exclusively that they were to present every printed matter for a preliminary censure.

2) Following the orders of the Soviet town Commander, proclamations inviting Czechoslovak citizens to volunteer for the Red Army were posted in the town of Hust, and supposedly also in its vicinity.

I am taking the liberty of drawing your attention to these two cases and would be obliged to you if I could be informed whether the course taken by the town Commander is based on the instructions of the Red Army headquarters.

Without prejudice to the final decision I wish to declare in advance that I am willing to inform beforehand the front headquarters about all intended measures, especially about official announcements. In such a case I demand, however, that a liaison officer of a rank corresponding to the importance of his function be appointed to my office. I think, however, that the circumstance that, also in my official capacity, my measures should be subjected to the censure of an incidental local military commander, would be at variance with both the letter and the spirit of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

As for the appeals for volunteers in the Red Army, I have to draw your attention to the fact that according to our constitution and our laws, which, in the spirit of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, I have to observe, the permission to join a foreign army can be given exclusively by the President of the Republic, as Supreme Commander of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

I would be very much obliged if you could inform me whether the posting of the proclamation has been done under instructions from the front headquarters. In case this question cannot be settled by the front headquarters, I would ask you to make possible a direct communication with our Embassy in Moscow so that I could inform through them the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow and my Government in London.

I am very sorry that I have to inconvenience you and take up your time in these grave moments with the aforementioned problems. But I am sure that only by accurately stating and clarifying each possibly doubtful matter will we strengthen and confirm the friendly co-operation of the two

states, the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, as it found expression in the treaty of mutual co-operation and in the agreement on the administration of the liberated territory. I think, my dear General, that in this connection the best service would be rendered by your detailed instructions to the local Soviet military commanders, as you had kindly promised.

The lack of clarity in today's position creates a situation in which our work is hampered and very often it is impossible to carry out important tasks, such as the mobilization of our armed forces, ensuring the internal security and the reconstruction of public administration, tasks the fulfillment of which is important from not only the point of view of our internal needs but also that of military actions of the Red Army.

Yours, etc ,

NĚMEC

i. e., Hust.

No. 4

Original
In Czech

Minutes of the Interview between Minister F. NĚmec, the Czechoslovak Government Delegate, and Army General Petrov, the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army, on November 5, 1944, in Mukachevo

PRESENT: Czechoslovak Government Delegate,
F. NĚMEC

Division General HASAL-NIŽBORSKÝ,
Commander of the Liberated Territory
Army General PETROV, Commander of
the IVth Ukrainian Army

Colonel-General MEKHLIS, member of the Army Soviet of the IVth Ukrainian Army.

The discussion was opened at 8.30 p.m. (Central European time) in Mukachevo, in the quarters of the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army. The object of the interview was the Czechoslovak Government Delegate's letter sent to the Army Commander on November 5, which concerned the censure of the publications and instructions of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate's office by the Soviet town Commander, and the appointment of a liaison organ with the Czechoslovak Government Delegate's office, of a rank corresponding to this function.

1) The Czechoslovak Government Delegate first thanked the Army Commander, General Petrov, for all the help which he is rendering to the Czechoslovak Government delegation and for everything he has done for us up to the present.

2) The Army Commander then opened the discussion of the letter of November 5, 1944, from the Czechoslovak Government Delegate. He first mentioned that it was necessary in war-time and, therefore, especially in the field, to take various measures essential to a successful conduct of the war and by which the security of the operations is assured from all sides. Such measures include the supervision and censure of the means of communication (post, telegraph, telephone, radio, etc.) and also the censure of the press and of public civil administration, both in the Soviet territory proper as well as in the territory occupied by the Red Army. The Soviet town Commanders, like other organs of the Red Army, have detailed instructions in this matter for the carrying out of which they are responsible. It is therefore a matter of course for the town

commander of Hust to demand that the local printing shop present to his censure anything they printed.

The instruction, however, cannot and must not in any case be extended to the office of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate and to the measures enacted by this office. The Soviet town Commander has therefore no right to demand the presentation for preliminary censure of printed materials sent by the office of the Government Delegate to the local printing shop to be printed there. The Soviet town Commander will be properly instructed on this point by the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief at the same time expressed a wish that the office of the Government Delegate send to the Headquarters for its information all printed matters (proclamations, decrees, etc.) published by them, as is being already done.

3) As for the proclamations on the volunteering for the Red Army, which were signed by the town Commanders, the Commander-in-Chief informed us that they were posted on his orders. He mentioned that there are Russians and Ukrainians living here, whom the Red Army does not renounce, and the local population (Hutsuls) have expressed their wish to serve in the Red Army. Anyway, the Soviet authorities had made it possible for the Ukrainians and for the Czechs of Volynhia, Soviet citizens, to join the Czechoslovak national units in the USSR, and thus there will perhaps be no obstacles now for the local population joining the Red Army as volunteers, and he supposes it would be one favour repaid by another.

To our objection that according to the Czechoslovak laws a Czechoslovak citizen can enter foreign military service only after the previous consent of the President of the Republic, the

Commander answered that the question was only about the Russians and Ukrainians and that besides, he had asked Moscow for an opinion in the matter.

4) As for the liaison organ demanded by the Czechoslovak Government Delegate, the Commander-in-Chief declared such a measure to be unnecessary. Those are our internal matters which belong under the jurisdiction of the Government Delegate.

5) Colonel-General Mekhlis drew attention to some events occurring outside of the zone already transferred to the administration of the Government Delegate. Thus, two Czechoslovak officers, provided with documents from General Svoboda, were preparing the mobilization in Svalyava and Velike Berezno, although these districts are still in the zone of operations. The presence of any officials who are not members of the Red Army in this zone cannot be tolerated. To this the Czechoslovak Government Delegate replied that the officers in question will be recalled, although they were not sent by the office of the Government Delegate.

6) 2

7) 3

8) 4

9) As for the connection with Moscow (telegraph) and the telephone connection with the Headquarters, the Government Delegate thanked the Commander-in-Chief for having kindly established this connection. The Commander remarked that there was also a possibility of a direct connection with the headquarters of the First Czechoslovak Corps.

10)⁵

11) Colonel-General Mekhlis informed us that the former deputy and Minister of the Ukrainian Government⁶ has been wounded, and is now in hospital under arrest. As for Fencik, he is being followed and will be arrested soon.

The whole discussion was conducted in a very friendly spirit. Before the end of the interview the Czechoslovak Government Delegate thanked the Commander-in-Chief once more for everything he has kindly done for us.

The interview ended at 10.30 p.m. of Central European time.

General Hasal Nižborský acted as interpreter during the discussion when a translation into Russian was necessary.

(Sgd.) HASAL-NIŽBORSKÝ

¹ See doc. No. 3.

² Not reproduced. Concerned re-opening of local railway lines.

³ Not reproduced. Concerned help of Red Army in removing minefields east of the demarcation line.

⁴ Not reproduced. Concerned reconstruction of highways.

⁵ Not reproduced. Concerned transportation of Czechoslovak Army draftees.

⁶ The name of the person has been omitted in the original.

No. 5

Printed publication
In Ukrainian and Czech

INSTRUCTIONS ON DETAINING OF PERSONS

CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC

Office of the Government Delegate

No. 140/1944

Hust, November 7, 1944.

Concerns: Instructions
on detaining of persons

To all District and Local National Committees:

Persons who, after September 29, 1938, have manifested opinions inimical to the state, or have in any [other]² way committed offences against their co-citizens and have lent assistance to the occupants, *are to be arrested and delivered to the jail of the proper district court.* The detention will be carried out by the National Committees and by the security organs.

This measure concerns mainly those who took part in the governments and in the conduct of the public administration after September 29, 1938, informers, [and also]² members of the Fascist organizations such as "Nyilaskereszt" (organizations of the Arrow Cross), "Fajvédő" (Association for the Protection of the Magyar Race), "Keleti Arcvonal Bajtársi Szövetség" (Association of the Fighters in the East), holders of "nemzetvédelmi kereszt" (Cross for Special Merits), further all leaders and organizers of "Volksbund der Deutschen", "Levente", "Sich", Kurtyak-Brody Party, Fencik [Party]¹, members of the SS, SA, Gestapo, and further all those who ordered or took part

in the abduction and bodily harm of people [and torture]¹; and finally [all]² those who ordered or actively took part in, the aryanization and sequestration and sale of properties of Czechoslovak citizens, insofar as this was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Czechoslovak legal order.²

The detentions should be carried out immediately; however, in the next meeting of the Presidium of the Local National Committee, a decision should be passed whether the person in question is to be kept in custody. On any such decision a report should be drawn, signed by the President and by at least two members of the Presidium. A copy of the report should be sent to the proper district court within three days after the arrest has taken place.

Government Delegate:
Minister FRANTIŠEK LEMEC

¹Thus in the Ukrainian text of the instruction.

²The Ukrainian text has '... to the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic'

No. 6

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrou)*

Telegram

Lust, November 9, 1944

My dear General.

I am very sorry to be taking up your time with this letter but I am forced to do so by the development of the situation in the Carpathian Ukraine.

The principal issue is the drafting of volunteers for the Red Army which is now being under-

taken in the whole liberated territory of Czechoslovakia in a manner not always corresponding to the spirit of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty and which makes us entertain doubts whether the presence of the Czechoslovak delegation is not superfluous in the territory transferred to its administration. During our last interview you yourself mentioned, my dear General, that you have made inquiries in Moscow regarding the voluntary drafting of our citizens into the Red Army. I would be very much obliged to you, if you could inform me, as far as service regulations will permit, how your inquiry was answered. As I have already informed you, according to the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of May 8 of the present year, and as the Delegate of the Czechoslovak Government, I have to adhere to the Czechoslovak laws and could not assist tacitly in their transgression. This is not only my right but also my duty. I could not accept responsibility for matters which are not in accordance with the said agreement and with the agreement of December of the previous year.

Some of the events which I mentioned at the beginning of my letter I will give you in more detail. According to reports or facts in our possession, the propaganda for volunteering for the Red Army is being conducted among the local population by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Red Army. There are various slogans being used, for example: "If you join the Red Army you will stay in the Carpathian Ukraine, if you join the Czechoslovak Army, you will have to go to Slovakia."

There were cases in which Czechoslovak citizens, reserve soldiers, were detained when called to their military service in the Czechoslovak Army. Thus, for example, on November 7, of the current

year, a captain of the Red Army detained 13 men on their way to Hust, where they were summoned by the Czechoslovak conscription commission. They were taken to the premises of the Red Army drafting board and inscribed on the list of volunteers. The mayor of the village who accompanied the men appeared then before the Czechoslovak commission to report the case. There are even cases in which the reservists, registered in the Czechoslovak Army, are taken as volunteers into the Red Army. According to reports, the drafting into the Red Army proceeds in a similar way in the parishes which are outside the territory transferred to the administration of the Czechoslovak Government delegation.

This situation causes chaos in the whole territory entrusted to my administration and reflects upon the drafting into, and the mobilization of, the Czechoslovak Army. It is therefore not our fault that the results up to now are not such as to satisfy you

As far as the local internal situation is concerned, it can be said that here also are many matters which it is absolutely necessary for me to discuss with my Government. I must therefore insist that a direct and quick communication with my Government in London be made available so that I could inform it and ask for proper instructions, and further also with the office of our representative in Moscow, so that I could ask him to inform the proper authorities of the Soviet Union. Without such a communication the work of the whole delegation is seriously hampered. We have been here for 12 days already, and still we have no direct communication. We are very grateful to you, my dear General, for having made a telegraphic communication with Moscow possible for us but this cannot replace a direct and quick connection which we absolutely need

I apologize once more, my dear General, for taking up your time with these problems at a time when all your attention is fully directed to the operations on the battlefield, but the existing situation forced me to do so. Rest assured that I myself and all the delegation as well are very grateful to the Soviet Union, to the valiant Red Army, to you and to the units whom you have the honour to command, for everything that you have done for the liberation of this country from the German-Magyar occupiers.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

No. 7

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 11, 1944.

No. 106/11

For London, via Embassy in Moscow. Inform London immediately that we have not yet had consent to our radio communication. I have been without any information for a fortnight. Intervene for the permission and ask also London to intervene. Absolutely necessary. Wholesale drafting of our citizens into the Red Army with the consent of Soviet military authorities encourages the idea that there will be a plebiscite and unification with USSR. Tomorrow, Sunday, meetings are to be held everywhere on this subject and supposedly a delegation will be sent to Moscow. Inform London immediately. I myself have intervened here. Advise what is the matter with Drtina and Uhlíř. Use the telegraphic line to Hust immediately. Am completely without information.

NĚMEC

No. 8

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador
in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 11 [13], 1944.
No. 118/16

For London. On Sunday, November 12, public meetings on the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine. There were declarations for union with the Soviet Union and resolutions were signed to this effect. Please inform whether this is a course agreed upon with the Soviet Union.

ŤĚMEC

No. 9

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrou) to the Delegate*

Telegram

November 11, 1944.

Dear Mr. Minister:

The question of admission of Ukrainian and Russian inhabitants of the Carpathian Ukraine as volunteers into the Red Army was put forward in your letter of November 5, 1944.¹ During our personal interview I informed you that the publication of the proclamations has been sanctioned by me. In consequence of the interview, which took place in the presence of General Nižborský, you were satisfied with my answer and the question was settled. Disregarding this, you return to the

question in your next letter of November 9, 1944², which to me is absolutely incomprehensible.

.³

PETROV

¹ See doc. No. 3.

² See doc. No. 6.

³ Not reproduced. Concerned local financial questions.

No. 10

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador
in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 16, 1944.

Intervene again for permission for a direct communication with London. We have only one translator of telegrams into Russian so that the work is held up. Direct communication with London and Moscow would substantially accelerate the pace of our work. Inform London that I have not yet received any news about our demand and that also the army headquarters did not get any answer. Report back.

NĚMEC

No. 11

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 16, 1944.

No. 135/28

For London. I have discussed the matter of drafting of volunteers into the Red Army with the

Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army. I drew his attention to the circumstance that, according to our laws, only the President could issue permission to join a foreign army. The Commander of the front, General Petrov, advised me that his orders concerning the drafting of volunteers were communicated to me by him for my information only, as he had acted in conformity with the Soviet laws. I notified him that I would transmit his information to my Government in London. I will myself abstain from any further interventions in this matter.

NĚMEC

No. 12

Copy
In Czech

*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)
to the Delegate*

Telegram

Moscow, November 16, 1944

No. 143

Your telegrams 12, 14, and 16¹ received and transmitted to London. In the matter of use of foodstuffs from local industry communicate with Commissar Mekhlis. We will send a larger consignment of currency in a special wagon. We ask that the bags be more solid. Drtina, Uhlíř received permission [to go] to Moscow. Resolutions mentioned by you have nothing in common with the policy of the Soviet Union, well known to you.

FIERLINGER

¹For tel. No. 16 see doc. No. 11. Nos. 12 and 14 are not reproduced. No. 12 concerned food supplies for Ruthenia. No. 14 gave a list of personnel in the office of the Delegate.

No. 13

Copy
In Czech

*To the Political Advisers, Heads of Sections and
to the Head of the Price Control Department*

Circular letter

Hust, November 17, 1944.

No. 144

By a telegram of November 13, I have informed our Ambassador in Moscow that on Sunday, November 12, public meetings have taken place in the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine, at which manifestations were made and resolutions signed, for the union of this part of the Republic with the Soviet Union. In spite of this being an action organized by people who have no idea about the policy of the Soviet Union, I made inquiries about the matter in Moscow. By its telegram of November 16, our Embassy informed me that "resolutions mentioned by me have nothing in common with the policy of the Soviet Union, well known to you". I beg you to take cognizance of this very clear and definite information. The campaign for the so called "unification with the Soviet Union" is undesirable and harmful from the point of view of the Soviet Union.

NĚMEC

No. 14

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Hust, November 16, 1944.

No. 136/29

My dear General:

After returning from a meeting with you I have

found out that Mr. Turyanitsa, who has been nominated my political adviser by the London Government, had organized a public meeting in Berehovo. According to our agreement with the army headquarters, this town lies in the zone in which the delegation has engaged itself not to deploy any activities. We have already recalled our officers whom the army-corps sent there because of insufficient knowledge of the situation. As I have no means of communication with the territory beyond the demarcation line, I beg you to accept my apologies (1) for the fact that my political adviser is active beyond the demarcation line without my knowledge and approval, (2) to have a message from me transmitted to him that he should immediately stop his activities and return to Hust, as the officers from the army-corps have done already. I apologize, my dear General, for the member of my delegation acting against the assurances which I have given to you, but I assure you again that this happened without my knowledge. I hope that you might be able to have my message delivered to him soon so that I could put things in order also in this case.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

No. 15

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Hust, November 16, 1944.

My dear General:

I have just received a telegram¹ from our Ambassador in Moscow, Z. Fierlinger, containing following information: During negotiations with

the Ambassador, Markomindyel² stressed that it was my duty to place all our demands before the Army Soviet, which is the proper authority to deal with all political and economic questions not only in the front but also in the rear where our new administration is working. In all questions where it does not consider itself competent, the Army Soviet will direct itself to the Supreme Headquarters which, if necessary, will decide such questions together with the proper authorities. Ambassador Fierlinger advises me on the importance of my entering into close and constant contact with the Army Soviet, especially with Commissar Mekhlis who has been properly instructed. I take the liberty to inform you about those instructions which establish firmly the procedure for our mutual contact. I will take necessary steps in this direction so that I will be constantly in contact with the headquarters and can inform it about all our demands and needs.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

¹Not found in the files.

²People's Commissariat for External Affairs.

No. 16

Copy
In Czech

The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis
Telegram

Kust, November 17, 1944.

No. 151/41

National committees of the district of Kust and of other districts were invited to send their delegates to a conference to take place in Mukachevo on November 26. I inform you, my dear General,

that the convocation and organization of this conference was undertaken without my knowledge. I would be grateful for your information if you know anything about the matter and if this happens with your permission, so that I can take necessary steps. I have convoked already a conference of delegates of the District National Committees from the territory east of the demarcation line. I intend to keep unconditionally the agreement on my not deploying any activities beyond the demarcation line. The agreement concluded upon your request is being violated by the convocation of the conference for November 26. I apologize but it happened without my knowledge.

NĚMEC

No. 17

Copy
Czech translation

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrov) to the Delegate*

Telegram

November 17, 1944.
No. 153

Dear Mr. Minister:

In answer to your telegram¹ according to which your political adviser Mr. Turyanitsa held public meetings in Berehovo and in which you asked me to transmit him your message to return to Hust, I advise the following: (1) I did receive reports that lately there were Czechoslovak officers coming to the forbidden zone and occupying themselves with various political questions and with mobilization. As I have been informed by the military commander, a man [came] to the mayor of the town of Mukachevo,

Mr. Dragula, and said that he was a representative of the Czechoslovak Government and talked about the mobilization to the Czechoslovak Army and to Mr. Dragula's question that without the military commander he could not allow any mobilization, he answered that we did not recognize your national committee. The priest of the Orthodox Church of the town of Mukachevo, Father Gavril, informed the garrison commander of Mukachevo that the officers of the Czechoslovak Army spoke as if, in agreement with Czechoslovakia, all Ukrainians and Russians who joined the Red Army as volunteers, were to be handed over to the Czechoslovak Army.

(2) The commander of the town informed me that on November 15, Lieutenant Elovic came and, in his capacity of a liaison officer, demanded from a member of the [national] committee that it send to Hust all former officers of the Czechoslovak Army. Elovic spoke in the towns of Berehovo, Uzhgorod and Mukachevo about his discontent with the fact that the militia of the town of Berehovo, consisting solely of Magyars, has been disarmed. The order disarming the Magyar militia has been issued by me because the Magyars have to be not only disarmed but interned as well. The behaviour of Lieutenant Elovic is disparaging to my orders and contravenes point one of the agreement between the Supreme Commander and Czechoslovak administration.² (3) In the town of Berehovo one of your lieutenants handed to the [national] committee a proclamation concerning the registration of citizens for the Czechoslovak Army. Such proclamations were distributed by the officers of the Czechoslovak Army in the district of Berehovo. On the basis of proclamations handed them by the lieutenant, the town committee carried out the registration. Those are not all the facts but a telegram does not allow me to write in detail about tens of various violations of the forbidden zone by individual Czechoslovak officers. I was

shown a document from Berehovo concerning the establishment of various political parties and the town commander added that it came from an official of the Government Delegate (4) As for your political adviser Mr. Turyanitsa [holding a meeting], I never heard about it. I was informed that Mr. Turyanitsa has been elected vice-president of the National Council of Mukachevo and it is possible that he had undertaken an official journey somewhere out of Mukachevo. I have inquired from the town commander of Mukachevo if he had issued a permit for Mr. Turyanitsa to leave Mukachevo. As for your demand that Mr. Turyanitsa should immediately return, you will certainly understand that it is unpleasant for me to transmit this message because, first, I would be giving orders to your political adviser and, second, I would be demanding to leave Mukachevo a citizen who was elected by the local population in the national committee.

Yours, etc ,

¹See doc. No. 14

PETROV

²Evidently Agreement of May 8, 1944.

No. 18

Original
In Czech

*Czechoslovak Minister of External Affairs
(Masaryk) to the Delegate*

Telegram

Received: November 17, 1944.¹

Telegram No. 1:¹

Beneš sent the following telegram to Tielinger:

"In answer to Pika's" telegram of November 11, about the recruiting of volunteers into the Red Army in the liberated Subcarpathian territory, I advise you as follows:

(a) On 13th of this month I have drawn the attention of Lebedyev³ who was having lunch with me, to the impossible course of action taken by the Soviet military authorities in the matter of recruiting of volunteers on our territory [garbled] that the Government of the USSR in 1943 gave us jurisdiction over all our citizens in the Soviet territory and permission for them to serve in our army as well and that they even turned over to us the Czechs of Volhynia, in spite of their being citizens of the USSR, and that we therefore do not understand their present actions. It causes us great difficulties and will provoke political complications for us. Lebedyev did not have any news and was himself surprised. Continued.

MASARYK

Telegram No. 2:

Continuation of my telegram No. 1.

(b) I have asked Lebedyev to inform Moscow that there will be an intervention from our Government, and to help us in Moscow to settle it since, if this were to continue, it would be misused by our opponents and by the opponents of Russia and also here in the West, further especially by the Poles and finally by some of our people. He promised to inform Moscow and as he is leaving on November 15, for Moscow, he will deal with the matter there himself. Continued.

MASARYK

(c) But already on November 14, in the morning, Lebedyev asked to see me with a message from Molotov, because meanwhile, he said, there was a protest handed in by us in Moscow (probably a protest handed in by Pika). He transmitted here a message from Molotov asking us not to insist on the release of the already drafted volunteers nor oppose the admission of volunteers into the Red Army.

(d) I repeated to him what difficulties this causes and yet may cause and how the matter would be misjudged here in London, if it became public. I asked for the whole affair to be settled quietly and without dispute. But we have to insist in the matter since it is regulated by our laws.

Telegram No. 4:

(e) First of all I demanded that no propaganda or agitation in this sense should be made in our territory. Further there must not be published there any public proclamations for joining the Red Army. As for the volunteers who have already joined the Red Army, we do not wish to start any quarrels or to disavow the Russian commanders and it will be possible to settle the matter later. For the rest we demand that the propaganda and publication of proclamations should cease and that our laws be observed. Lebedyev promised to communicate this immediately to Moscow. Proceed, please, in the sense of this telegram. Beneš."

MASARYK

¹No London date available. Reproduced as found in the files.

²General H. Pika, Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Moscow.

³Soviet Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Government in London.

No. 19

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador
in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 18, 1944.

No. 156/44

Thanks for the intervention in London.¹ Keep insisting on reports being sent to me. I have not

received a single Government decision. On Cibere² will advise Monday. Turyanitsa after his arrival left for Mukachevo explaining that he was going to see his mother. Since that time he has not shown up. He is in the territory beyond the demarcation line. I have informed the Army Headquarters that his attitude which violates both the treaty and our agreement with the headquarters, is not backed by my approval nor did I know about it. As for the exchange³, I have sent you new suggestions, based on an interview with the Army Headquarters. I repeat: on the request of Colonel-General Mekhlis, with which I quite agree, it is necessary to ascertain the opinion of experts in Moscow, especially as to the amount which would be exchanged at once. What is the matter with our communication with London? Advise how far the negotiations for permission of a direct communication have progressed. Why does Pika not answer Nižborský's telegram? How is Gottwald? Give him and the rest my regards.

NĚMEC

¹On November 18, 1944, Fierlinger informed the Delegate that he had asked London to send texts of Government decrees, etc. In the same telegram he asked about Turyanitsa.

²Dr. Pavel Cibere, a Ruthenian member of the State Council in London. Cf. doc. No. 22.

³Exchange rate of Soviet rouble, Czechoslovak crown and Hungarian pengö.

No. 20

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Hust, November 18, 1944.

My dear General:

I have received your telegram of November 17.¹ Allow me to answer its individual points. (1) I would be very much obliged to you if you could

have sent to me those tens of cases in which the agreement on the so-called forbidden zone has been violated. I will investigate immediately and in proper way all offenders who demonstrably committed any such acts. As for the concrete cases communicated in your telegram, I state: I have no knowledge about the case in Mukachevo and, as I have ascertained, none of our officials or officers were sent to Mukachevo on any such mission. As for the news, spread by the Czechoslovak soldiers, concerning the return of our citizens from the Red to the Czechoslovak Army, no such instructions have been issued by anybody. Senior-Lieutenant Elovic who by his actions, as you stated, had slighted your orders and violated art. 1 of the agreement, was immediately suspended - in a mutual agreement between myself and General Nižborský - from his function of a liaison officer. I wish to assure you, my dear General, that for this our step your simple caution by which you informed us about your opinion on Elovic, was sufficient. By a special order, the Commander of the Liberated Territory, General Nižborský, has again drawn the attention of all military personnel to the fact that entry beyond the demarcation line is allowed them only on the permission of Soviet military authorities. I assure you that this decision will be also fully observed. As for the information that posters appeared in Berehovo, originating from officials of the Government Delegate and concerning the foundation of various political parties, I state the following: No official of the Government Delegate visited Berehovo. I myself was there once, at a time when the demarcation line was not yet accurately known to me, and this happened on the occasion of my trip to the Army Headquarters. Neither I myself, nor any of my officials, published any instructions on the founding of political parties, which is also in conformity with the standpoint of our Government. On this occasion, however, I would like to stress

that according to the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic, which I have to observe in accordance with art. 2 of the agreement concerning the relationship between the Czechoslovak administration and the Soviet C.-in-C., antifascist and democratic parties may be renewed or established on the territory of the Republic. I assure you, my dear General, that it is my endeavour that no conflicts concerning the activity of my organs beyond the demarcation line should arise. In this sense, I will do my utmost to have the agreement observed from our side unconditionally and I ask you to communicate to me any case to the contrary.

(2) As for Turyanitsa, I apologize for having asked you to communicate my message to him. I quite recognize that it was inopportune. I made the demand simply because I do not want to send even a message into the territory behind the demarcation line so as not to violate the agreement. I was actually afraid that Mr. Turyanitsa as a member of the Government delegation was working exclusively in the territory of the so-called forbidden zone and that thereby he had violated to the full extent art. 1 of the agreement between the Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak administration. I retract my inopportune demand, apologize for it and assure you, my dear General, that this case of the violation of the agreement will also be put in order, as soon as the opportunity arises. At the same time, I am taking the liberty to attract again your attention to the fact that a meeting is being convoked at Mukachevo, to which delegates from the zone east of the demarcation line were also invited; I assure repeatedly that this happens without my knowledge and that also in this case I am not responsible for the violation of the agreement. My dear General, I regret extremely that I have to inconvenience you by those small matters in the great work weighing upon you and your headquarters. But

I hope that a mutual clarification of all complaints will only strengthen our co-operation which for my part is and always will be directed by the idea of perpetual friendship. I ask you, therefore, to inform me about all cases of violation of the agreement and I pledge in advance my word to do everything to ensure that on our side the agreement is kept in all respects. If some mistakes happened at the time when we did not know exactly the demarcation line, I apologize again. Allow me, my dear General, to thank you and Colonel-General Mekhlis for the willingness and kindness with which you endeavour to solve difficulties arising naturally in situations which the Czechoslovak administration meets in her first work and which, I hope, we will overcome soon and with your kind help.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

¹ See doc. No. 17.

No. 21

Copy
Czech translation

*The Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian
Army (Petrov) to the Delegate*

Telegram

November 19, 1944

The army headquarters received your telegram addressed to Colonel-General Mekhlis, in which you inform [him] about the invitation of some delegates to the town of Mukachevo. Colonel-General Mekhlis left for an official journey to the units and will be back probably on November 22. He will then certainly answer your telegram.

PETROV

¹ See doc. No. 16.

No. 22

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 20, 1944.

No. 171/54

I urgently need to fly to Moscow. I have to contact London on our internal matters. Expedite my request for a flight in shortest time. My stay in Moscow could last at most 2-3 days. Arrange simultaneously for the return trip in this interval. Deputy Valo would also come with me. Report immediately and inform also London. Send Dr. Cibere with evacuated Slovak families.

NĚMEC

No. 23

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 23, 1944.

No. 195/66a

Fierlinger for London. I am sending this telegram on Thursday, November 23, 1944, at 10.45 a.m. Central European time. I have asceratined today the following facts: (1) In the towns and parishes of Carpathian Ukraine a leaflet is being distributed with the title: *For Union of Transcarpathian Ukraine With the Soviet Ukraine.* In this leaflet is published the resolution of the

Communist Party of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, demanding the union of the Carpathian Ukraine - still a part of the Czechoslovak Republic - with the Soviet Union. In this regard petitions are being signed by the people in the towns and villages both west and east of the demarcation line.

(2) On Sunday, November 26, a conference of the members of the national committees from both zones will take place in Mukachevo, in which, according to my information, about 1,300 delegates are to take part. Today, on Thursday, there are already 500 delegates present in Mukachevo. While I have undertaken, upon the request of the Army Commander, the obligation that no military or civilian persons would cross the demarcation line, all the delegates have received permits from Soviet Commanders. The obligation not to cross the line is observed on our part. If at any time, for lack of information, the line is crossed by our soldiers or officers, the Soviet authorities return or detain them. It is thus impossible for me to enter into any contact with the districts west of the demarcation line, where a Provincial National Committee is to be constituted and the resolution of the Communist Party discussed. I have informed our Embassy in Moscow about this campaign and they advised me, by a telegram of November 16, in the following way regarding the resolutions accepted in the above sense on meetings in my districts. "Resolutions mentioned by you have nothing in common with the policy of the Soviet Union, well known to you." I contented myself with this assurance. In the present situation, however, I have to inform the Government directly and demand that I be instructed immediately as to my further course of action. Since I have no direct communication with London and since it is very difficult to transact these matters by telegraph, I have asked the Army Headquarters to make possible my immediate flight to

Moscow. I would like to discuss my further course directly from London from our Embassy in Moscow. So far, I am not touching upon the subject in question, about which I would like to inform the Government directly, but I stress that the form of communication between myself and the Government makes direct and thorough information impossible. Finally, I ask you to send this telegram to London and to confirm its receipt and to have expedited my demand for my flight to Moscow at the earliest possible moment. Deputy Valo will come with me and I could also take along deputy Krosnař.¹ Krosnař arrived today and could go back with me. I will acquaint the member of the Army Soviet, Colonel-General Mekhlis, with the contents of this telegram. For your and for the Government's information I am enclosing the text of my telegram² sent to Colonel-General Mekhlis.

NĚMEC

¹Josef Krosnař, deputy for the Communist Party in the Czechoslovak Parliament before 1939 and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; during the war resident in Moscow.

²See following document, No. 24.

No. 24

Copy
In Czech

The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis

Telegram

Hust, November 23, 1944.

No. 185/63

My dear Colonel-General:

Today I have received in turn the following information: (1) In the towns and parishes of Carpathian Ukraine a leaflet is being distributed with the title: *For Union of Transcarpathian Ukraine With the Soviet Ukraine*. In this leaflet

is published the resolution of the Communist Party of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, demanding the union of the Carpathian Ukraine - still a part of the Czechoslovak Republic - with the Soviet Union. In this regard petitions are being signed by the people in the towns and villages both east and west of the demarcation line. (2) On Sunday, November 26, a conference of the members of the national committees from both zones will take place in Mukachevo, in which, according to my information, about 1,300 delegates are to take part. Today, on Thursday, there are already 500 delegates present in Mukachevo.

I am taking the liberty, my dear Colonel-General, of drawing your attention to those facts and also to the fact that I have undertaken an obligation, upon the request of Army Headquarters, that no civilian or military persons from the territory east of the demarcation line would cross this line. This obligation is very strictly observed and Soviet military authorities return or even detain Czechoslovak citizens who cross the demarcation line. On the other hand, according to the information received from you on our last meeting, the military commanders have given permission to all delegates from the territory east of the demarcation line, who will participate in the conference, to cross the demarcation line. The prohibition to cross the line is therefore one-sidedly directed against the members of the Czechoslovak Government delegation, who are thus prevented from entering into contact with the participants of the conference or with the conference itself. It is also my belief that the contents of the distributed leaflet are known to you since you had stated yourself that without the military censure no printed matter can be published in the liberated territory of the Car-

pathian Ukraine. My duty is to observe the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic and comply with the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement in which the obligation to observe the Czechoslovak laws is stipulated by the signatures of the Plenipotentiary Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Lebedyev, and of our Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Ripka. Since the distributed leaflet is evidently in contradiction with the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement, I am taking the liberty of drawing your attention to the circumstance that I am informing, through our Embassy in Moscow, my Government in London and am asking for instructions for my further course of action. I am sending you, for your information, a copy of my telegram to London just as I am sending a copy of this telegram to London. I ask at the same time that my immediate flight to Moscow be made possible so that I could ask for my instructions in the shortest possible way. I have not yet a direct radio communication with my Government and I have to contact them through our Embassy in Moscow.

I would be very much obliged if you could let me know your point of view as soon as possible.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

No. 25

Copy
In Czech

The Delegate to Colonel-General Mekhlis

Telegram

Hust, November 23, 1944.

No. 185/63

My dear Colonel-General:

With reference to our yesterday's interview and to avoid any misunderstandings in the future,

I would like to state all existing issues. (1) The zones both west and east of the demarcation line are theatres of military operations. For this reason, the territory east of the demarcation line has not been transferred to my jurisdiction and I am there with my office only as a liaison organ between the local organs and the Soviet Headquarters. For this reason I have to respect the instructions and orders of the local Soviet Commanders. (2) Analogically this goes also for the building of the Czechoslovak armed forces. In this case, too, we are on a territory which has not yet been transferred to our civilian administration and we have to proceed accordingly. (3) This precise clarification of the situation will determine my jurisdiction and responsibility. I will report accordingly to my Government in London. It was exactly the present uncertainty that caused some misunderstandings which I want to avoid. (4) Immediately after the Provincial National Committee has been established and when it finds itself on the territory transferred fully and formally to Czechoslovak civilian authority, I will regulate the mutual relations of the Provincial National Committee with the office of the Government Delegate in a manner corresponding to the directive of my Government concerning the national committees as representatives of popular government. Up to that time, however, I will have to take measures for the support of the Red Army on my own responsibility and only on the territory where I am allowed to co-operate. It is my wish that the conditions for my co-operation with the Provincial National Committee materialize as soon as possible. (5) I would like you to inform me whether it would be possible for me to send, through you or through your organs, my written message to the forthcoming congress of District National Committees, on November 26, in Mukachevo. I conceive that my demand might again be inopportu-

tune but I have no other way, if I do not wish to transgress upon the accepted principle. (6) I assure you, my dear Colonel-General, that I am aware, after yesterday's interview at the headquarters, of my jurisdiction being more limited than I originally thought and that I have taken cognizance of it. (7) I would also like your communication concerning the exchange rates for the pengö and the crown, as established by the Army headquarters. For the time being I have stopped our preparations for the currency exchange, until we receive the opinion of the Soviet experts from Moscow and I would be very glad if in this connection I could know your exchange rates. (8) In closing, I beg you to accept my repeated assurances that I will proceed most energetically against anybody who by their attitude would violate the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as, no doubt, you would do if some transgressions were ascertained on your side.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

No. 26

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the
Delegate*

Telegram

Dear Mr. Minister:

November 24, 1944.

In answer to your telegram¹ addressed to me and to Colonel-General Mekhlis I wish to advise:

(1)²

(2) You write, for the first time since the be-

ginning, that the zone east and west of the demarcation line is a theatre of military operations and that therefore the territory west of the demarcation line has not been transferred to your administration. In all documents which we have received up to now you wrote about a zone "transferred to the administration of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate". So you write also in the telegram re financial questions, which I received today, in which you write about the territory transferred to your administration. You know that, so far, only a small part of Czechoslovakia has been liberated and that, at the same time, the liberated territory still remains in the zone of the divisions and army etapes, where there are actual military operations. You know that there has been no transfer of territory in the sense mentioned in point 6 of the agreement, and there could not have been, for the reason that only a small part of the territory has been liberated. And it seems to me that you did not speak about the question of this territory being completely handed over to you. For normal conditions of the Government Delegate's work a line of the forbidden zone was constituted, to the east of which the Czechoslovak administration had begun to function. In those districts, following my instructions, offices of Military Commanders were established to keep up the military order, and points for the dislocation of airfields and of necessary material? All questions of the internal administration on the territory east of the forbidden zone are settled by the Government Delegate. He issues orders or instructions, convokes conferences, as he sees fit. Throughout the whole territory of the Carpathian Ukraine we are interested only in military questions, whose purpose is to improve the situation in the etape, to clear it from the Hungarian and German prisoners of war and from

the Hungarian gendarmes and police forces who, not long ago, still felt quite safe in the territory east of the forbidden zone and in various places even penetrated into the local civil administration. This can be explained by insufficient suppression of those elements among whom there are many spies. (3) You write about the establishment of the Provincial National Committee and its co-operation with the office of the Government Delegate. This matter is completely unknown to us, as you never mentioned it during our numerous interviews and we are not informed who, when and why will organize the Provincial National Committee and we do not understand therefore why you write that "the conditions for co-operation with the Provincial National Committee should materialize as soon as possible" This matter, as well as other issues which are not in direct connection with the defence and with military operations and needs of the army, do not concern us and they belong properly in the sphere of the Czechoslovak administration. (4) Your demand to help you to send your address to the coming conference of the National Committees is incomprehensible. Neither the questions regarding the establishment of the Provincial National Committee, which you mention in your letter, nor the questions regarding various conferences are our concern. We are up to our necks in our own work and it would not be proper for the Headquarters to get mixed in civilian affairs and to ask the civil administration of Mukachevo to do things which concern the Czechoslovak Government Delegate. (5) As for the problem of the exchange of pengö's for crowns and for the relation between the rouble and the crown, we will have to discuss that separately. Your suggestion that the rate of rouble be equal to that of the crown is unjust and impossible and cannot be used even temporarily. Such a rate differs completely from orders which

we have received in these matters.

Yours, etc.,

PETROV, MEKHLIS

¹See doc. No. 25. According to the files addressed only to Mekhlis.

²Not reproduced. Gives permission to an official of the delegation to travel to Mukachevo and to take part there at a funeral of the victims of Magyar persecution during the war.

³This last part of the sentence is not clear in the Czech text.

No. 27

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 25, 1944.

No. 206/72/75

Received your No. 11.¹ Thanks for the information about the retribution decree. In Turyanitsa's case I refer to my telegram 44² and repeat Turyanitsa after his arrival stayed in Hust only few days and then announced that he was going to visit his mother in Mukachevo. He did not return from Mukachevo again. He also did not announce whether he had resigned the function of the adviser which he does not discharge nor does he inform me why he does not discharge it. According to the agreement with the Soviet Army Headquarters the whole delegation is under obligation not to cross the demarcation line nor to work there without permission from the Headquarters. Turyanitsa has violated both these principles. I have therefore apologized at the Headquarters for his transgression. In consequence of the above obligations

I am unable to contact Turyanitsa. As for his activities beyond the demarcation line I have only indirect informations. According to them he founded a newspaper which prints proclamations in favour of the union of the Carpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Union. I am unable, however, to furnish any direct and authentic information about his activities.

NĚMEC

¹Not reproduced. Concerned London Government's post-war legislation. At the end the Ambassador asked: 'Advise what concrete charges you have against Turyanitsa. Very important.'

²See doc. No. 19.

No. 28

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Hust, November 26, 1944.
No. 207/76

My dear General:

I have received your telegram of November 24, 1944.¹ (1) Thank you for the permit for Mr. Žižka.² (2) I apologize for having spoken in my documents about the administration of the liberated territory, although this territory has not yet been transferred to my administration, since it is still in the zone of army and divisions' etapes. There has been a misunderstanding of which I am now fully aware. During our first interview you were kind enough to draw on a map the demarcation line which I considered to be the line beyond which the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement concerning the Czechoslovak civilian administration was operative. This misunderstanding on my part has caused also some errors in the

interpretation of my jurisdiction, as I have stated already in my telegram No. 63.³ To eliminate such misunderstandings completely, I would be grateful for your information whether, in your opinion, there are already conditions for a full and formal transfer to my administration of the territory beyond the demarcation line, in accordance with the agreement of May 1944. I would like it to happen as soon as possible, so that I could start an energetic fight of the enemy, especially Magyar, elements. On this occasion I would like to draw your attention to the fact that their self-confidence has been strengthened by some events, thus for example by the fact that in Mukachevo, that is, in the forbidden zone, a Magyar newspaper is already being published. (3) I understand that you have not been informed about the establishment of the Provincial National Committee. I send you information and inquiries in all matters, according to the instructions received from our Embassy, as they were expressed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and as I have communicated them to you in my telegram No. 37.⁴ I do this, therefore, also in cases which are not directly within the competence of the Headquarters. I did not intend to inconvenience you with these matters as I know what heavy tasks lie ahead of you. However, I have to do it, in accordance with my instructions from our Embassy in Moscow. My wish that I could soon co-operate with the Provincial National Committee was expressed only in the hope that the formal transfer of the civil administration would soon take place and thus the opportunity for such a co-operation would be realized. I do not ask the Headquarters to mix themselves into civil matters but according to the agreement I have to observe an obligation that without the knowledge of the Headquarters I will neither cross the demarcation line nor work beyond it. For this

reason I have directed my inquiries re the forbidden zone to the Headquarters. In the future I will not do so any more. It will mean that I cannot enter into any contacts in the forbidden zone. (5) As for the currency matters I am awaiting your kind communication when a meeting of your and my experts could take place. Until then I will not undertake any steps so as to leave, on our side, the whole question an open one until an agreement with you.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

¹See doc. No. 26.

²See footnote 2 to doc. No. 26.

³See doc. No. 25.

⁴See doc. No. 15.

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

No. 29

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrou) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the
Delegate and to General Hasal*

Telegram

November 26, 1944.

Dear Mr. Minister and dear General:

In your telegram of November 23, 1944¹, you write that you will take steps against anybody who by their attitude would violate the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty; we gladly take notice of this your statement. But we have to state that individual high officials of the Czechoslovak administration undertake acts which are aimed against the Red Army and at the deterioration of our mutual relations with the Czechoslovak Government Delegate. General Nižborský has asked for

consent to recall to the Czechoslovak military service officers residing in the forbidden zone.² Since in the past there have been quite a few cases of dishonest behaviour among the individual soldiers who were allowed to come to the forbidden zone, I find myself forced to abstain from an affirmative answer to General Hasal-Nižborský. Disregarding the fact that no permission was given, the chief of staff of the District Military Office, Colonel Koutnik, sent, through messengers, orders addressed to various persons living in the forbidden zone. Such orders were sent to I. Homonaj, J. Varga and others in the towns of Mukachevo, Uzhgorod and Berehovo (the original orders are at the Army Headquarters). In the districts of Velika Berezna and of Uzhgorod agencies were established to carry out the mobilization but in fact individual officers of the Czechoslovak Army engaged in subversive activities and agitated against the volunteering of the peasants for the Red Army. The military police in the etape seized from a resident of Velika Berezna, Dika Luka Nikolayevich, 700 leaflets (questionnaires), part of which have been already completed, and similar other documents and instructions, as well as a certificate entitling him to carry out the mobilization, dated November 17, 1944. The District National Committee of Irshava sent us on November 17 a declaration that documents, which they enclosed, are being sent illegally to the district and asked us to forbid in the future any illegal activities in the district, declaring that such activities disturbed the peace of the population. Senior-Lieutenant Ney was detained because he travelled illegally through the parishes of the forbidden zone and in his knapsack was found a fascist leaflet, directed against the Red Army, with the title: *Order No. 13 of the Supreme Commander of the German Army Concerning the Members of the Red Army who Voluntarily Went*

Over to the Side of the German Army. It is completely incomprehensible why the reserve battalion of the First Czechoslovak Army Corps has been transferred into the forbidden zone; it is commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Strelka who by his negative attitude towards the Red Army discredits the work of the District Military Office in the town of Hust; at the same time, the transfer of the battalion was effected contrary to the decision according to which the Czechoslovak Army Corps should have remained in its old position. The Commander of the battalion sends, under the pretext of leave of absence, military personnel to various villages directly in the front zone, without issuing them proper papers. On November 1, in the villages of Nizhne Veretske, Tyachovo, Volovets, were detained soldiers of the Czechoslovak Army, Sgt. Beregy, Sgt. Madar, Pte. J. Varga, who agitated against the Soviet authorities and the Red Army, saying that the latter do not comply with their obligations towards the families of the volunteers and that therefore nobody should enlist in the Red Army. Sgt. Beregy carefully inquired and noted down in every village those who volunteered for the Red Army, thus intimidating the population. In this dishonest activity the sergeant went so far as to declare that it was the Czechoslovak Army which came to the Transcarpathian Ukraine and is liberating its people from the Germans and the Magyars and it is therefore necessary to join the Czechoslovak and not the Red Army. This whole group of the Czechoslovak army personnel was provided with orders valid for ten days, that is up to November 20, 1944. The orders were issued by the above mentioned reserve battalion and it was stated in them in a general manner that the men were sent on official business. Into the villages of the district of Tyachovo came many privates and non-commissioned officers of the above mentioned reserve battalion, who

agitated against the volunteering for the Red Army and intimidated the population which expressed its sympathies with the Russians and Ukrainians and the Soviet Union. Sgt. Lopojda from the reserve battalion came to the village of Sokyrnitsa under the pretext of a 15 days' furlough. On November 21, he made a disturbance in the village, behaved in an undisciplined way towards the Red Army, agitated against the volunteers and insulted the militia men of the National Committee and told them: "Why do you wear red armbands, you are idiots for wearing them, throw the red armbands away". In the village of Kraynikovo the same Lopojda killed by a shot from his revolver a militia man of the National Committee, M. Oros, because the latter had declared openly his sympathies with the Red Army and the Soviet Union. Lopojda was arrested by our military commander and will be tried. On November 22, Senior-Lieutenant Popovich came to the military commander of the town of Eust and first spoke about getting a speaker for a lecture (this is not among the duties of the commander nor is it concerned with the help to the Soviet Army) and then, for incomprehensible reasons, declared that he did not want to serve in the Czechoslovak Army, evidently trusting to gain by this discussion motives for slandering the Soviet military commander. Senior-Lieutenant Barat, who has some official position with the Czechoslovak delegation, agitates against the volunteering for the Red Army. "What do you need the Red Army for?" he declares, he also undermined the measures, taken by the military commander, concerning various persons of German and Magyar nationality who were to be sent to a prisoners-of-war camp. He prevented the registration of a Magyar J. Kovach and included him into some Czechoslovak military unit. Similarly there were included into the Czechoslovak Army Magyars and Germans G. Weiner, Schubert

and Fotul, who were to be sent to the prisoner-of-war camp. The delegation addressed to us several demands not to send to the prisoner-of-war camps a number of Magyar officers who fought against the Red Army, designating them, we do not know why, as Czechoslovak officers. Such a situation east of the forbidden zone prevents us from making this sector of the etape sufficiently secure. Many prisoners of war and also men of military age of Magyar and German nationality conceal themselves from the military commander and are still in hiding. Through only a simple investigation there were found and confiscated in Hust, Sevlyush and other villages 26 trench mortars, 196 various machine guns, 1393 rifles and submachine guns, 33 revolvers, 721 grenades, 24,500 rounds of ammunition, 50 cases of mines and 60 kilograms of explosives. This had forced us to establish additional military commanders east of the forbidden zone. You will understand, Mr. Minister and General, that the facts mentioned above (and their number is much greater, but we cannot write about them as the extent of this telegram does not permit it) make us feel uneasy. The matter is further complicated by the circumstance that lately there arrived, to be at the disposal of the staff of the District Military Office in Hust, groups of officers who spent a very long time abroad, and nobody asked us for permission for them to come to Hust. These people, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Pernikář, are engaged in the etape of the fighting armies in work which has nothing in common with the mobilization of the contingents for the corps. We ask you, Mr. Minister and General, to take effective steps to prevent the repetition of the above mentioned and similar facts: nor should people who disturb our normal relations remain on the territory which still is a zone of military operations.

Yours, etc.,

PETROV, KEHLIS

Not found on files. ²No such demand was found on files.

Copy
In Czech

No. 30

The Delegate and General Hasal to the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov) and to Colonel-General Mekhlis

Telegram

Hust, November 28, 1944.

No. 219

Gentlemen:

Allow us to answer in detail your telegram of November 26, 1944¹, after we have investigated all the cases mentioned in it. Right at the beginning we repeat our standpoint that both the Government Delegate and the Commander of the Liberated Territory will punish without exception any proven case of deliberate violation of our agreement that the demarcation line would not be crossed. To the individual cases we remark: (1) Lieutenant-Colonel Koutnik called to service several officers living west of the demarcation line because we have not enough officers. We have ordered that this must not be repeated. (2) We have no knowledge of any mobilization agency in V. Berezno and in the district of Uzhgorod. We can assure you that neither the Delegate nor the Commander of the Liberated Territory had issued any instructions in this sense to anybody. Nor were any questionnaires issued and, equally, nobody has been authorized to carry out the mobilization in that territory. We would ask you therefore to communicate to us more details so that the affair could be thoroughly investigated. (3) The Czechoslovak delegation did not bring with them any propaganda material with the exception of a few pamphlets printed in the USSR. Our local printing shop is under the supervision of the town commander who is informed about every-

thing we print. As for the District National Committee in Irshava, the case pointed out by you can refer only to the village of Dubrovka near Irshava, situated east of the demarcation line and where we therefore sent our mobilization proclamations. Those proclamations were seized by the militia from Irshava, probably because the District Committee did not know the demarcation line well. (4) Senior-Lieutenant Ney was sent today back to the 1st Czechoslovak Corps where proper proceedings will be opened against him. Senior-Lieutenant Elovic was sent back to the Corps on November 24. (5) As for the reserve battalion, it was sent to Hust on the order of the Commander of the Corps, with the minimum of military personnel (about 40), and this had happened before the decision was taken that the Corps would stay in its old position, and because it was assumed that the battalion would be transferred to the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine. Until clarification of the situation, the battalion was left in Sevlyush with the Czechoslovak forces, together with the artillery units. They go through the first basic training so as not to be idle. In Kriva, the new recruits for engineers' and telegraph units are concentrated. Partially schooled members of these units are undergoing the basic training and the engineers are repairing the bridges at Berezno and V. Kopan. We ask you to approve these measures temporarily until the question of the transfer of the battalion will be cleared up. The Commander of the battalion was ordered to suspend the leaves for all members of the battalion. (6) Sgt. Beregy, Sgt. Madar and Pte. Varga have already been handed over to us and will be sent to the 1st Army Corps, where proper proceedings will be opened against them. (7) Sgt. Lopojsda, after having been wounded at Dukla, was sent by the Corps for treatment to the hospitals in Lwów and later in Polyanka. After

his recovery the Corps had granted him a 14 days leave to go to his native village, Kraynikovo. We did not know anything about his arrival to Hust. During the investigation of the case, the following has been ascertained: Lopojsda came to Hust from Polyanka in a Studebaker. He does not know the name of the driver. In Hust he met a Russian Senior-Lieutenant, whose acquaintance he had made in the Ukraine but whose name he does not know. Standing beside the car, they drank together about a litre of vodka. Thereafter Lopojsda proceeded by car to the village of Kraynikovo and bought more vodka during the trip. Upon his arrival to Kraynikovo, on November 19, at about 4 o'clock p.m., Lopojsda was greeted by the local population, among whom was also his good friend Michal Oros, wearing as a militia man a military rifle. They went together to the shop of M. Oros, where they drank more vodka, Lopojsda being very drunk at that time. When he left the shop, together with the militia man Oros and with another militia man, Mitrovka, Michal Oros declared that he would fire from his rifle in the air, in honour of Lopojsda. This he did. Lopojsda, too, fired from his revolver. Oros fired two or three times, Lopojsda does not remember how many times he himself did fire. He remembers only that, after several shots from his revolver, Mitrovka exclaimed "our friend is wounded". He is unable to recollect anything more and he knows about the affair only what he learnt on the next day from the local population. He is a relative of the wounded man and he had neither intention nor reason to harm him. Sgt. Lopojsda was handed over to us, is under arrest and after further investigation will be handed over to the military court of the 1st Army Corps as there is no military court yet in Hust. In your telegram the accusation against Lopojsda is formulated as follows: "He killed by a shot from his revolver the militia

man of the national committee, Oros". According to the ascertained facts he heavily wounded a man who is a relative of his and with whom he was on very friendly terms. They were both drunk and fired their arms to amuse themselves. (8) The case of Lieutenant Popovich is under investigation and when it is finished, Popovich will be sent to the Corps which will open proper court proceedings against him. (9) The case of Lieutenant Barat is under investigation and you will be informed about the results. From among the names of persons mentioned by you as Magyars or Germans and supposedly included into the Czechoslovak Army under the influence of Lieutenant Barat, only the name of Šubert has been ascertained, following a check of the list of mobilized men: according to the investigation he is a teacher of Ukrainian nationality from Volove. The investigation of the case has not yet been closed and you will be informed about the results. (10) As for the group of officers from abroad, whose list has been sent to the Chief of Staff at the Headquarters, we remark that the group came to Hust only on November 22, in the evening. The Soviet Government gave these officers a permit to travel through the territory of the USSR. After their arrival to Baku, the group was directed, by an order from Moscow, to go by train to Krosno and thence they were sent by the Commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps to Hust. We learnt about their departure from Krosno only when they were on their way to Hust, nor were we told their names. We could not therefore ask the Army Headquarters beforehand for a permit to their entry on the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine. (11) Lieutenant-Colonel Pernikář is temporarily appointed as head of a division in the Staff. He does not and did not work with the group of officers who came to Hust. He met the mentioned officers several times only in the officers' mess during lunch time. Lieutenant Pernikář, who is

an officer of the air force, will be sent to the Czechoslovak Air Force, which is being formed on the territory of the USSR, immediately after the proposal for his appointment has been dealt with by the Czechoslovak Military Mission. Up to that time he will remain with the Commander of the Liberated Territory. (12) We declare most categorically that we will punish any conduct and any act directed, as your telegram says, against the Red Army and at the deterioration of mutual relations with the Czechoslovak Government Delegate. We are greatly aggrieved by your statement that there have been in the past not a few cases of dishonourable behaviour of individual soldiers who were permitted to enter the forbidden zone. We have dealt and will deal severely with every proven case. We feel sorry about your statement that a group of officers, who came from England, has been engaged in the etape of the fighting armies in work which had nothing in common with the mobilization of contingents for the Corps. The information, in both cases, is so momentous that I have to inform my Government in London about it. It was and always is the sincere wish not only of the Government delegation but of the whole Czechoslovak Government, to do everything to strengthen the force of the glorious Red Army to whom the Czechoslovak people are grateful for everything it has done for their liberation. We regret therefore that, against our intentions, the present situation has developed, and it is our conviction that after you have examined the reports submitted by us, a relationship of friendly co-operation will be established. In our opinion the main cause of the difficulties are the following two reasons: (a) an uncertain situation originating in the fact that the territory east of the demarcation line has not yet been handed over formally to the Government Delegate or that, at least, his jurisdiction has not been defined

with greater precision; (b) also, the fact that in this territory in both zones a free agitation for its separation from the Czechoslovak Republic is going on. This agitation, carried out by a part of the local population, decreases the authority of the Government delegation and makes it impossible for them to perform the work for which they are responsible according to the agreement. We regret to have to state that in the view of the population, the drafting of volunteers in the Red Army confirms the opinion that the fate of this part of the Republic has not been settled definitely. We take the liberty of communicating to you this our point of view to your telegram of November 26, 1944.¹

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC, HASAL

¹See doc. No. 29.

No. 31

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, November 28, 1944.

No. 214/73

I am sending for you and for London a preliminary report on the Sunday manifestation in Mukachevo. In this manifestation which took place on November 26, about 600 delegates and about 400 guests from the whole territory of the Carpathian Ukraine took part. A Provincial National Council was elected. It has 17 members. Its President is I. Turyanitsa; vice-president, a high school

teacher Sova from Uzhgorod, second vice-president Lintur, a high school teacher from Hust. According to a preliminary report the meeting accepted the demand that the Carpathian Ukraine should be united with the USSR, either as an autonomous republic or as a part of Great Ukraine. Supposedly, a delegation was elected which is to be sent to Moscow to negotiate directly for the fulfillment of this demand. The Government delegation was attacked at the congress and the following two concrete cases were mentioned: the killing of a militia man by a Czech military police and the arrest of a priest by the Czechoslovak garrison commander in Rahovo. After an investigation of both cases I report: Sergeant Lopojska, of Ukrainian nationality, who had been wounded, was sent by the Corps, without any knowledge of the delegation, to his native village Kraynikovo on a sick leave. Being drunk, he started, at night, to fire from his revolver, together with a man with whom he was on very friendly terms, and wounded him severely. He will be sent before a military court. In Rahovo, the garrison commander detained for two hours a priest, who criticized him in the presence of the draftees in the drafting commission room, by telling him that he behaved like a highwayman. We have immediately suspended the garrison commander and he will be punished. We are, however, unable for lack of information facilities, to counteract the campaign which uses these two cases against the delegation. I repeat. In both cases the guilty persons were from the ranks of the local Ukrainian population. I ask for communication from London whether Turyanitsa remains political adviser of the Delegate even after the Sunday manifestation. You have not confirmed yet the receipt of my telegram No. 66¹, in which I have informed both London and you about these matters. I expect instructions for my further course of action. In taking any measures I

want to keep the principle of co-operation between the Government delegation and the national committees. This co-operation was greatly hampered by the campaign for union of the Carpathian Ukraine with the USSR and is radically endangered by the Sunday manifestation. In consequence, all our work is slowing down. The lack of precise instructions for my further course of action begins to be critical. Remind London urgently to advise (1) about the results of the negotiations on the drafting of volunteers for the Red Army (my telegram No. 28⁴), (2) about the campaign for the union (my telegrams 11³, 16⁴, 30⁵, 66¹). Until I receive definite directions from the Government in these two basic issues I cannot work as I should. I could perhaps discuss these matters directly with London during my visit to Moscow. The absence of a direct radio-communication with London appears to be a catastrophic obstacle to all my activity.

NĚMEC

¹See doc. No. 23. On December 5, 1944, Fierlinger informed the Delegate: 'Have not received your '66'.

²See doc. No. 11. ³See doc. No. 7. ⁴See doc. No. 8.

⁵Not reproduced. Contains petition of the inhabitants of the village of Boronyava, addressed to the President of the Republic and asking him to support the union of Ruthenia with the Soviet Union. The Delegate telegraphed the petition to Moscow.

No. 32

Original
In Czech

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate*

Telegram

London, November 29, 1944.

With regard to the political situation in Subcarpathian Ruthenia I inform you that Beneš, as well as the Ministry for External Affairs,

repeatedly asked the Soviet Government for a speedy and friendly settlement of difficulties in Subcarpathia resulting from the recruiting into the Red Army. Our standpoint is based simply on our laws under which a citizen's enlistment in a foreign army is bound by the previous consent of the President of the Republic, and further, naturally, by our adhering to the standpoint of the treaty.

The matter is now being discussed by Fierlinger directly with Narikomindyel. We hope that the matter will be soon settled. Continuation follows.²

RIPKA

¹People's Commissariat for External Affairs.

²See the following document, No. 33.

No. 33

Original
In Czech

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Delegate*

Telegram

London, December 1, 1944.

Continuation and end. We ask you therefore to be on very friendly terms with the Soviet Commander and to try to dispel by patient explanations all misunderstandings which have occurred up to now and as long as they exist, at the same time making it clear that in everything we are acting absolutely loyally towards the Soviet Union.

While acting thus, it is also possible to defend effectively our basic point of view as given by our laws and by the treaty. We expect

that such a course of action has been taken by you. It will facilitate considerably the diplomatic negotiations which we have opened to settle this case amicably and with speed.

RIPKA

¹See the previous document, No. 32.

Original
In Ukrainian

No. 34

*National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine
to the Delegate
Letter*

Mukachevo, November 30, 1944.
No. 8/1944 Pres.

To the Official Delegate of the Czechoslovak Government, Minister F. Němec.

As is already known to you, Mr. Minister, on November 26, 1944, the First Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine decided to secede from the Czechoslovak Republic and to elect a National Council as the supreme and only organ of central authority in the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

In conformity with this decision, the National Council suggests that you and your whole staff, both civilian and military, leave the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine within three days.

In case you will not act upon this categorical decision and demand of ours, we will be obliged to take necessary steps with all resulting consequences to you.

We are enclosing the manifesto accepted by the

First Congress of the Delegates of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

Yours, etc.,

I. TURYANITSA

Printed publication
In Ukrainian

[Enclosure]

Manifesto
of the First Congress of the National Committees
of Transcarpathian Ukraine
for the unification of Transcarpathian Ukraine
with Soviet Ukraine

The happy historical day for the Transcarpathian Ukraine has come. With the help of the valiant Red Army the German-Magyar yoke has been thrown down. An end has been made to the age-long domination of the Magyars and of other foreigners in the lands of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, ours from time immemorial.

The Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine extends in the name of all the inhabitants of the Transcarpathian Ukraine its sincere thanks to the magnanimous Red Army which has expelled the German-Magyar occupiers and under its banners brought joy and happiness to our nation. Hail to the Supreme Commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin !

Living for centuries separated from its fatherland, the Ukraine, the Transcarpathian-Ukrainian nation was destined to depopulation and

slow death. The peasants, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the Transcarpathian-Ukrainian people, were deprived of the land. Earned by blood and sweat, the wealth of our people went to the Magyar and other foreign oppressors. Our language was being persecuted, our national Ukrainian culture ruined and suppressed, our schools were being closed, the people were being dislodged from their land by foreigners and we were dying out. Within the last hundred years, since 1826, hundreds of thousands of Transcarpathian Ukrainians, in order to save themselves from the horrors of starvation and destruction, were forced to emigrate to foreign countries.

The collapse of the iniquitous Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in which the Transcarpathian Ukraine dragged out its existence like a colony, did not lead, however, to the national, economic and cultural renaissance of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Our homeland found itself again cut off from the rest of its fatherland, the Ukraine. The so-called "autonomy" of the Transcarpathian Ukraine within the borders of the Czechoslovak Republic, as it had been proclaimed by the treaty of St. Germain of 1919, was never put into effect. Even in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic, created on the ruins of Austria-Hungary, there was no place for our Transcarpathian-Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainians were kept away from all decisive governmental positions.

But for the Transcarpathian Ukraine the year 1938 and the following six years of Magyar servitude were the most oppressive. As a means of buying themselves off from the pressure of the Hitlerite Germany, the Government of Czechoslovakia had delivered us into the servitude of the Magyar fascists. Without firing one single shot, they gave us in payment to the German-Magyar imperial-

ists in order to save Czechoslovakia. The Transcarpathian Ukraine had become small change in the international arena.

They treated us in this way because, separated as we were from our fatherland, the Soviet Ukraine, we were helpless. They were able to treat us in this way because our fight for the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine had not been brought to its end, because we had become abandoned and outside the pale of the great family of nations of the Soviet Union.

More than once during its history had the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine taken up arms against foreign oppressors. There have not yet been wiped out from the memory of our generation the occasions when the people demanded to have the Transcarpathian Ukraine joined with Russia, united with the Soviet Ukraine. National meetings in Marmaros on December 18, 1918, and in Hust on January 21, 1919, representing 420 organizations, had proclaimed the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the rest of the Ukraine. The attempts of the people to acquire their national independence were ruthlessly suppressed. History will forever record the Marmaros trials of 1904 and 1913-1914, the shooting of the workers in Hust in 1929, the shooting of the demonstrators in Turya-Fasika and in other villages on February 10 and 18, 1932.

The whole history of the Transcarpathian Ukraine tells us that our people - living as they did for centuries in servitude - will perish if they should remain within the borders of a foreign state, deprived of their national independence. Either the union with the Soviet Ukraine and national renaissance, or oppression and life without rights and successive dying out of the

people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

Now, when the nations of Europe are fighting against nazism and Hitlerite tyranny, against racial hatred and for their national independence, it would be a tremendous injustice if our people should still continue its sorrowful existence torn away from its maternal homeland - the Soviet Ukraine. Only united with the Soviet Ukraine, in the family of the brotherly nations of the Soviet Union, can we safeguard the freedom of our national development, internal economic prosperity and external security.

The people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, liberated from the German-Magyar prison-camp, have decided once and for all to attain their perennial aspiration and to unite with the Soviet Ukraine. With this idea the people have gone to elections of the local, district and town national committees, giving them the mandate to bring about the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine.

Supported by the unshakable will of the whole nation, expressed in the petitions and resolutions of the workers, peasants, intellectuals and priests of all the towns and villages of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, demanding the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine,

the First Congress of the National Committees
of All Transcarpathian Ukraine

RESOLVES

(1) To unite the Transcarpathian Ukraine with its Great Motherland, the Soviet Ukraine and to secede from Czechoslovakia.

(2) To ask the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to include the Transcarpathian Ukraine as a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

(3) To elect a National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine as the only central authority executing the will of the people in the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

(4) To empower and bind the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine to put into effect the decisions of the Congress regarding the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine.

Mukachevo, November 26, 1944.

No. 35

Copy
In Slovak

*To the Heads of Sections and to the Head of the
Price Control Department*
Circular

Hust, December 1, 1944

No 235

With regard to the situation created by the resolution of the congress of the delegates of the national committees in Mukachevo and with regard to the fact that the national committees refuse to co-operate with the Government delegation, I am asking the Heads of Sections to discontinue, beginning with today and until final solution of political problems, any written or personal communications with the national committees and other organizations

NĚMEC

No. 36

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, December 1, 1944.

No. 231/83

Inform immediately whether you received from Narkomindyel the permission for my flight to Moscow. An aeroplane is ready here. The situation so serious that I have to contact through you the Government immediately. Otherwise cannot assume responsibility any further. Answer immediately.

NĚMEC

No. 37

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, December 1, 1944.

No. 232/84

Situation after Sunday Mukachevo congress very serious. A delegation elected by the congress for the purpose of discussing in Moscow the union of the Carpathian Ukraine with the USSR is ready to leave by aeroplane. The national committees have received instructions not to co-operate with the delegation. I myself do not want to undertake anything against their will. Consequently all work practically stopped. I have not received

from you any instructions from London and you did not even confirm receipt of my telegrams in which I reported on the development of the situation. I cannot assume responsibility any further. I have fully informed all political advisers. We are here all in complete agreement. I have no news from you nor from London. I demand that London be immediately informed and my immediate flight to Moscow permitted. On the orders of the national committee our flags were removed everywhere tonight. Inform London and demand immediate instructions for me. If necessary arrange for me the shortest trip to London. Possibly this flight could be made in the shortest way within one night. I am reminding [you] of all this for the last time.

NĚMEC

No. 38

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, December 1, 1944.

No. 239/86

On Friday, December 1, 1944, at 4 o'clock p.m., I received the following letter from the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine: [Follows the text of the letter of the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine of November 30, 1944, as given in the document No. 34]. After having discussed the matter with my political advisers, I have decided to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army for an interview which will take place probably during Saturday. I am

asking for this interview because the decision in question has been made by the National Council whose election took place and whose seat is in the part of the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine where the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters pertaining to the conduct of war belongs to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. Therefore I have to discuss this question with him, even where it is a matter of our internal political problems, because they touch upon the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty. Under no conditions do I want to make a decision which would violate this treaty. After the interview I will contact the National Council and inform it of my standpoint. I ask you to inform London immediately and to demand instructions for me. Draw the attention of London to the fact that in the manifesto two principles were accepted, first, the principle of separation from the Republic, which appears in the letter, and further the principle of union with the USSR, which the letter does not mention. With regard to the standpoint of the National Council, thus formulated, I would like to be informed also about the [Government's] point of view regarding the second part of the manifesto. I ask for immediate instructions. In case I have to fly to Moscow, I have arranged that the political advisers Hala¹, Hodža², and the members of of the Slovak National Council, Šrobár³ and Púll⁴, General Hasal and Polák⁵, will conduct the affairs of the delegation collectively.

NĚMEC

¹František Hala.

²Dr. Fedor Hodža.

³Dr. Vavro Šrobár.

⁴Dr. Ján Púll.

⁵Dr. Ervín Polák, an official of the delegation.

No. 39

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the National Council of the
Transcarpathian Ukraine*

Letter

Hust, December 2, 1944.

No. 242

Gentlemen:

On Friday, December 1, 1944, at four o'clock in the afternoon I received your letter in which you announced: (1) that the Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine has decided to secede from the Czechoslovak Republic and to elect a National Council as the supreme and only organ of central authority of the Transcarpathian Ukraine; (2) that you suggest that I and my civilian and military staff leave within a period of three days the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. You will allow me to express my point of view to your letter. I have been nominated Czechoslovak Government Delegate for the liberated territories according to the agreement concerning the relationship between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak administration on the entry of the Soviet troops into Czechoslovak territory, of May 8, 1944, signed by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR, V. Lebedyev, and by the Minister of State, Ripka. In this international treaty, the duties and tasks of the Government Delegate were stipulated in an exact manner. According to the decision of the Government, based on the agreement of all political and national groups of the Czechoslovak émigrés, those tasks had and have to be fulfilled through

the national committees. For this reason the political advisers of the Delegate, nominated by the Government, were selected so as to represent all three Slav nationalities of the Czechoslovak Republic. As political adviser for the Transcarpathian Ukraine, Ivan Turyanitsa was nominated by the Government and had accepted the function. The duty of the political advisers is to organize national committees within their nationality, immediately after the liberation of a part or of the whole of their territory, so that the Government Delegate could fulfill, through those national committees, the duties conferred upon him by the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of May 8, 1944.

When the Government delegation, in agreement with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, arrived on October 28, 1944, in the first liberated territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, there existed here no district committees, let alone a Provincial one. In spite of this shortcoming, the Government delegation co-operated in full measure with the local and, later, with the district national committees as soon as they were established. In consequence of an agreement with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the activity of the delegation was limited to the territory of five districts east of the demarcation line, and I intended therefore to ask the district national committees of these districts to co-operate with the Government delegation in general questions until the Provincial National Committee could be established. I had in mind especially the carrying out of the work essential to the conduct of the war and help to the Red Army, both of which could not be postponed. Besides that, it was necessary to ensure a uniform food supply to the population, undertake the exchange of the money and revive the economic life. As there was no elected Provincial National Committee, I intended to ask the district

national committees to create, by delegating to it some persons of their choice, a temporary organ which would carry out those tasks with our help.

This good will and readiness of the Czechoslovak delegation will be certainly borne out by the members of the national committees, both local and district, from the territory where the Czechoslovak administration works.

Unfortunately, the attempt at this co-operation was not successful. After a promising beginning, when we put into effect various necessary measures in a friendly way and in the closest harmony with the national committees, as far as they existed, the co-operation slowed down and eventually ceased after the congress of the national committees on November 26, 1944. The cause of this fact was not and is not the unwillingness of the Czechoslovak Government delegation to use the national committees for the tasks imposed by the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, but the resolution of the congress of the national committees in Mukachevo to separate the Carpathian Ukraine from the Czechoslovak Republic and the demand for union of this territory with the USSR. In spite of this, and in agreement with my political advisers, I was and I am ready for even further co-operation with the National Council in all practical economic and social matters - excluding any discussion of constitutional issues, until they are settled by the Government.

You will certainly understand that it is completely outside of my jurisdiction to take a stand on your resolution of November 26, 1944. Only the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, in agreement with the Government of the USSR, can express opinion on this demand. For me, the only

directive, pending a possible different decision, must remain the constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic and her international treaties and obligations. I may remark that there had been no differences at all between us on this point, as can be proved by the point of view of your President, Mr. Ivan Turyanitsa, who is still my political adviser, and who expressed this point of view in his article in the newspaper "Pravda" in Banska Bystrica on October 20, 1944, that is, six weeks ago, as follows:

"What is the future Carpatho-Ukraine to be like? The Carpatho-Ukrainian nation must have equal rights with their Slovak and Czech brethren within the Czechoslovak Republic. The Carpatho-Ukraine must be national and thoroughly democratic. In the Carpatho-Ukraine the Carpatho-Ukrainians should be masters, living in brotherly union with the heroic Czech and Slovak people".

You will certainly understand that I cannot take cognizance of your communication asking me to leave, within the period of three days, the first liberated part of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. I would be violating not only my duties as a member of the Government and as its plenipotentiary, but also our international treaty with the USSR. I have presented your communication as well as your resolution of November 26, 1944, to the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. I must await their further instructions.

At the same time I express my regret that for the negotiation in so important a matter, a form was chosen, which up to now we were used to finding only on the side of undemocratic regimes and our enemies. The Czechoslovak delegation, whose task it was and is to help with the organization of civilian administration in the Car-

pathian Ukraine and which will have in the near future to fulfil this task in yet other parts of the liberated Republic, can in no case be made responsible for this behaviour. I express my deep regret over this, the more so since the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has shown quite clearly, in the formulation of its policy towards the Slovak National Council, in what way they intend to arrange the internal situation in our liberated state. This standpoint of the Government has clearly confirmed its unflinching desire to build up the Republic on the principle of co-operation of the three Slavic nationalities with equal rights, each of them being a master of its own destiny in its own territory.

Under the given circumstances I must, however, await further instructions of my Government. Your present refusal of co-operation has already caused and still causes a slackening in the work that was to obtain all possible help for the fighting Red Army and to take care of the security and of the food supplies of the population. I refuse, naturally, to accept responsibility for this state of affairs, which came into being through no fault, and against the best will, of the Czechoslovak delegation.

I ask you, gentlemen, to take cognizance of my standpoint and to consider well and thoroughly all the reasons for it. The Czechoslovak Government delegation came to this country in pursuance of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement, with their tasks defined precisely and for a limited duration. We were supposed to assist the Ukrainian people, with your help and through you, to organize its own administration and to reconstruct its national life as soon as possible. It is not our fault and therefore not our responsibility if this did not happen in the desired extent.

Since, according to your declaration, I cannot count on your co-operation in the fulfillment of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, I will await the decision of my Government as to my further conduct.

Yours, etc.,

NĚMEC

¹See doc. No. 34.

No. 40

Copy
In Czech

Memorandum by General Hasal for the Delegate

According to a memorandum from Dr. Czesany of November 30, 1944, the President of the District National Committee in Hust issued the following instruction: Czechoslovak national flags are to be immediately removed; supposedly, he threatened by imprisonment simultaneously, as if on the orders of the local Soviet military commander.

In the question of taking down the Czechoslovak flags, Second-Lieutenant of Infantry, Michal Mastej, an officer of the Czechoslovak garrison in Hust, was dispatched to the town commander of Hust to gain information in the matter.

To his question, Second-Lieutenant Mastej was assured by Major of the Red Army Krutskikh (the Soviet town commander) that no orders had been given nor would be given to take down the Czechoslovak flags in this town. At the same time he promised to investigate who had issued such an order and to inform us of the results.

Hust, December 2, 1944.

GENERAL HASAL

No. 41

Copy
In Czech*Memorandum by Colonel Hrabsky for the Delegate*

In addition to the information concerning the order on taking down Czechoslovak flags in Hust:

On December 3, 1944, the Soviet town commander, Major of the Red Army Krutskikh, informed the officer of the Czechoslovak garrison in Hust, Second-Lieutenant Michal Mastej, of the results of his investigation, namely, that the order concerning the taking down of the Czechoslovak national flags in Hust was issued by the National Committee of the town of Hust.

Hust, December 3, 1944.

COLONEL HRABSKY

No. 42

Copy 1
In Russian*Decree of the National Council of the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine*

Concerning the Severance of Relations between the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Delegate of the Czechoslovak Republic

The National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine issued at its session of December 5, 1944, the following decree:

Art. I

In accordance with the decision of the First Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine on the secession of the Trans-

carpathian Ukraine from the Czechoslovak Republic and on its union with the Soviet Ukraine, all Village, Town and District National Committees are instructed to sever immediately any relations and connections with the Delegate of the Czechoslovak Government, Minister Fr. Němec, and with his civilian and military officials who are, for the time being, in the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

Art. II

Beginning with the day of the publication of this decree, the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine must conform in all administrative, military and other questions, exclusively to the instructions of the National Council and, in questions of administration, maintain contact only with the Council.

Art. III

This decree is effective as of today and will be executed by all members of the National Council.

Mukachevo, December 5, 1944

¹From a typewritten copy in Russian found in the files.

Copy
In Czech

No. 43

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Moscow (Pierlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 6, 1944.

We have received your latest telegrams, especially 456, which have comforted us. They

have confirmed my conviction that the Soviet Government, equally with our Government, is interested in settling the whole affair in a speedy and friendly manner, so that the incidents which, according to evidently incomplete information at our disposal, were of local origin and character, would not give rise to complications that would be immediately used by our and Soviet enemies. If I interpret correctly your information, the matter could possibly be settled in the following way:

(1) Additional consent of President Beneš would be given to those who have already joined the Red Army.

(2) The mass drafting into the Red Army would be stopped.

(3) The Soviet Commander would support the mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army.

(4) Our Government Delegate would use all possible means to urge the Subcarpathian Ukrainian people towards military and civilian war effort and to everything that the Red Army needs for the conduct of military operations.

(5) If proposals for union with the Soviet Union or the Soviet Ukraine should still be heard from some Subcarpathian circles, they would receive no answers at all, from either the Czechoslovak or the Soviet side. The Government Delegate and the political advisers would explain to the population that such manifestations are inopportune at present, as they render precarious the political interests of both the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, because these issues can be discussed only after the war has ended and because the Soviet and the Czechoslovak

Governments observe scrupulously the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of alliance.

(6) There is a silent but clear understanding between the Soviet and the Czechoslovak Governments that they must not come to any conflict on behalf of the Subcarpathian Ukraine, since that would be immediately used against both of them. After the war we will settle all those questions definitely, only between the two of us and in the most friendly understanding and in such a manner that our agreement would only help to strengthen the permanent Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance.

We are of the opinion that the problem could be settled on this basis.

RIPKA

Copy
In Czech

No. 44

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, December 7, 1944.

No. 260/92

For London via Embassy. Today I have received the following letter signed by all members of the National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine: "To the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. E. Beneš. Dear Mr. President: Following the resolution of the First Congress of the National Committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine, we have the honour to notify you of the manifesto on the secession of the Transcarpathian Ukraine from the Czechoslovak Republic, accepted unanimously on November 26, 1944. The National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine which, according to

the decision of the Congress, is the only central authority in the whole territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, has begun the realization of its resolution to unite the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine, and we hope, Mr. President, that you will not hinder the realization of the perennial desire of our Ukrainian people to join our motherland - the Soviet Ukraine. The national committees of the villages, towns and districts, with the National Council at their head, have begun their active work in helping, according to their own forces, their great liberator, the heroic Red Army, in her historical mission of complete destruction of the German-Magyar occupants, and in helping also in the liberation of our neighbours, the fraternal Slavic peoples, Slovaks and Czechs, who belong in the united Czechoslovak Republic. The National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine expect, dear Mr. President, that you will order, as soon as possible, the official Delegate of the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Němec, to leave the territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. We remain, etc., I. Turyanitsa, S.V. Beretskyi, I.M. Vash, D.I. Ivashko, M.V. Molavchuk, S.L. Veis, I.J. Kercha, R.I. Rusin, I.J. Kerechanin, F.I. Chekan, C.I. Borkanyuk." I have sent the National Council the following letter:² "Gentlemen: I have received today your letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. E. Beneš. I have the honour to inform you that I have transmitted your letter by telegraph directly to London. I have, however, to draw your attention to the fact that it is outside my jurisdiction to formulate in any way a response to your resolution. My duty is to observe the laws and the constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic and the international treaties with the USSR, in which were stipulated my duties as a Delegate for the administration of the liberated

territory. According to the decision of the Government, I am to carry this administration through the national committees. It goes without saying that the Government Delegate and the delegation, while performing their functions, will enter into contact with the National Council, as a representative organ of the local and district national committees. According to the agreement on the administration of the liberated territories, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief will communicate his wishes and needs exclusively to the Government Delegate. It is my firm intention to communicate these wishes and needs to the National Council, so that it could express its opinion on them and carry them out in co-operation with the Government Delegate. The matter itself and speedy conduct of war could only profit if we could find, in mutual agreement, a concrete way in which this co-operation could be established as soon as possible and realized as speedily as possible. I, for my part, was always completely ready for it. The delegation's direct intervention in the administration of the liberated territory was necessitated by the fact that, at the time of the arrival of the Government delegation in the liberated territory of the Carpathian Ukraine, there were no district committees, let alone a Provincial one. I expect you to kindly communicate to me your standpoint. Yours, etc."

NĚMEC

¹The letter itself has not been found on files.

²No copy or draft of the letter has been found on files.

Copy
In Czech

No. 45

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, December 7, 1944.
No. 263/93

In view of the situation I must urgently get into direct contact with Government. Impossible to discuss everything in open telegrams. Advise on my flight to Moscow.

NĚMEC

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

No. 46

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrov) and Colonel-General Mekhlis to the
Delegate*

Telegram

December 7, 1944.

Dear Mr. Minister:

In answer to your request to undertake a service trip to Moscow I advise. Our Air Force received an order to put at your disposal an aeroplane at the aerodrome at Stryj, whence we ask you to come by car, it will be, however, necessary to announce this to us in advance. If there are any questions concerning your trip, we could meet in Michalovce on December 8, 1944, at 14 o'clock. Lieutenant-Colonel Lyashko was ordered to take care of your flight. Following your request, we

permit Dr. Šrobár and political adviser Valo to go on December 9, to Michalovce, Humenne and Trebišovo. Their permits will be issued by the town commander in Hust.

PETROV, MEKHLIS

No. 47

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

Colonel-General Mekhlis to the Delegate

Telegram

December 7, 1944.

Dear Mr. Minister:

In answer to your telegrams¹ I advise: Dr. Šrobár and adviser Valo are given permission to go to Michalovce, Humenne and Trebišovo. I will probably also come to Michalovce so that we will see each other before your departure for Moscow. Also General Hasal will come with you. You may not send telegrams to the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine since, with the exception of the Government Delegate, no civilians have the right to use army telegraph. The National Council, as far as I know, has no telegraphic connection.

Yours, etc.,

MEKHLIS

¹Not reproduced. By a telegram of Dec. 7, the Delegate asked for permission to send telegrams to the National Council of the Transcarpathian Ukraine through the army telegraph in Hust. By another telegram of the same date he asked for permission for some members of the Slovak National Council to travel to the liberated territory of Slovakia.

Copy
In Czech

No. 48

*The Delegate to the Commander-in-Chief of the
IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Hust, December 7, 1944.

No. 272/110

My dear General:

In answer to your telegram of December 7, 1944,¹ I have the honour to inform you that I, together with my political adviser Valo and General Hasal, will come to the Army Headquarters on December 8, 1944, at 14 o'clock Moscow time.

Yours, etc ,

NĚMEC

Copy
Czech translation
from the Ukrainian

No. 49

*The District National Committee in Hust to the
Delegate*

Hust, December 7, 1944.

The District National Committee of the district of Hust is in possession of abundant material showing that Czech officers and soldiers are engaged among the population in propaganda against the Soviet Union and the Red Army - the army of liberation. The whole world is aware that the Red Army is waging a just war for the liberation

of all European nations who have fallen under the oppression of the German-Fascist occupants. By its heroic acts the Red Army has earned the love and gratitude of all oppressed nations of Europe.

The District National Committee regards such inimical behaviour of your officers and soldiers towards the Red Army as inexcusable. The National Committee protests categorically against such attitude towards the Red Army and suggests:

(1) Any such inimical behaviour towards, and agitation against, the Red Army should be stopped immediately;

(2) the district of Hust should be evacuated immediately and all officers and soldiers should be taken out of the district of Hust;

(3) for anything happening in consequence of such agitation the District National Committee does not assume any responsibility.

Signature¹

¹The original letter in Ukrainian has not been found on files. The Czech translation does not give the name.

No. 50

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ministry of
External Affairs*

Telegram

Moscow, December 22, 1944.

Valo and I are in Moscow. It is impossible to send a detailed report from Hust. There we depend only on the field telegraph. The situation in the

Carpathian Ukraine is as follows: On our arrival the reconstruction of the Republic appeared indubitable. In a fortnight the situation has changed completely. The movement for the union with the USSR is spontaneous. The co-operation of the local and district national committees, very good at the beginning, ended after the Mukachevo congress. The National Council gave the delegation a three days' ultimatum to leave the Carpathian Ukraine. They ordered the national committees to break relations with the delegation. After the ultimatum had been rejected, the National Council sent to the President its resolution for the union with the USSR. The delegation did everything to prevent incidents. Our relation to the National Council is expressed in our wish to be able to co-operate with them in all measures of daily life until a decision about the constitutional status is made. The standpoint of the Army Commander: for the Soviet authorities, the only proper authority with which to negotiate is the Government Delegate and it is his business in what manner he will establish his relations with the local authorities. Today's situation: the refusal to co-operate with the delegation hinders the work of reconstruction, especially in communications and economy. Any further progress depends on how the constitutional position of Transcarpathian Ukraine is decided. I urgently need instructions on this point. The basic line of the whole delegation, i. e., of both the political advisers and its officials, has been expressed as follows: the events in the Carpathian Ukraine are our internal issue and they must not touch upon our relations with the USSR. This attitude has been scrupulously adhered to by the civilian administration. The relationship with the Commander of the Soviet Army was not quite satisfactory at the beginning because of the following circumstances in particular: the Soviet Command's

considerable mistrust of a part of our officers' corps; lack of clarity in the position of the delegation and insufficient definition of its jurisdiction, which gave rise to misunderstandings, a suggested exchange rate of the pengö set too low, so that it appeared to the Command as harmful to the interests of the Red Army and of the local population. And finally, the conflict over the drafting of volunteers into the Red Army. During successive negotiations, the relations between the civil administration and the Red Army have considerably improved. However, the mistrust of the military part of the delegation remained, especially after the arrival of new officers from England, among whom there were some considered objectionable (Hrabovsky) and who were entrusted with leading positions. My impression is that the Soviets feel as if we were following a twofold policy: in the civilian sphere a democratic one, absolutely friendly towards the Soviets; in the military sphere a reactionary one and unfriendly towards the Soviets. I perceive fear that, in contradiction to the civilian administration, the military administration intends to build the army on precisely the same basis as in 1938. The solution of the army problem is, in my opinion, a test of the relations between us and the Soviet Union. I think that it is absolutely necessary to nominate a Chief of Staff from among the generals who are now at the front. The organization of the army by officers of the etape is considered here as confirmation of the fact that we intend to build our army with a defensive spirit. I think that the minister should be a civilian, a Slovak, of indisputably democratic character; the Chief of Staff a Czech, also an undisputable democrat. As for the political situation in the Carpathian Ukraine, the delegation's course of action, with the complete agreement of all its components, was prompted by

the conviction that we ought not to regard the unification campaign as an action against the state. We all agree in criticizing the National Council only for some of the ways in which they directed the movement and for their relationship towards the Government delegation. We all agree in the opinion that it would not be correct to oppose this popular movement. I am asking the Government to decide whether the delegation should carry on its work under the circumstances, or whether it should not, given the consent of the Army Command, leave at the first opportunity for the Slovak territory. Again, we agree in the opinion that the relations between the delegation and the Slovak National Council present conditions for a development quite different from that in the Carpathian Ukraine. Between us and the Slovak National Council there is a clear cut agreement on the unity of the state, on the principle of two nationalities and on the organization of civil administration. On this point I must stress the loyal and extremely positive co-operation of all members of the delegation and of the Slovak National Council as well. I further add to this report that General Petrov and General Mekhlis made clear to me amicably, during our last meeting, that the Czechoslovak Government had not yet remembered with decorations the soldiers of the Red Army who are liberating our territory. I think we are very slow. I recommend that we follow the Russian practice and transfer, during war time, a limited right of conferring orders on the commander of the corps. The greatest obstacle to our work is the lack of communication. The Embassy received my telegrams of November 23, about the political situation, only on December 11. I am asking the Government to decide immediately on the further course to be taken by the delegation and to take care of the communications so

that I can have all decisions in the shortest possible time. I am waiting in Moscow for answer. I have informed Valo in detail about this report.

NĚMEC

Copy
In Czech

No. 51

*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the
Delegate*

Telegram

London, December 13, 1944.

Before you receive official instructions from the Government I am giving you my personal impression on, and opinion of, the situation. It is identical with the opinion of the Prime Minister and of the Government. I see the matter as follows: (1) Immediately upon receiving reports about the difficult situation in the liberated territory, we took steps in Moscow. On two occasions I negotiated with Lebedyev and Lebedyev brought me, after our second interview, a reply from Molotov. We also asked Fierlinger to intervene which he in fact did. (2) I am of the opinion that Moscow is not pleased with these matters, that they do not welcome them the same as our Government does not and that they would like to settle them in a conciliatory way in agreement with our Government. My impression is that in this matter both Governments are proceeding with sincerity and in the same direction. (3) It seems to me, however, that the Ukrainian Government and especially also the Ukrainian Communist Party intentionally proceed differently; they want to confront both Moscow and ourselves with accomplished facts and do not respect anybody, but follow recklessly their own aims. I do not think there is a double game of

Moscow in this and I have the impression that it is beginning to get out of hand of, and against, the Central Government. This would be, of course, a serious development. One must not forget that Ukrainian nationalism is and will be dangerous in every respect and that Moscow has to take it into account. This is, at least, how I see the matter at present. (4) In this situation, we shall proceed as follows: (a) Come what may, we will adhere to the treaty and will demand in Moscow that it be fulfilled, we will relinquish nothing and shall not abandon our rights. (b) Where prevented from asserting and exercising our rights, as you are now, we shall state this fact and shall become observers and passively await further developments. It would be a mistake for us to use force. On the one hand, we do not possess sufficient executive powers and, on the other, they would use any such act as a pretext against us and would exploit it. (c) We shall not relinquish our position and will remain to the last and absolutely correctly at our post and by our duty. (5) I am addressing you in this spirit, you as well as all members of the delegation and all political advisers. Remain at your posts; maintain, please, solidarity with me and with the Government; preserve quiet and patience. To the General in question state issues in writing and prepare thus for yourself and also for us a basis for our future course of action. We will not fail in our obligations now as we have not done at times most critical for us and we shall see later what to do, if others are to fail in their obligations. Wait in this respect for instructions which you will possibly receive from the Government. (6) I send you greetings and also sincere thanks for your course of action in Slovakia and presently in the Subcarpathian Ruthenia. It was correct. Drtina and Uhlir are here and have already reported. Also greetings

and thanks to all your collaborators and simultaneously to the advisers, and again I am asking you to keep up mutual solidarity and to proceed unanimously. We appreciate your work and are with you in your difficulties.

BENEŠ

¹Mgr Jan Šrámek.

No. 52

Carbon copy
In Czech

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 15, 1944.

For Minister Němec.

(1) Both the President and the Government are very glad that you came to Moscow and ask you to send us a detailed report as soon as possible.

(2) Fierlinger will inform you about all steps taken on the one hand by President Beneš and the Government here at the Soviet Embassy and on the other by Fierlinger himself in Narkomindel.

(3) In our telegram to Fierlinger No. 470¹ we have expressed our viewpoint and our opinion on how the issues which have arisen in Subcarpathia (Carp. Ukraine) could be solved. (We ask Fierlinger to show Němec and Valo this telegram.)

(4) We are still of the opinion that the great difficulties which occurred in Subcarpathian Ukraine were provoked by the local Ukrainian elements who, for understandable reasons, desired

the union with the Soviet Ukraine and who act without respect to the international needs and considerations which both the Soviet and the Czechoslovak Governments have in mind. We have also the impression that this state of mind is being used by some Subcarpathian elements who have compromised themselves by collaborating with Magyars and Germans. We are convinced that the Soviet Government, like the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, has the greatest interest in settling speedily this problem so that no international difficulties would arise therefrom, since otherwise our common enemies all over the world could exploit them against the Soviets and against us as well.

(5) The Government, in full agreement with President Beneš, stands on the exact position as given by the treaty of alliance and by the agreement of May 8. We therefore consider as correct that the delegation in the Subcarpathian Ukraine should remain at its post and attempt to perform its tasks as outlined by the treaty of May 8. The Government has a full understanding for the extremely difficult situation in which you find yourself and sincerely thanks you, and all political advisers as well, for having taken a sensible and tactful course. The Government wish that you should endeavour to fulfill the tasks indicated in the agreement of May 8, and that you should, even if you cannot fulfill these tasks in the present situation, remain at your post, even if you have to behave passively for the time being. We are convinced that you are behaving towards the Soviet authorities, both military and civilian, with absolute loyalty, and we beg you to try to ward off, by friendly co-operation with them, any disagreeable situations. The Government welcomes greatly your information about the solidarity of the whole delegation and

asks you all to maintain this firm solidarity. The Government thanks you for your previous attitude in Slovakia, about which Drtina and Uhlíř have reported in detail.

(6) I have also informed Nosek² and his friends about these matters and they, too, agree fully with the outlined course of the Government.

(7) We ask Fierlinger and you to try to settle the matters successfully in your negotiations with the proper Soviet authorities. Greetings to all.

RIPKA

¹See doc. No. 43.

²Václav Nosek, Communist member of the State Council in London.

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 53

*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)
to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs*
Telegram

Moscow, December 15, 1944.

(1) I have visited Zorin today to ascertain the standpoint of the Soviet Government towards questions which were presented by us at the joint meeting with Němec and Valo. Zorin said that he had already reported about our discussion but he did not know yet the Soviet standpoint. He said that it was difficult for them to interfere in our internal matters. We have to settle them ourselves. The Soviet authorities have so far ob-

served the treaty and there is no reason why they should interfere in our relations with the national committees. He asked me what was my opinion about it. I replied that we have to find a way out of the present situation, which is awkward for us and presumably also for the Soviet Government, because otherwise not even the mobilization on the territory of Subcarpathia could be carried out. I said I thought that especially in this matter we need sincere advice of the Soviet authorities. I further said that I would imagine the next step could be that, immediately after the return of Němec, Valo and Petrushchak, Commissar Mekhlis would convoke a joint meeting with the Transcarpathian-Ukrainian Council, and there everything could be settled in a friendly discussion. I know that the members of the National Council are not unfriendly towards us and that such an agreement could be reached with the assistance of the Soviet authorities. Zorin promised to think it over and said that such a solution would not be impossible. To my question whether he had in mind some other, more radical solution, along the lines of the resolution of the National Council, Zorin answered that the Soviet Government would hardly wish any such solution today. Vyshinski, who returned from Rumania, is unfortunately ill and he will not be able to see me before Monday. I told Zorin that I would recommend that our delegates definitely stay here until the matter is settled and until the President and the Government have taken up their standpoint.

(2) Zorin informed me further that during Němec's absence, Lieutenant-Colonel Střelka has supposedly provoked a new incident in Sevlyush. He is understood to have arrested two members of the local committee who were charged by the committee with ensuring supplies for the Red Army.

After an intervention of the Soviet military organs, Střelka had to release them but, immediately afterwards, he had them arrested again, which led to a complaint of the local Soviet organs to the Army Command.

(3) According to Zorin, Vyshinski intends to see also the delegation of the Slovak National Council.

FIERLINGER

No. 54

Carbon copy
In Czech

The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

Telegram

Moscow, December 18, 1944.

I have received your telegram.¹ Thank you. It is the first directive I have received. My course of action up to now corresponds fully to your instructions. The situation is extremely difficult. My telegrams of November 20-25, in which I have sent detailed information, were received by the Embassy only on December 5. After my talks in Moscow I agree with you that everything here is meant honestly. This is confirmed also by the attitude of our Communists, who behaved very well and loyally. The greatest danger lies in the appeals for volunteers. After such appeals, doubts about the permanence of the constitutional position appear and a well directed campaign can change everything in a week or a fortnight, especially if courage is lacking. Therefore, the greatest pressure on the prohibition of appeals

for volunteers in Slovakia. It is to be noted that for more than three months our army has not been mentioned, in spite of its battles and losses. I think there are two reasons: lack of success at Dukla and the defeat at Banská Bystrica. Both were costly affairs and without any gain for the Soviets. From the point of view of our future relations with the Soviet Union, I put the military issues today on the first place. A sweeping and quick solution is necessary. Otherwise, the opinion that our fighting is unsuccessful will also spread into the civilian sphere. The delegation is splendid. All the time an absolute solidarity. It would be good to show gratitude on this occasion. Physical and political difficulties were overcome well, although they were not small. A categorical need: direct communication with you, by radio and couriers. I ask also for Drtina to come back as soon as possible. Would it be possible for me to fly occasionally to London to report? If I were allowed to fly from Uzhgorod via Bari to London, it could be achieved in a week or 10 days. I think it would be important for both sides. This instance the Russians could regard as an exceptional one. My co-operation with the Slovak National Council is good. I have sent to you all the documentation by courier.

*See doc. No. 51.

NĚMEC

Copy
In Czech

No. 55

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 19, 1944.

The Prime Minister, Dr. J. Šrámek, asks Minister Němec not to leave Moscow before the main issues in question are cleared up in your and

Němec's negotiations with the Soviet authorities. We are simultaneously sending to Němec and to you our first reply to your reports.

RIPKA

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 56

*Minister of State in the Czechoslovak Ministry
of External Affairs (Ripka) to the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 21, 1944.

Please give this message to Němec:

(1) We thank you for your work and we thank you and your collaborators for having acted with solidarity and common sense. The Government will occupy itself, step by step, by the complex political questions as outlined by you. You will understand that they cannot decide on your various suggestions immediately, particularly since all the circumstances are not quite clear to us. But we wish to inform you right now that at present, while Masaryk is absent because of illness, the Ministry of National Defence is in charge of Slávik.

(2) As for the constitutional position of Carpathian Ruthenia, we have expressed our standpoint in the instructions sent to Fierlinger as well as in a telegram sent to you. We repeat again that naturally and for reasons of principle we must insist on the viewpoint as given by the treaty of alliance and by the agreement of May 8. But especially for reasons of principle, which you know well, we must insist that, until the peace conference, the pre-Munich integrity of

the Czechoslovak Republic be preserved and that any changes of frontiers be negotiated with final validity only after the war, during the definitive peace settlement. We repeat that in the question of Subcarpathia we will decidedly come to an agreement through direct and friendly negotiations with the Soviet Government, and in such a manner that the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance would be in these negotiations strengthened.

(3) We greatly welcome your positive cooperation with the members of the Slovak National Council and we ask you only to keep up this solidarity, as it is absolutely necessary to the interests of the state.

(4) The Government will occupy itself immediately with the establishment of new decorations for Soviet officers and soldiers.

(5) We ask Fierlinger to demand again consent for a telegraphic connection between the Government Delegate and the Government and the Embassy in Moscow as well. The Government also feels greatly the lack of this connection since, on the one hand we cannot know the existing situation well, on the other, we are unable to inform the Government Delegate systematically.

(6) We agree with what you said and suggested to Zorin on December 13, as reported by Fierlinger in his telegram 494.¹ We ask you to go on with these negotiations. Fierlinger should at the same time ask the Soviet Government to inform him how they regard the suggestions presented by us and which you, too, have transmitted them. We consider it would be better for you to stay in Moscow until the main issues are cleared up and settled with the Soviet Government.

(7) We also must know exactly to what measure and extent the administration was actually transferred into the hands of the Government Delegate.

(8) Also, please, inform Valo and the rest about the contents of this telegram; we ask all of you to proceed unanimously and in solidarity.

¹Not found in the files.

RIPKA

No. 57

Carbon copy
In Czech

*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the
Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Ficrlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 24, 1944.

Thank you for your reports. Only now do I understand the situation more or less clearly and am sending you this personal reply to your suggestions:

(1) In the matter of the constitutional position of Subcarpathia, I repeat what has been said by me and by the Government as well. We insist on the treaty and on the Soviet and our public declarations regarding the pre-Munich frontiers, since otherwise, during the armistice negotiations and at the peace conference, everybody would take a piece of our remaining territory. For the armistice we have already officially demanded from Great Britain the formula on pre-Munich frontiers and it would be a great catastrophe to change that formula with respect to

anybody. I will therefore answer no declarations or appeals of the Council. In any case, no telegram in the name of the Central Council of Uzhgorod has been delivered to me yet, probably the Russian censorship had it stopped, and if it should come I will not reply. In any case, I have no right to give any promises, even if it is generally known among us in what manner I personally wish to solve this question after the peace conference. I ask you therefore to adhere to this line, quietly and realistically, without excitement and as a principle.

(2) From your reports I gained the impression that a mistake was probably committed by the delegation when it moved into the territory which was not yet actually transferred. They were, it seems, in error, thinking that the administration already was in their hands, acted accordingly, and this probably helped to start the conflicts. I ask Minister Němec to pay great attention to this in the future, especially where Slovakia is concerned. I would rather see the political situation there (especially elections of the committees, drafting of volunteers, etc.) develop in the absence of the London Government, i.e. of its delegation, than have events happening in the presence of Czechoslovak authorities, and at a time when everything is abnormal, against our laws and in favour of only one political tendency. It is better if we are not responsible. It must not be forgotten that all this will influence the situation in Slovakia and in the Czech lands. During the negotiations in Moscow, you should therefore put down with more precision the conditions for the transfer of territory, the respective jurisdictions of all military Soviet authorities and the exact jurisdiction of our military authorities. Otherwise there will be conflicts again. This can be arranged only in

Moscow or in a discussion with Petrov and Mekhlis. Perhaps the best would be to attempt to supplement the treaty of May 8. I consider this point a very important one. However, you in Moscow can judge better if this all can be realized.

(3) I reaffirm that the events in Subcarpathia are our internal affair and that we should proceed in a manner which would not reflect upon our relations with the USSR. Where our laws and previous agreements with the Soviets are openly infringed and no agreement can be reached, you should proceed in the manner already indicated in my previous telegram. State it quietly, possibly in writing, but do not start further conflicts. I ask you to remind our military authorities especially of this. In this respect, however, do not leave any doubts that the drafting into the Red Army, conducted without our consent and without agreement with us, cannot be considered from our standpoint as compatible with our laws, but no ultimatata should be given or any sanctions or anything else threatened. While negotiating in Moscow, draw their attention to the fact that an identical procedure in Slovakia would probably provoke grave political consequences. For this reason I agree fully that during your negotiations you put the greatest stress on the development in Slovakia, as appears from your reports.

(4) I agree with you that the most important question is the establishment of the relationship between our soldiers and the soldiers and authorities of the USSR and also that a mutual confidence must be re-created at any price. On this point I stress the following:

(a) Foreseeing these possible political and military complications, I have already decided,

some time ago, in agreement with Šrámek and Ingr,¹ that a civilian should be nominated Minister of National Defence and that the Commander-in-Chief Ingr should hand in his resignation and should occupy himself only with the questions of his military function. Now, at the first opportunity, Ingr will move his office of Commander-in-Chief to the east. On this point a general agreement has been reached directly with the Soviet authorities. In the same manner and following an insistent demand of the Slovak National Council and according to the explicit text of our law, Viest, when nominated Commander in Slovakia, ceased to be Minister. The direction of the Ministry of National Defence has now been entrusted to Masaryk (during his illness it is in charge of Slávik²). Since I am expecting speedy political developments, I wish to keep the Ministry of National Defence for a politician who will be nominated on the basis of the situation at home and on the occasion of a general change of cabinet.

(b) I have received from Subcarpathia a plan for a new military organization, according to which there should be organized only the fighting army (Corps) and not two armies: the fighting one and a peacetime army (i. e. the Corps and the etape), since the latter provoked mistrust of the Soviet soldiers. Further, General Hasal would remain Commander of the Liberated Territory, his delegate should be General Svoboda, Klapálek to be a Commander of the First Corps, and with him Boček and Satorie. There is, supposedly, an understanding among these soldiers.

If this reorganization can help things, London will not oppose it. General Pika should present a formal proposal in this respect.

A basic condition of our success is that the Soviets see that there are among us no rivalries

or personal differences or intrigues. If the above change could work in this direction, I would welcome it.

(c) I was informed that some officers from England are, rightly or wrongly, mistrusted by the Soviets. If that is so, and even if it were a misunderstanding or an injustice toward this or other individual, it is necessary that Nĕmec in agreement with Hasal should suspend from active duty those who, for political or other reasons, are considered as causing the mistrust, or that he should place them in such positions so as to end all of this. More serious matters than persons are at stake in this whole conflict and even though I feel sorry, we have to make this decision. If Nĕmec and Hasal have other plans they should present them here. On the other hand, in these matters they have to be given sufficient powers to decide on the spot and according to the situation.

(d) There are no objections in the matter of a new military decoration. Ripka has already answered you for the Government. However, it would be sufficient to send us now by cable, names of soldiers and officers who should be decorated with *our existing orders*, as has been done during my trip to Moscow; this would be arranged immediately. Cannot Nĕmec and General Hasal arrange this thing immediately with Petrov and Mekhlis? As soon as they send the names or other more detailed agreement with the Russians about the decorations, for ex., numbers of War Crosses, Gallantry Medals, etc., the matter will be immediately expedited. In any case, I will discuss with the Government the possibility of allowing the Delegate and the Military Commander to confer the decorations on the spot, on behalf of the President and the Government, if necessary.

(e) The lack of radio communication between the delegation and London is to be blamed to a

great extent for the misunderstandings and conflicts. You have informed us yourselves to what extent the delegation's connection with Moscow is hampered. It is, indeed, unbelievable that the Soviet authorities have refused it and as far as I know are still refusing it. From the military standpoint, they are, no doubt, within their rights, and it lies completely in their own power. We cannot therefore do anything; however, what has been said above applies even more so in this case, i. e., that upon the transfer and taking over of the territory our rights and our duties must be stipulated with precision. It will be absolutely out of the question, for ex., for our delegation to take over, and move on, the Slovak territory, if they do not have the right to radio communication with London. The Government here cannot know and judge the situation correctly without a direct connection and cannot therefore assume responsibility for what happens there. The Delegate, on the other hand, cannot work without direct consultation with his Government. All decisions are in consequence impossibly drawn out and postponed. This situation has to be ended. During your negotiations in Moscow try, please, to persuade the Soviet authorities there that this question has to be settled. Perhaps it would be best to stipulate that a direct radio communication with London is a necessary condition of the transfer of the territory. The Government Delegate, i. e., the Government, will not take over any territory where military authorities cannot allow a communication with us, for whatever reason. What I have in mind is, I repeat, that in the future the responsibility for what is going on should be clearly established, especially in Slovakia. I think that when negotiating in Moscow for the radio communication you should explain all these reasons quite openly.

(6)³ I remark that all these matters have to be negotiated primarily in Moscow and on the territory of Subcarpathia itself. Lebedyev has been now recalled from London and I have been told that he is not coming back. We do not know here the reasons of this step, but we refuse to connect it in any way with all these events. The Russians, with whom we are in contact here, are rather wondering about the events, express their surprise and tell us that they have no information; knowing the situation here in London and a little in the USA, they understand the reflection of this all upon the relations with the USSR. They wish sincerely that it were ended, especially now when the matters of Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland have again furnished the adversaries of the Soviets and our adversaries with plenty of material for agitation.

(7) For the rest, I am of the opinion that we all, you there and we here, have proceeded correctly, with moderation, consideration and patience. As far as the treaties or our laws were infringed upon, it was done by the local military or civilian authorities or organs. Also, the local population, under the local political influence, acted in other ways than they should have (the committees, for ex.). I expect that the attitude of our delegation, of all its members without difference, will be correct, pro-Soviet and of mutual solidarity. Express to them, please, our thanks for it. Where this would not be the case, I ask you to take energetic steps or to inform the Government and to suggest what should be done.

All known factors show that the Soviet Government and our Government proceed so as to avoid any conflicts and difficulties; so far as conflicts have occurred, they sincerely desire to

put them quickly out of way. I state this again categorically, personally for myself and for the Government as well. You will be informed as soon as possible about Drtina's and Uhlíř's return. Try to settle everything, or at least as much as possible, in Moscow before returning to Subcarpathia, and preferably stay until you have cleared up the issue. But it is up to yourselves to decide this in Moscow.

BENEŠ

¹Sergěj Ingr.

²Dr. Juraj Slávik.

³Thus in the copy in the Delegate's files.

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 58

*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic*
Telegram

Moscow, December 25, 1944.

I have received your message today. Thank you for the instructions and I state the following:

(1) During the fortnight of my stay in Moscow I have had only one opportunity for an informative discussion with Zorin, in which Valo and Tierlinger took part; I intended to leave immediately after this interview, but I have remained in Moscow because the Government wished it, and also because Narkomindyel announced that Vyshinski will see us. This interview has not taken place yet, but it may take place in the next few days.

(2) Meanwhile the situation in the Carpathian

Ukraine has deteriorated. After the initial improvement after my arrival in Moscow, new measures were taken by the Army Command (see the telegram of General Hasal on the disbandment of the Staff Company).

(3) I have inquired whether, in the development of these poor relations, the delegation was guilty as a whole or through its individual members. I can declare that in spite of some mistakes and blunders committed by individuals, the delegation on the whole has acted correctly and that the poor relations between the Soviet authorities and the delegation are a consequence of certain doubts about our military policy (I refer to my previous telegram²) and about our conception of foreign policy. In the military matters, we are reproached mainly for tendencies to build the army in the etape on the principles of 1938. In the foreign policy, there is the unsettled relationship towards the Polish Committee, the last speeches of Masaryk and the application of our treaty according rather to its letter than to its spirit. These causes created a situation in which the Soviet authorities deal with our matters a little more harshly than with those of other liberated nations.

(4) I am aware that some misunderstandings were caused by the fact that the liberated territory has not been transferred formally to the Delegate. I have explained the situation in my previous telegrams. The responsibility for it does not lie with one side only.

(5) As I see the situation, I warn against the transfer of the Army Command, with Ingr at its head, to this territory. I regret that I have learned about it only in Moscow. The agreement about the civil administration presupposes only

a military mission. I have drawn attention to this fact already a month ago. I am of the opinion that in the present situation all military affairs should be concentrated in the Corps. If this question is not quickly and satisfactorily settled, we will be in Hust even after the occupation of Bratislava and we will never get the radio communication.

(6) To the situation in the Carpathian Ukraine I remark: the problem of the separation from the Republic and of union with the USSR has been already posed and has to be solved and solved definitely.

(7) I stress repeatedly the solidarity of the delegation, both of its political and official parts, in all difficult situations. I will transmit them your thanks.

(8) In all these problems we keep in mind Slovakia and Bohemia. I underline therefore again the importance of the military issues and the necessity of a clear conception in the foreign policy.

(9) I will wait in Moscow a few more days during which, according to Fierlinger, the interview is to take place. Then I intend to discuss all the questions with the Army Command. I will invite the National Council to a discussion about co-operation in the questions of daily life. If no agreement is reached, I will then limit the work of the delegation, until its departure for Slovakia, on its internal business. I consider the situation as being very serious and demanding a sweeping and courageous solution. There must not be any doubts here about our sincere wish to be a loyal ally of the USSR.

(10) I ask to be informed in what way and by whom the project of arrangement of military matters has been submitted to you in London from Subcarpathian Ruthenia. I do not know anything about it and I ask that these eminently political matters should be settled in future in agreement with me.

(11) My colleague Valo has been informed about this and your telegram as well.

NĚMEC

¹See doc. No. 57.

²See doc. No. 50.

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 59

Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)
to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs
Telegram

Moscow, December 26, 1944.

(1) Today Vyshinski saw me, Němec, Valo, Ursiny,¹ Novomeský¹ and Vesel.¹ On Němec's demand the delegation of the Slovak National Council went with us, to which I did not object. I had to assure the Protocol that the delegation of the Slovak National Council was coming with us on our own demand. I think, nevertheless, that it was well that we went to Vyshinski all together and also later, after the interview ended, Vyshinski stated he was glad that it happened so. I told Vyshinski that we would like to discuss with him on the one hand the question of Subcarpathia, where a specific situation has developed, and on the other hand our further cooperation with the Soviet Command in the territory of Slovakia. Our suggestions had been already

presented to Zorin and we were now expecting Vyshinski's answer.

(2) Vyshinski stressed that his Government adhered strictly to the treaty and did not want to do anything against it. He thought, however, that neither of our states could disregard a strong popular movement such as could be observed in Subcarpathia. It was not a temporary occurrence or an opportunist movement; on the contrary, it was a national movement based on history, and thus the Soviet Government could not be expected to want to hamper or oppose the movement. To this Němec asserted that from the Czechoslovak side as well there have been no attempts to obstruct the movement and that the delegation had in mind only its concrete tasks and was in general, at any time, prepared for co-operation with the national committees. In concluding this part of the discussion I stated that the points of view of both Governments were identical. The President and the Government could not accept today any change in the constitutional position of Subcarpathia, but there was an agreement between us that this question would be settled in such a way as would correspond to our close and friendly alliance with the USSR, which we wish to strengthen even more. Vyshinski agreed with this and we thereafter went over to the concrete question of the co-operation between the delegation and the Ukrainian Council.

(3) Němec upheld the opinion that it was important that all able bodied citizens do their duty but that he, personally, did not attach any importance to the question whether the able bodied men, who had not joined the Red Army as volunteers and had not been mobilized yet, should serve in the Czechoslovak or the Red Army. Valo expressed himself in the same sense. Vyshinski's opinion

was that the matter should be decided in a manner analogical to that used with the Soviet citizens of Czech and Slovak nationality who were mobilized for the Czechoslovak Corps. We should allow the mobilization of Czechoslovak citizens of Ukrainian and Russian nationality for the Red Army. However, Vyshinski did not dare to suggest any solution. All questions should be solved between the delegation and the Ukrainian National Council on the spot. Němec said that he would attempt this and expressed hope that it might be achieved, given a benevolent attitude of the Soviet Command. Němec further explained that he intended to appoint Petrushchak as his representative to discuss with the Ukrainian Council all matters of common interest. Further, Němec would like to proceed as soon as possible to the Slovak liberated territory, together with the delegates of the Slovak National Council.

(4) In the name of the Slovak National Council Ursiny thanked the Soviet Government for the help rendered to the Slovak revolution. Vyshinski interrupted him immediately and said that the Soviet Government had done everything possible and that they will go on rendering help, since the Slovak resistance was fulfilling an important task. Ursiny stressed that the Slovak National Council was in favour of the unity of the Czechoslovak state and of a close friendship with the USSR. There was an agreement between the Slovak National Council and the President and the Czechoslovak Government about the further tasks of the Slovak National Council, which will co-operate with the Government Delegate. In this connection, a discussion developed about the concrete tasks of the Government Delegate and of the Slovak National Council and about their relationship to the Soviet Command, and especially about the function of the military mission, which should

be more closely connected with the Command and should discuss with it not only military and organizational questions, but also all economic and financial questions such as the division of booty, the restitution of rolling stock, of machinery and of public property as well as all questions of economic help. Vyshinski promised that the Command of the Red Army would meet the demands of our delegation in all points and stressed that through joint effort it would be possible to stabilize the economy of the liberated territory. He warned against exaggerated optimism as far as UNRRA was concerned. To my question in what stage was the question of nomination of Alekseyev, he answered that negotiations were being conducted with Lehman. Nĕmec stressed the necessity of a radio communication with London, assuring that it would not be misused. Finally, both the Government and the Slovak delegates stressed their wish to be given the opportunity to leave Moscow as soon as possible and to transfer afterwards from Hust to the Slovak territory. Vyshinski said that he had to report first to Molotov, who had been ill lately, but that he thought that all this might be achieved.

(5) My general impression from the interview is that with regard to the situation in Subcarpathia the negotiations ended favourably. It is true that Nĕmec spontaneously offered concessions of principle in the question of our mobilization, but I doubt that it would have been possible to bridge the difficulties in any other way.

(6) During the discussion Vyshinski stated that the President and the Czechoslovak Government should be in the liberated territory. It would then be easier to come to an understanding in many matters, especially in the economic

assistance. He referred to the example of Poland and Hungary.

(7) Lebedyev, who lunched with me, maintained approximately the same opinion. The presence of the President could help to make easier the solution of so many difficult problems which appear in the liberated territory, and it would especially give support to the liberation fight in the Czech lands.

It is the first time that this idea was expressed at all and in such a clear manner. It is evident that Moscow earnestly contemplates closer political and economic co-operation with us.

Today's interview with Vyshinski has cleared up many issues, since it helped to dispel mistrust. In my opinion it is necessary to continue our co-operation with the USSR in this spirit.

FIERLINGER

¹Members of the Slovak National Council.

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 60

Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)
to the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs
Telegram

Moscow, December 27, 1944.

[(1)] This morning I received a message from Molotov that I could see him, together with Němec, today at 7 o'clock p.m., in the Kremlin and if we wished to take anybody along, that we were free to do it. I consulted Němec and we

decided that, having seen Vyshinski yesterday altogether, we would do the same on this occasion and that we would also take along Petrushchak, so that we could not be reproached for doing it all without the Ukrainians. The interview lasted 3/4 of an hour and Vyshinski was also present. To Molotov's question what we wished to inform him about, I repeated approximately what I had already said yesterday. There existed a movement in Subcarpathia which we respected but which had manifested itself sometimes - on whichever side the fault for this might have been - by quite sharp opposition to our delegation. We feel sorry for this since we had lived with the people of Subcarpathia for twenty years. Our people always felt friendly towards them and regarded with sympathies the question of their national self-determination, though there might have been on our side some obscurity on this point. The President and the Government did not consider it opportune to solve the question in any radical way now; however, they were prepared to do so at a given moment in the spirit of unqualified friendship towards the USSR and towards the people of Subcarpathia as well. Several times the President has advised the Soviet Ambassador of this very definitely and the Government, too, have expressed themselves in the same manner in telegrams which I have received lately. It was necessary to find some temporary solution without affecting the constitutional position of Subcarpathia for the time being, with this was connected a whole series of practical problems, which we discussed yesterday with Vyshinski. Thereafter Molotov asked Němec to give his opinion and to say what he thought about the Ukrainian movement in Subcarpathia and, also, whether he had any complaints concerning the attitude of the Soviet organs. Němec replied that he thought the movement was spontaneous and very strong and that he

had also respected this and that, on the whole, he had no complaints even if there had been incidents which he had always tried to settle directly with the proper Soviet organs. After this Ursiny repeated about the same that he had said yesterday. Molotov promised to assist the economic reconstruction of Slovakia and in this connection mentioned the proposal of our participation in reparations to be imposed on Hungary, which he had sent to the President. (This is known to the President and to the Government from my previous telegrams.) Molotov added that the British have not yet given their opinion and that they have been drawing out the negotiations unnecessarily. I then asked Molotov if he had any complaints concerning the attitude of our delegation in Subcarpathia and if he thought that we have not proceeded correctly or if mistakes were made on our side. Molotov replied a little evasively that we could not expect the Soviet Government to hamper spontaneous manifestations of the will of the people who felt that they belonged ethnically to the great Ukrainian nation. He thought that it would be well if the President and the Government were nearer to the liberated territory. Many things could be thus cleared up more easily. I asked him where did he think the President and the Government should go. He replied that there were many cities where the President and the Government could take up their residence, thus for example Lwów. I answered that this idea was very interesting and that I would transmit it to the President. Perhaps it could also be our liberated territory. With this Molotov agreed with animation. Towards the end Molotov also asked Petrushchak to express his opinion. Petrushchak said that he did not think any difficulties could exist between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. There was only one difficulty, namely, that the Ukrainian people of Subcarpathia

wanted to join the Soviet Ukraine and it was therefore desirable that the Czechoslovak Government remove this obstacle as soon as possible. (I am using Petrushchak's words.) Finally, Němec asked if the Soviet authorities also intended to carry out the drafting of volunteers in the Slovak territory. Molotov answered that this question would not be considered. Němec further reminded him of his demand for a radio communication with the Government. Molotov replied that the delegation would have the radio communication, but it would be better if the President and the Government were nearer, then the contact would be easier.

(2) From the interview with Molotov I have gained the general impression expressed already in my previous telegrams. The Soviet Government wish a closer political and economic co-operation with us. They regard the problem of Subcarpathia as a matter solved in principle by the recent developments; occasionally they also bring up the plebiscite of 1918, which asked for the union with the Soviet Ukraine. However, the Soviet Union respects the existing treaties and the wish of the President and of the Government to leave the question open until the moment when the discussions could be resumed. Whether they submit to this wish with willingness or only with embarrassment, it is difficult to say. Were I to take into account all circumstances I would say that our last interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov have cleared the atmosphere considerably and have prepared the ground for a closer and more effective co-operation in the Slovak territory. The presence of the delegation of the Slovak National Council, who repeatedly stressed the unity of our state, was useful. The concessions made by Němec, as Government Delegate, in military and administrative matters in Subcarpathia could

be fully outweighed by advantages which we could gain elsewhere, since today these are actually questions of vital importance for our state. In this sense should be interpreted the results of our negotiations. Němec will also send in a report.

FIERLINGER

Carbon copy
In Czech

No. 61

*The Delegate and the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger) to the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic and to the Czechoslovak
Ministry of External Affairs*

Telegram

Moscow, December 29, 1944.

For President Beneš and the Government:

After my talks in Moscow, especially after the interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov, I submit this my opinion about the situation in general:

The movement in the Carpathian Ukraine for the separation from the Republic and for union with the USSR has to be characterized in its present stage as a popular and spontaneous movement. The Soviet Union considers it to be a manifestation of the national will and respects it in the same way as it does in general with the manifestations of national will of the Slavic nations. It insists, naturally, on adherence to the international treaties and agreements, as it has also proved by the attitude of its leading and military authorities in our liberated territory. If there appeared, on the part of the sub-

ordinated organs, some deficiencies in this sense on our or Soviet side, we have settled this in yesterday's discussion with Molotov. In this regard I have drawn attention to the fact that there have been some mistakes on our side which could be explained by the lack of clarity of our position. Molotov, on the other hand, stated that when people were already tired by the war, there certainly were and would be mistakes committed, which could be explained by the fever of the first days of freedom.

Considering this situation, I recommend to the Government to occupy themselves immediately with the problem of the Carpathian Ukraine. It is out of question that the Czechoslovak administration could assert itself in the Carpathian Ukraine against the will of the local population. Under the circumstances, that would mean governing there against the wishes of the people by force and against the intentions of the Soviet military organs who demand an absolute peace in their hinterland. The problem of the constitutional position of the Ukrainian people in the Republic was always a problem of its kind. The right to decide to which state the Ukrainian people wanted to belong is given by their historical development.

With regard to the prestige of the state and to the further internal and external development of the Republic, I consider as absolutely necessary that the Government should decide to announce to the Soviet Union that they are willing, taking into consideration the resolution of the conference of the national committees of the Carpathian Ukraine of November 26, 1944, to accept that demand, and that they are asking the USSR to open negotiations in the matter. It is up to the USSR to decide for itself whether or not the solution

of the question at present will cause it any international difficulties.

I warn our Government against our interpreting the movement as anything else than a result of the popular and national consciousness in the Carpathian Ukraine, as it developed, step by step, after the liberation of the country.

I informed Molotov frankly that I had no right to negotiate questions of international policy and that I would only submit my opinions and suggestions to London. These suggestions, in the above sense, I have formulated in a joint conference in which took part, besides our Ambassador, all members of the Slovak National Council (Ursiny, Novomeský, Vesel), deputy Petrushchak and deputies Gottwald and Kopecký. After a detailed and friendly discussion and after changes and amendments, this formula was unanimously accepted. I wish to point out and stress the fact that we are unanimously of the opinion that the wish expressed by Molotov, concerning the transfer of the President and of the Government, temporarily for example to Lwów or another Soviet city, should be satisfied. We consider this under the circumstances as advantageous for the situation.

I ask the President and the Government to decide on these suggestions as soon as possible; I am clearly aware, and I did not conceal it during the conference, that they are not in complete agreement with the present conception of the Government. The initiative on our side would certainly strengthen and better our position in the eyes of the Soviet Government, and this enhanced sympathy towards us would certainly find its evaluation in our future political and economic demands. From my point of view, the question today is whether we will utilize the will of the

ordinated organs, some deficiencies in this sense on our or Soviet side, we have settled this in yesterday's discussion with Molotov. In this regard I have drawn attention to the fact that there have been some mistakes on our side which could be explained by the lack of clarity of our position. Molotov, on the other hand, stated that when people were already tired by the war, there certainly were and would be mistakes committed, which could be explained by the fever of the first days of freedom.

Considering this situation, I recommend to the Government to occupy themselves immediately with the problem of the Carpathian Ukraine. It is out of question that the Czechoslovak administration could assert itself in the Carpathian Ukraine against the will of the local population. Under the circumstances, that would mean governing there against the wishes of the people by force and against the intentions of the Soviet military organs who demand an absolute peace in their hinterland. The problem of the constitutional position of the Ukrainian people in the Republic was always a problem of its kind. The right to decide to which state the Ukrainian people wanted to belong is given by their historical development.

With regard to the prestige of the state and to the further internal and external development of the Republic, I consider as absolutely necessary that the Government should decide to announce to the Soviet Union that they are willing, taking into consideration the resolution of the conference of the national committees of the Carpathian Ukraine of November 26, 1944, to accept that demand, and that they are asking the USSR to open negotiations in the matter. It is up to the USSR to decide for itself whether or not the solution

of the question at present will cause it any international difficulties.

I warn our Government against our interpreting the movement as anything else than a result of the popular and national consciousness in the Carpathian Ukraine, as it developed, step by step, after the liberation of the country.

I informed Molotov frankly that I had no right to negotiate questions of international policy and that I would only submit my opinions and suggestions to London. These suggestions, in the above sense, I have formulated in a joint conference in which took part, besides our Ambassador, all members of the Slovak National Council (Ursiny, Novomeský, Vesel), deputy Petrushchak and deputies Gottwald and Kopecký. After a detailed and friendly discussion and after changes and amendments, this formula was unanimously accepted. I wish to point out and stress the fact that we are unanimously of the opinion that the wish expressed by Molotov, concerning the transfer of the President and of the Government, temporarily for example to Lwów or another Soviet city, should be satisfied. We consider this under the circumstances as advantageous for the situation.

I ask the President and the Government to decide on these suggestions as soon as possible; I am clearly aware, and I did not conceal it during the conference, that they are not in complete agreement with the present conception of the Government. The initiative on our side would certainly strengthen and better our position in the eyes of the Soviet Government, and this enhanced sympathy towards us would certainly find its evaluation in our future political and economic demands. From my point of view, the question today is whether we will utilize the will of the

Carpathian people so as to better our position or will we wait for the Carpathian people to settle things without our consent, or even against our wishes. By a bold decision we can gain much today. By imprudence or vacillation we can lose much.

These suggestions are a result of my experience in the Carpathian Ukraine, in Banská Bystrica and of my talks on the one hand with our deputies here and the members of the Slovak National Council, and on the other hand, with the Soviet authorities. My impression is that our deputies here advocate clearly, unambiguously and with decision the principle of the Czechoslovak Republic, strong internally through the solution of the question of the Czech and Slovak nationalities, and that they support the policy of a loyal co-operation with the Soviet Union.

NĚMEC, FIERLINGER

No. 62

Carbon copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic*
Telegram

Moscow, December 29, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

In addition to my yesterday's telegram² which I sent as a result of joint deliberations and which, before being sent, was read and concurred with by Gottwald, I am sending this my opinion: The standpoint expressed in yesterday's telegram was my personal standpoint. Even if the separatist movement in the Subcarpathian Ruthenia developed

step by step, it is today a popular movement and is being recognized as such today. This explains the attitude of the Soviet union towards it. To break it means to govern with bayonets and to create an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. Had I manifested any doubts in the decisive moments about the spontaneity of this movement, then, in my opinion and according to my experience, a similar situation would have developed in Slovakia. The formula which I have used created a situation where Molotov himself had invited me to negotiations, during which he (1) actually apologized for mistakes of some subordinated organs, (2) recognized our right to a direct radio communication with London, and (3) declared there would be no drafting of volunteers in Slovakia. I consider these facts as very important for further developments since I emphasize and have emphasized the last point. I am of the opinion that postponement tactics in a matter on which there cannot be any doubts among us today, (the problem of Carpathian Ukraine) could result in isolating the Government from the homeland. I think that we were threatened by the danger of the same measures being used against us as were used against the London Polish Government. In this respect I considered as particularly significant Lebedyev's recall to Moscow. I tried to overcome here this critical moment. I was afraid that the drafting of volunteers would take place in Slovakia, that the delegation would be practically excluded from having any influence on the events and that the Slovak National Council would follow the road of the Ukrainian Council. I think that my attitude helped to dispel this danger. I might say that the members of the Slovak National Council behaved very well and that Ursiny, when talking with Vyshinski and Molotov, underlined emphatically the unity of the Republic. Petrushchak, on the other hand, was a complete

failure My suggestion, that the Government should now take the initiative and should offer to negotiate the problem with the Soviet Union, seems to me the only possible one, and it contains more than this problem. I think that the negotiations would lead to a final settlement being shifted to a time more opportune to both parties. But we have to come up with the initiative, soon and clearly. I am aware that in my attitude I did not adhere fully to my instructions and I take full responsibility for it, politically and personally. I acted as I thought fit from the point of view of the future and of the integrity of a Czech and Slovak unitary territory. My suggestions are well considered and I advise you urgently to accept them. I have also found out that Fierlinger proceeded correctly. I warn against bickering between us. The tenor of some telegrams from London is unnecessarily sharp. There is no possibility of any other representation here. I am suggesting all these things as indispensable. I think that in this way we will strengthen the co-operation with the Communists. Valo behaved very well during the whole crisis, Kopecký expressed to me his thanks yesterday in the conference, in spite of the fact that upon my arrival our deputies here were almost against us. As for the transfer of the Government, i.e., of the present one, I will continue to discuss the possibilities of a transfer directly home. For you I consider this as unavoidable in the very near future. You should negotiate regarding the transfer. I think that before it is accomplished, it will be possible to go to Košice or to Prešov.

NĚMEC

¹The copy has December 29, should be probably December 30. Cf. the dates of documents No. 61 and No. 62.

²See doc. No. 61

No. 63

Carbon copy
In Czech

*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the
Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

London, December 31, 1944.

From President Dr. E. Beneš:

To your telegrams Nos. 512, 513, 514, 515¹ and to your reports about the interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov I advise the following:

(1) The discussions with Vyshinski and Molotov have changed the situation so far that I need not answer the previous telegrams in detail. I will say, however, that I welcome above all the following questions having been cleared up:

(a) The constitutional problem of Subcarpathia has been postponed for the time being, and it was agreed that at the given moment it will be settled in a friendly way without affecting the amicable relations between the two states. I suppose that this point of view agreed upon with Molotov could be rendered more precise between the two Governments at the time of my passing through Moscow on my way to our territory. On this occasion also, many other questions could be dealt with, such as for instance, some concerning frontiers, carrying out of the transfer², indemnification for damages committed by Germany and Hungary, etc.

(b) In Slovakia, there will in no case be any drafting of volunteers into the Red Army. It is also valuable that Molotov and Vyshinski heard in person the standpoint of the members of the Slovak National Council.

(c) I consider both interviews as important, as they have certainly improved and relieved the situation and re-established confidence. On this basis and at least for the time being, the situation concerning the organization of, and the cooperation in, the military matters could be improved also. As I view the situation from here, hardly anything can be done in military matters before we transfer our seat to the liberated territory, but I ask Němec to do everything possible in these matters, without abandoning the principles of the agreement of May 8, 1944. The suggestion of personnel changes in the Corps and in the army organization in the liberated territory were sent to me from Hust by Hala, upon an understanding, I imagine, with all our soldiers concerned.

(2) Please inform the Soviet Government that in my judgment, my and the Government's transfer to the liberated territory is the only solution which can finally settle our present difficulties, both political and military. I therefore welcome this indirect appeal to transfer, made by the Soviet Government, accept the invitation and am making immediate preparations. I might observe that I have expected the invitation. With regard to the West, I consider it more opportune to effect the transfer directly to our territory (for example Košice) and not to Lwów or other Soviet place, unless it were for quite a short period. I ask Němec to make all preparations in our territory accordingly, as far as it is possible to do so. It will be, of course, necessary to define the zone in which the President and the . . . [words missing] . . . , and to agree exactly on the mutual rights and obligations of the President and the Government and of the Soviet military authorities so that the difficulties would not be repeated.

(3) I fully agree that there is insufficient contact between our and the Soviet Governments, in view of the fact that our most important matters are now being decided in Moscow and not in London. From this spring also the misunderstandings or mistrust in questions of foreign policy. I do not regard as tragic what you and Němec reported on the matter of foreign policy, but I do not underestimate it and I do not wonder that, given the Russian sensibility and their suspicious nature, conclusions not corresponding to reality are being drawn from our various utterances or incorrectly interpreted formal steps. Lastly, the fact itself that we are still in London must have some effect. I have expected this with certainty. Therefore it will be only right and logical if the present situation ends as soon as possible.

(4) As for Poland I state the following:

(a) I, as nobody else, have helped the Soviets in this matter with all concerned and especially in the situation here I have worked consistently for a Polish-Soviet agreement as we have discussed it in Moscow and as it has been later agreed upon by Stalin and Churchill. Everybody knows that and especially the Poles here know it. I have, of course, never advertised it nor used it for propaganda.

(b) However, we cannot do anything in the question of the Lublin Committee until we have been asked by either the Soviets or the Lublin Committee, and until the Lublin Committee has been proclaimed the Government. It is unthinkable that we should begin to break diplomatic relations with the Polish Government when, as far as we are concerned, we have no reasons to do so.³

(c) We expect that undoubtedly the Lublin Committee will proclaim itself the Government, that it will be recognized by the Soviets and that the question will be thus posed for us. In this case I consider it necessary to enter into preliminary negotiations in which we would agree on some declaration, which would mean a rejection of Beck's policy towards us in 1938 and 1939, a disavowal of all his steps and negotiations with Germany, Hungary and Rumania regarding our territory and a mutual promise of friendly relations for the future. Just because the Polish Government here kept refusing to do something of this kind, this would be a weighty manifestation and make great impression both here and in America; it would help Lublin considerably, inflict a new blow on Germany and have a good effect in Poland as well as at home. Please inform the Soviet Government about all this and possibly ask them their opinion; you can also sound the Lublin Poles in this connection, if you have the opportunity. It would be best to settle everything at once, at the time of my moving from London to the East, but I do not make it a condition.

(5) 4

(6) 4

(7) On the strength of your reports about the two interviews I think that in the present situation you have done, on the whole, everything possible. It was also good that a line has been maintained in these discussions which has been reached in these discussions.⁶ I myself had a talk with Chichayev during which I asked Moscow decidedly for clarification. From the course of your discussions I gain the impression that Narkomin-

dyel already has his telegrams from here. Thank you for the reports.

BENEŠ

¹Could not be identified.

²The transfer of the German (and possibly Magyar) population from Czechoslovakia to Germany (Hungary).

³The Czech text has an obvious misprint: ". . . we do not give reason to do so.

⁴Not reproduced. Concerned with Army organisation matters.

⁵Sic. Probably garbled.

No. 64

Carbon copy
In Czech

*Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)
to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic*
Telegram

Moscow, January 2, 1945.

(1) Today we all discussed together your telegram No. 524¹ and we acknowledge gratefully that you surmise correctly the reasons for our attitude. We suppose, nevertheless, that you were not yet acquainted with the collective suggestion presented by Němec in our telegram No. 522,² and that, therefore, on the occasion of your passing through Moscow your negotiations could be concerned only with the definite settlement of the whole Subcarpathian problem. I ask you to examine our suggestions and inform me about it.

(2) Your intentions concerning Poland I interpret as your having in mind actual recognition of the new Government, immediately after it is constituted and recognized by Moscow. In such a case your wish to reach an agreement on the questions of the frontier is entirely legitimate.

To send a simple representative would not be enough any more. Presently also Churchill promised to send a representative. I will find out cautiously from Narkomindyel and from the Poles here. I think it will be possible to obtain a satisfactory declaration from the Polish side when needed.

(3)³

(4) I can state once more that, in all discussions with the Government Delegate here, all participants were absolutely unanimous and we all hope that this will be properly appreciated in London and will induce you to further steps on a road which we here consider as the only correct one.

FIERLINGER

¹See doc. No. 63.

²See doc. No. 61.

³Not reproduced. Concerned with Army organization matters.

No. 65

Carbon copy
In Czech

President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Delegate and to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Fierlinger)

Telegram

London, January 4, 1945.

I asked today Chichayev to come and see me and informed him about the following:

(1) I asked him to transmit to Moscow my official communication that I welcomed the interviews with Vyshinski and Molotov, according to which I and the Government should move our seat

to our liberated territory. I asked him to transmit the information that it has been decided that both I and the Government will effect the transfer.

Simultaneously, I . . . [words missing] . . . Chichayev that I have never been kept in London, nor am I now, by any political considerations or by any influence on the part of the British Government, and that I have been simply waiting for the circumstances to be ripe for the change of the seat and that it had been quite impossible to do so without preliminary and direct agreement with the Soviet Government. I have been waiting for some such indication or suggestion from the Soviets. This has been settled now. The transfer can be completed in one or two months and it will be necessary to start the preparations immediately. For the time being I have Košice in mind.

(2) I went with him in detail through the Polish business and informed him about all the points in my instructions sent to you in my last telegram.¹ I told him further that I have received meanwhile and only today your telegram about your interview with Zorin on the Polish matters. I asked him to inform Moscow that you will be having discussions along the lines suggested in my last telegram and that I think it should be Moscow's duty to help us now to settle all the problems between us and Poland, in the spirit as I have cabled to you. That would be a role fitting the greatest Slavic nation, considering that Moscow obviously reckons for the future with policy of Slavic solidarity, as far as I am able to judge.

(3) I went with him again through the question of Subcarpathia. I acknowledged that, according

to your telegrams concerning your interviews with Zorin, Vyshinski and Molotov, Moscow understands well our need to have the final solution in Carpathian Ruthenia postponed and that I considered the matter as closed for the time being. Anyway, since the question of the change of our seat is now settled, I thought that I myself would be passing through Moscow on my way to the liberated territory and would arrange the whole matter personally with Molotov and Stalin.

(4) I continued with what Ripka had been discussing already with Chichayev, the matter of the armistice conditions with Hungary, and asked him again personally to support us in the three remaining points: the date of the state of war between us and Hungary, the pre-Munich frontiers and the formula on transfer.¹ I told him that you had all the formulas and that you would ask for their acceptance during the negotiations. I have also drawn his attention to the circumstance that we must fulfil our duties in this respect much more rigorously since the Slovaks were concerned here.

(5) Your and Nĕmec's telegram² concerning our external policy I will answer later. Nĕmec's suggestions I will answer separately. However, the idea must be *a priori* excluded that the President of the Republic or the Government and the President could pass some official resolutions that they gave up this or that territory; put that out of your minds. Such things can be and must be settled, in the interest of both partners, in a quite different way.

BENEŠ

¹See doc. No. 63.

²The transfer of the Magyar population from Czechoslovakia to Hungary.

³See doc. No. 61.

Carbon copy
In Czech

No 66

*President of the Czechoslovak Republic to the
Delegate*
Telegram

London, January 5, 1945

(1) I have been greatly surprised by your telegram of December 29, No. 522.¹ You say, with regard to the prestige of the state and to the further internal and external development of the Republic, that the Government should decide to announce formally to the Soviet Union that they are willing to comply with the demand for separation of Subcarpathia and to start negotiations concerning it. You say that the Government should decide immediately. I do not agree with this suggestion.

(2) By his telegram of December 26, No. 514² Fierlinger has reported from his interview with Zorin the following Soviet standpoint: "The Soviet Government does not demand from us any rash settlement concerning the Carpathian Ukraine and does not even consider it as expedient at present". In his telegram No. 516³ Fierlinger informs us that, in his discussions with all of you, Vyshinski stressed that his Government had adhered strictly to the treaty and did not want to do anything against it. Fierlinger then adds: "In concluding this part of the discussion I stated that the points of view of both Governments were identical: The President and the Government cannot accept today any change in the constitutional position of Subcarpathia, but there is an agreement between us that this question will be settled in such a way as would correspond to our close and friendly alliance with the USSR which

we wished to strengthen even more. Vyshinski agreed with this." And finally, in his telegram No. 519,⁴ Fierlinger reports on your discussion with Molotov and says that he explained to him, just as he did to Vyshinski, that it was necessary to find some temporary solution without affecting the constitutional position of Subcarpathia and he adds: "however, the Soviet Union respects the existing treaties and the wish of the President and of the Government to leave the question open until the time when it would be possible to discuss it." How should I then reconcile all this with your urgent suggestion? Considering Fierlinger's telegrams I regarded the agreement about the postponement of the constitutional settlement as confirmed, since that is what follows from them clearly. It has also been confirmed here by Chichayev. Besides, neither the Government nor the President has any right to do what you suggest, as I have already told Fierlinger several times. We can state that we are prevented from exercising our sovereignty in Subcarpathia, but we have no right to give it up as simply as that. This is not a standpoint unfriendly to the USSR and, as I see from the replies of Zorin, Vyshinski and Molotov, the Soviet Government understands this well.

(3) You say that it is up to the Soviet Union to decide for *itself* whether or not the solution of this question at present will cause any international difficulties. *That is not so.* It is also Czechoslovakia's right and *duty* to examine whether it will not cause international difficulties for her. The fact is that it would cause international difficulties to both of them and for Czechoslovakia relatively greater ones than for the USSR. It would be a poor precedent for us, and the Poles, Germans and Magyars would exploit it against us immediately. Also the international

prestige of Czechoslovakia in the face of the whole world would be badly affected. The rest of the world would see in it simply a defeat of our whole policy towards the USSR and all enemies of the Union and ours would exploit it as much as possible. We have no right to underestimate this and, if I ask for postponement, it is done also in the interest of the USSR and I ask at the same time that the USSR should take into consideration also *our* difficulties in the matter. On the other hand, we will not create special difficulties for the USSR in the question of Subcarpathia. If we are not able to make the agreement of May 8 work, we will say so and will remain passive. We will not object to the delegation moving to Slovakia. If the USSR suggests an amendment to the agreement of May 8, we will discuss it willingly and we will see whether any new agreement can be reached in these matters. But I would regard as a fundamental psychological and diplomatic error to accept a procedure suggested by you. At the same time, you all know my opinion in the question itself, an opinion which I have expressed a long time before the question has been posed at all. In my judgment, what you suggest is not, in your words, "a bold decision" by which we can gain much, nor is my standpoint "imprudence" or "vacillation", but adherence to the treaties and agreements. In particular, too, the question of Subcarpathia's frontier with Slovakia is being opened in this connection, and that is a very delicate point and must be made clear between us first of all.

(4) I adhere therefore to what I have told you and Fierlinger in the last telegram. I consider the question as having been postponed for the time being and suppose that at the occasion of my and the Government's trip to the liberated territory we will be able to make a direct and

more detailed arrangement in Moscow. If you return to Hust and are not able, you and the delegation, to work according to the treaty and our instructions, limit yourself to the internal business, as you have already indicated, and remain passive for the rest. Just as soon as it becomes possible, move to Slovakia, in agreement with the Slovak National Council. When we come to Moscow, I will do everything to the best of my power. Please do not abandon the principles of the treaty and observe the indicated procedure.

(5) What I have said in my last telegram applies to the question of the transfer of our seat from here to the liberated territory. I might say, however, that up to the present I have felt on all sides . . . [garbled]. . . I for my part have always indicated that I would not postpone my departure from here for a single day, as soon as the time became ripe or the proper authorities expressed a desire in this respect. This has happened now and the thing is settled.

(6) I could have some more remarks but will leave them for another occasion.

BENEŠ

¹ See doc. No. 61.

² Not in the Delegate's files.

³ See doc. No. 59.

⁴ See doc. No. 60.

No. 67

Carbon copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic*
Telegram

Moscow, January 5, 1945.

Yesterday, I received your telegram to Fierlinger. Tomorrow morning I will probably fly back and, therefore, I am sending tonight some further explanations. On my arrival to Moscow I was welcomed in a very unfriendly manner. The general opinion here was that the attitude of the Delegation had caused the separatist movement in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This opinion I have dispelled with the effective help from Valo; he made a common stand with me, for the whole delegation, and declared that I had proceeded with the approval of the delegation and that, even if there had not been any incidents, matters would have gone the same way. In the talks with the Soviet authorities, I gained the impression, which I have acquired already in the Subcarpathian Ruthenia, that our opposition to the separation was qualified as an anti-Soviet attitude. I have, therefore, chosen as a method of further procedure to negotiate about the *modus agendi*, as it was called by Vyshinski, with the Ukrainian National Council, leaving the decision on the final fate of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the negotiations of the two Governments. To refuse strictly any discussion about the Subcarpathian Ruthenia would have meant, in my experience, that I would have been faced on the part of the Army Headquarters with new innumerable obstructions which would have practically prevented any activity and delayed the transfer to Slovakia until very late. Besides, there was the danger that a

movement similar to that in Subcarpathian Ruthenia would develop also in Slovakia, if the Soviet organs were benevolently disposed towards it. In this regard I have observed the tendencies of especially some of the members of the Slovak National Council, which has been conceded the attributes of a government in accordance with an agreement with you and with the Government. I noticed that there were signs of tendencies to proceed independently from the Government, as has been done by the Ukrainian National Council. I objected, therefore, to discussions about the settlement of Slovak issues, because the present environment is biased for these discussions. However, not wishing to risk a conflict, I had to postpone my departure until the discussions with the Slovak National Council in Moscow were ended. Their result is a considerable appeasement of all the members of the Slovak National Council. The bourgeois members of the National Council especially, are now unflinchingly behind the unity of the Republic for reasons which you will understand. By my efforts in Moscow I have calmed the temper of the Soviet authorities which has been directed sharply against us in matters concerning Subcarpathian Ruthenia, I have put in the right light the so-called incidents and I have done away with the opinion that the Czechoslovak administration was responsible for the developments in the liberated territory. Besides that, I have regularized my relations with the Slovak National Council, whose members here had maintained at the beginning a rather unfriendly attitude towards the delegation. After my return I will attempt the agreement on the *modus agendi* with the National Council in Mukachevo. I have the impression that they have received some hint in that direction. I will not touch upon the constitutional problems, referring them to the negotiations of the two Governments. From the Army

headquarters I will demand our transfer to Slovakia, naturally under the condition that the administration of the territory would be transferred formally. In such a case, the Subcarpathian Ruthenia will be left to its fate, since it is out of question that our officials could work there and Petrushchak is not reliable. Upon our move to Slovakia I will hand over to the Slovak National Council the greater number of my officials and will keep for myself only some specialists as liaison officers with the Slovak administrative and political organs. I myself will carry out any negotiations with the Army Headquarters, always with participation of some member of the Slovak National Council. Hasal must assume the function of the head of the military mission and move to the Army Headquarters. I suppose there will be no disagreement on the formation of our army. This disagreement had developed in Subcarpathian Ruthenia and has grown deeper only because the Soviet military organs regarded that territory as a future Soviet territory and looked for pretexts under which the formation of our units could be prevented. The Czech Communists really have in mind the unity of the Republic without Subcarpathia. Gottwald told me that they had already excluded from the party the Ukrainian branch, as they considered it now an independent one. On the other hand, I am not quite so sure about the attitude of some Slovak Communists. I am certain that your arrival in Slovakia will give great support to the idea of the unity of the Republic and I will do everything to have favourable conditions for this as soon as possible. With the Slovak bourgeois elements, the idea of unity is now stronger than any other interests. It is necessary to keep this in mind during every negotiation. I have experience along this line from my discussions with Ursiny and Hodža. A direct communication with you will

give me an opportunity for speedy decisions. In this regard I have faced unsurmountable difficulties. All my telegrams concerning developments in Subcarpathian Ruthenia came to Moscow on the day of my arrival there, the earliest ones with a delay of some three weeks. Lastly, I ask for explanation why our press did not register the fact that the delegation was in Banska Bystrica. This has astonished me. I also ask that Drtina be sent here soon. I need him urgently.

¹See doc. No. 65.

NĚMEC

No. 68

Copy
Czech translation
from the Ukrainian

District National Committee in Hust to the Czechoslovak Government Delegation

Letter

Hust, January 13, 1945.

No. 21/pres. 45

In the name of the District National Committee in Hust we present the above mentioned Delegation with the following demands:

(1) The Delegation should stop immediately all activities in Hust and in the district of Hust and refrain from interfering in our internal administration

(2) It should disarm immediately all military units and the police as well and send them to the front.

(3) It should recall immediately all frontier guards and disarm them.

(4) It should leave our territory within one week, i. e. , by January 21, 1945.

In the event that the Czechoslovak Delegation fulfills immediately and completely our above mentioned demands, the District National Committee guarantees to all its members their personal inviolability, including their personal property.

President of the District
National Committee:

J. M. SIKURA

Copy
In Czech

No. 69

*Colonel Hrabovsky to the Commander-in-Chief of
the IVth Ukrainian Army (Petrov)*

Telegram

Urgent

Hust, January 14, 1945.

My dear General:

Today after 1 p.m. armed militia men came to the government building and following the instructions of the National Committee began to occupy the premises of the office and the building of the office of the Government Delegate.

The militia commander declared to Minister Šrobár that he had orders to chase all the Czechoslovaks out of the government building and that he would carry out the order even at the price of bloodshed.

The occupation of the building of the Government Delegate's office is an act of violence. I

have asked the Soviet town commander to take necessary steps. The town commander, Major Krutskikh, declared that he would not interfere and that all this was a matter of the National Committee. The telephone connection with the IVth Ukrainian Army, which we requested, cannot be effected, according to Major Krutskikh.

Dear General, I ask you for protection against the forceful step of the National Committee. In absence of General Hasal:

I. HRABOVSKY

Copy
Czech translation
from the Russian

No. 70

*Commander-in-Chief of the IVth Ukrainian Army
(Petrov) and Colonel-General Mckhlis to Colonel
Hrabovsky*

Telegram

Received: January 15, 1945

Dear Colonel:

With reference to your telegram in which you inform us that the local militia of the town of Hust came to the building of the Government Delegate, following the orders of the National Committee, I advise:

(1) I have issued instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Lyashko and to the town commander, Major Krutskikh, to stop any illegal actions of the militia and of the National Committee.

(2) I have ordered the commander of security in the rear, Colonel Bosa, to proceed immediately to Hust and to take appropriate measures.

(3) The firing into the militia by a gendarme of the Czechoslovak Army was an act of provocation and could cause serious complications. Take necessary steps so that similar things would not be repeated in the future.

According to our information, individual Czechoslovak officials meddle in the work of the National Committee, in the affairs of the forest administration, railways, etc., which has brought about a deterioration of the relations with the National Committee.

I ask you to take this into consideration and, in connection with the present situation to prevent any objectionable acts of the individual Czechoslovak officials.

(4) The commander of the security in the rear was ordered to send to Hust the frontier guards to protect the buildings of the Government Delegate.

PETROV, MEKHLIS

No. 71

Copy
In Czech

*The Office of the Government Delegate to the
District National Committee in Hust*

Letter

Hust, January 15, 1945.

No. 22/Pres. 45

To your letter of January 14, 1945, in which you demand that

(1) the Government Delegation should stop immediately all activities in Hust and in the district of Hust and refrain from interfering in

the internal administration;

(2) it should disarm immediately all military units and the police and send them to the front;

(3) it should recall immediately all frontier guards and disarm them;

(4) it should leave the territory of the district of Hust within one week, i.e., by January 21, 1945,

we inform you of the following:

(1) Beginning with tomorrow, i.e., January 16, 1945, the activities of the Office of the Government Delegate directed towards the administration of the territory, in which the activities of this office have been allowed by the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army, will cease.

(2) As for the second, third and fourth points of the demands of the District National Committee, we have asked the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army to open negotiations on the subject, since these points cannot be decided by a single-handed decision of the Delegation only, the less so, because the Delegate is now absent.

POLLAK

Copy
In Czech

No. 72

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Hust, January 17, 1945.

We landed at the Mukachevo airfield on January 16. Everything in order. Inform London. Send

revenue stamps and baggage as soon as possible. Can be sent by railway via Stryj as far as Mukachevo.

NĚMEC

Copy
In Czech

No. 73

Minutes of the Conference at the Headquarters of the IVth Ukrainian Army on January 18, 1945

The conference of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate and of the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army took place on January 18, 1945, at the seat of the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army in Michalovce. Present were:

Minister František Němec, Czechoslovak Government Delegate; Army General Petrov, Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army; General-Colonel Mekhlis, member of the Army Soviet; Major-General . . .¹, Commander of the Field Security Service; a Lieutenant-General¹; and Lieutenant-Colonel Lyashko, the liaison officer.

The minutes were kept by Cinke.²

The conference was opened at 9.15 p.m., Central European time. General Hasal functioned as interpreter during the conference.

Minister Němec opened the conference by thanking the IVth Ukrainian Army for all the kindness shown him during his trip to Moscow and for facilitating the journey. Thereafter Army General Petrov asked with whom and about what the Delegate had his discussions in Moscow.

Minister Němec replied that he had left with the only intention of informing his Government on

current matters and had not thought that there would be any negotiations. He had an interview with Vyshinski and on his demand discussions were opened about the situation in the liberated territory. In the discussions the People's Commissar Molotov and Vyshinski took part. The subject of the discussions was the situation in the Carpathian Ukraine. Molotov asked whether the movement demanding the union of the Carpathian Ukraine with the USSR was spontaneous and popular. Minister Němec answered that in his opinion it was, if one took into consideration the situation created by the congress of the national committees in Mukachevo. Molotov asked further what were the relations between the IVth Ukrainian Army and the Government Delegate and was told that they were good. Small complaints on both sides were settled immediately by direct negotiations. He himself did not have any complaints; on the contrary, he expressed thanks to the Commander of the IVth Ukrainian Army.

Commissar Molotov declared then that it would be useful if the President would transfer his seat to a place nearer to the Czechoslovak Republic and offered Lwów as a concrete suggestion. The Minister informed London of this and they expressed their agreement in principle

Army General Petrov remarked to this information: "Why Lwów. If we progress another 50 km it can be Hust." Minister Němec remarked: "A Czechoslovak town would be better". General-Colonel Mekhlis asked whether Lwów has been accepted. The Minister explained that London gave their consent only in principle and the actual place had not been discussed. Thereafter General-Colonel Mekhlis asked whether Moscow had been informed about this decision. Minister Němec explained that this was so, since he himself got the in-

formation from Commissar Molotov, to whom it had been transmitted from the Czechoslovak Government through Chichayev.

Minister Němec further informed the Army Commander that Commissar Molotov had said that he was well aware of the Czechoslovak Government Delegate's complaints concerning the lack of communication with his Government. He was well informed about the complaints and he therefore permitted the radio communication under certain conditions. These conditions he had handed over in writing. (Division General Hasal handed over to the Army Commander the file containing the conditions.) General-Colonel Mekhlis remarked: "I do not understand". General Hasal explained the whole matter as follows: People's Commissar Molotov had given his consent in principle to our radio communication with Moscow and London and indicated what technical data concerning the radio traffic we would have to furnish to the Army Command. To this General-Colonel Mekhlis remarked that they had not yet been given any instructions from the Supreme Command and that, therefore, they could not make any decisions in this matter before they asked for them in Moscow, which they would do immediately.

General-Colonel Mekhlis asked whether the Delegate would interfere with the activities of the National Committees in the Carpathian Ukraine. The Minister replied that he had informed the President and the Government about the situation and had presented his own suggestions. In no case would he interfere with the activities of the National Committees. The President and the Government had not yet expressed their opinion on his suggestions. He could not therefore inform the participants of the conference.

Minister Němec further said that he had drawn

the attention of the Czechoslovak Government to the insufficient appreciation of the deserts of the Red Army in the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic and that he had suggested to the President that a new order with five classes should be created. His suggestion has been accepted.

General-Colonel Mekhlis asked whether deputy Valo took part in the discussions. After receiving an affirmative reply he asked whether Ambassador Fierlinger advocated his own opinion or that of the Government. The Minister replied: "Fierlinger had his instructions from the Government." General-Colonel Mekhlis also asked whether there were any differences of opinion, and the Minister answered in the negative.

The Minister declared that this had exhausted all the information on the discussions. General-Colonel Mekhlis asked how the Delegate intended to solve the existing problems. Minister Němec replied: "As a primary problem I consider the problem of the Carpathian Ukraine, namely, in the sense that it must never lead us along a path which would endanger our good relations with the USSR. Therefore the only question remains when this problem should be settled." Army General Petrov declared spontaneously: "After the war." To this General-Colonel Mekhlis reminded him that this would be settled by Moscow.

Minister Němec declared again that in his information he limited himself to bare facts, as he did not know the opinion of his Government. He had presented his opinion to the Government, but had not yet received any reply and, therefore, he could not reveal it. The fact, however, that the President would soon be passing through Moscow gave hope that he would be able to settle the matters there directly. General-Colonel

Mekhliis remarked that this would be best and Minister Němec said that it was a question of only several weeks.

Army General Petrov asked that practical questions should be now discussed. Minister Němec added to the previous information that the question of the military mission had been discussed also. Vyshinski had expressed the opinion that it might be good to have the head of the mission right in the Army Headquarters, to discuss there all questions, i.e., military, economic and even political ones. The Minister had not yet taken up his standpoint, and only informed the gentlemen so that they could discuss the matter in advance. General-Colonel Mekhliis then declared: "We are soldiers, we receive orders and we carry them out."

Minister Němec informed the Army Commander that Messrs. Ursiny, Novomeský and Vesel, delegates of the Slovak National Council, had arrived from Moscow simultaneously with him. He asked that they be allowed to come to the Army Headquarters and to visit the Corps. General Petrov replied that operations were now in progress and that he would be able to give his answer only tomorrow. Minister Němec then asked for permission to have all the members of the Slovak National Council moved to Slovakia, so that they could work there. There were 14 of them, out of which 4 were already here. General-Colonel Mekhliis asked for their names and, after being told declared that Tvarožek was not a member of the Slovak National Council.

Army General Petrov declared it would be possible in a short time to move the whole delegation to Slovakia. Minister Němec then withdrew his previous demand.

General-Colonel Mekhlis then directed the discussion to the events in Hust, on Sunday, January 14, 1945. He repeated several times that Hrabovsky had sent him a telegram and that he had ordered the town commander to intervene. The Division General Hasal reported in detail about the events, to which Army General Petrov declared that the whole thing would be solved by the transfer of the delegation.

Minister Němec asked that the matter should be given attention as long as the delegation remained in Hust: it was possible that all of these were provocations, considering how [radio] Bratislava had of late treated the problems of the Carpathian Ukraine. General-Colonel Mekhlis joined in the discussion at this point, declaring that there were 250 Germans, Magyars and spies in the Czechoslovak Corps. Concretely, Hrabovsky had sent 4 Germans to the Corps. General Hasal tried to explain the matter but General-Colonel Mekhlis only repeated that this happened with Hrabovsky's knowledge. Not even General Hasal's reference to the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lyashko at the investigation was of any help. Lieutenant-Colonel Lyashko finally confirmed the declarations of General-Colonel Mekhlis.

The discussion was interrupted by Army General Petrov who asked to what place the Government Delegate would like to move the delegation. Minister Němec declared that he thought the best place would be Trebišov, for the time being. He further declared: "To avoid the difficulties which we had met in the Carpathian Ukraine, it is necessary to make quite clear whether the territory into which we will move, will be transferred to our administration, or whether it will be a simple change of the seat of the delegation." To this, Petrov replied that it was impossible

to discuss this question today; it would be solved simultaneously with the question of the moving of the delegation. Naturally there would again be two zones.

General-Colonel Mekhlis asked what would be decided in the question of the police and of the frontier guards. General Hasal, who just intended to discuss the point, declared that it would be better to move them too. General-Colonel Mekhlis again repeated that he had the District National Council in Hust informed that they had committed an unlawful act, which must be considered as an attack on the Red Army. He had to demand an absolute quiet in the hinterland. Division General Hasal reminded them that some districts had handed all their business over to the frontier guards. Concretely, he named Tyachovo. To this General-Colonel Mekhlis remarked: "You will remove the town commanders and will make them town commanders again in Slovakia." Division General Hasal declared that the intention was to remove everybody from the Carpathian Ukraine. To this Minister Němec declared that only Petrushchak, a member of the State Council, and a Ukrainian, would remain in the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine. Mekhlis asked then whether Petrushchak's presence would not cause the political peace to be disturbed. Minister Němec replied in the negative.

.³

General Petrov expressed his gratitude for the information given by Minister Němec and repeated then that the question of the arrival of the Slovak National Council would be settled together with that of the Government delegation. It was a question of only a few days. The Corps has now its full complement and the mobilization

need not be carried on any longer. They could supplement their losses directly, since now they would be fighting on the Slovak territory only. He had been giving the Corps everything necessary to complete its equipment. In the next days the Corps would be moved to the south, so that they would remain in the Slovak territory.

Minister Němec expressed his thanks and declared that with all our means we wanted to help the Red Army in their effort to defeat the Germans. He wished that our relations with the USSR would be most cordial. We needed the friendship of the USSR. To this General Petrov remarked: "That is correct." Minister Němec mentioned the Czech saying that we loved the Russians through our hearts - now we would have to love them also through our reason.

The conference then ended.

January 21, 1945.

The minutes were taken down on the basis of the discussions in Czech. The parts concerning the declarations of the Soviet officers are based on the translations of General Hasal.

¹No name given.

²Vratislav Cinke, an official of the delegation.

³Paragraph not reproduced. Concerned with supplies of arms to the Czechoslovak by the Red Army.

Original
In Slovak

No. 74

*Address of the Delegates of the Slovak National
Council to the President and to the Government
of the Czechoslovak Republic*

Letter

To Dr. Eduard Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, and to the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic,

London.

After its arrival from London and from Moscow, the Delegation of the Slovak National Council for the Liberated Slovak Territory has discussed the situation created by the decision of the Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine of November 26, 1944, calling for the incorporation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as other developments which have taken place since that time, and has decided to acquaint you, Mr. President, and the Czechoslovak Government in London as well with our standpoint, which follows:

The consequences following from the decision of the Congress of the National Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine calling for the incorporation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, and the response of this decision in the USSR, present not only a question of an adjustment of frontier between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic, but they reflect above all the natural right of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, who belong ethnically to the Ukrainian nation, to decide freely to what state organization they want to belong. Therefore, the question of the Transcarpathian Ukraine cannot be

decided by international treaties, since it is a problem of the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, of the Government of the USSR and of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Government has recognized the principle of self-determination for the Transcarpathian Ukrainians and this was expressed by Minister Dr. Ripka at a public manifestation of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians in London at the end of October of the last year, at which the delegates of the Slovak National Council also took part; also you yourself, Mr. President, have expressed the opinion, in the presence of our delegates during our London conversations, that the preservation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in Czechoslovakia could not be considered as permanent.

Under the circumstances, we recommend that you, Mr. President, as well as the Government, kindly consider taking the Mukachevo decision as a basis for immediate negotiations with the Government of the USSR, aiming at the incorporation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR. The objection that an immediate settlement of this question could create a precedent for the remaining territory of the Republic has no standing, since the problem of the Transcarpathian Ukraine is a historical problem of unification of all Ukrainians. On the other hand, any procrastination in the solution of this question could affect the good relations between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, which in its turn could have unfavourable influence on the securing of the pre-Munich territory of Slovakia.

Hust, January 24, 1945.

DR. VAVRO ŠROBÁR

JAN URSINY

L. NJVOMESKÝ

DR. JAN PÚLL

Original
In Czech

No. 75

Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow (Pierlinger)
to the Delegate
Letter

Strictly confidential

Moscow, January 26, 1945.

My dear friend:

I am sending you the text of a letter which will certainly interest you. I am adding the following. Molotov had invited Gottwald to an interview and later Stalin also joined in the discussion - I myself was invited to see Molotov the next day and given the mentioned letter. The Soviet Government had probably learned that the attitude of the Soviet authorities in Subcarpathia was being criticized in London and they wanted to check this. Stalin apologized for the mistakes of various Soviet organs and said expressly that "there have been too many zealots" on the Ukrainian side.

Marshal Stalin wishes that our Government would recognize the Polish Government - at present this causes a considerable tension here and our position in the Těšín question is getting dangerously weak, since the new Polish Government also does not intend to give up the Těšín territory so simply and right away. Of course, Molotov thinks that we could discuss it immediately after we have recognized the new Polish Government.

As for the progress of the war, the Soviet Government expects that the German Army will put up a hard fight for the Czech territory, so that they could save their last industrial regions, and the Government is therefore of the

opinion that Slovakia represents a rather delicate hinterland where one has to proceed carefully, especially as far as the communications with abroad are concerned. Our Government, which intends to move here, presented the question of the transfer of the entire diplomatic corps to Košice and this, naturally, met with objections. I do not know how the situation will develop further.

Yours, etc.,

FIERLINGER

Carbon copy¹
In Russian

[Enclosure]

*The Prime Minister of the USSR (Stalin) to the
President of the Czechoslovak Republic*

Letter

Dear Mr. President, Mr. Beneš:

I have learned today from Comrade Gottwald that the Czechoslovak Government had expressed its uneasiness about the events in the Transcarpathian Ukraine, thinking that the Soviet Government intended to settle the question of the Transcarpathian Ukraine single-handedly, in spite of the agreement between our countries.

I must inform you that, if you have reached any such assumption, then it was based on a misunderstanding.

The Soviet Government did not and could not prevent the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine from expressing their national will. This is understandable, the more so as you yourself had told me in Moscow that you were prepared

to cede the Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union, to which, as you will certainly remember, I did not at that time give my approval. But, from the fact that the Soviet Government did not prevent the Transcarpathian Ukrainians from expressing their will, in no case does it follow that the Soviet Government intends, as it were, to violate the agreement between our countries and settle the question of the Transcarpathian Ukraine single-handedly. Such an assumption would be an offence to the Soviet Government.

Insofar as the question of the Transcarpathian Ukraine has been posed by the population itself of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, it will have to be, of course, settled. But this question can be settled only by an agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, either before the end of the war with Germany, or after the end of the war, when the two Governments would think it opportune.

I beg you to believe that the Soviet Government has no intentions of harming in any way the interests of the Czechoslovak Republic and her prestige. On the contrary, the Soviet Government is fully determined to extend to the Czechoslovak Republic all possible help in her liberation and reconstruction.

With regards,

J. STALIN

¹It could not be ascertained whether this enclosure was a carbon copy of the original letter or a copy made from it at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow.

No. 76

Copy
In Czech

*The Delegate to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in
Moscow (Fierlinger)*

Telegram

Košice, February 2, 1945.

For President Beneš and the Government:

Dear Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister:

I have the honour to announce that on February 1, 1945, I have moved with my office to Košice. Before leaving the Carpathian Ukraine, I asked Petrushchak whether he wanted to take over as the representative of the Government Delegate in the Carpathian Ukraine, taking care of the disbursement of family allowances, etc., in an office to be established there. In agreement with the National Council, Petrushchak accepted the offer. I will sign the proper letter nominating him my plenipotentiary and am asking for your additional approval. On February 2, I met in a formal meeting with the Presidium of the Slovak National Council, to announce my arrival to them and to decide about the further procedure. In accordance with the Government's decision, I will transfer to the National Council the administration of the liberated Slovak territory and will remain as a liaison organ between them, the headquarters and the Government. Consequently, the National Council have asked me to have some of the officials of the Government delegation appointed temporarily to their service. I will do so since my need of officials has diminished as I do not have now to take care of the administration proper. Along these lines we will work out an agreement in which our mutual relations will be formulated and which I will then present

to the Government for additional approval.

For Fierlinger:

We have no news yet about the direct radio communication with London, as promised by the Commissar of External Affairs Molotov in December last year. Advise what is the matter.

NĚMEC

Original
In Czech

No. 77

*Memorandum on the Ukrainian Movement in Eastern
Slovakia*

Unsigned memorandum

Confidential

Košice, February 16, 1945.

According to the information of Dr. I. Židovský, on Thursday, February 15, 1945, a meeting was to take place in which an organization for the protection of the interests of the Carpathian Ukrainians was to be constituted, with its center in Prešov. Delegates have been invited to the meeting and it was expected that about 400 persons would take part in it. However, the meeting did not take place and the delegates were recalled. This happened because of an intervention of the Soviet authorities. To the representatives who were present - Dr. I. Židovský, former deputy Peter Židovský, Dr. Rohal, Vasil Karaman and Michal Lichvar - a Soviet Major explained that under the present circumstances, when the war was still in progress, it was not opportune to hold such meetings. Dr. Židovský then had a long talk with the Soviet Major who explained to him that it was not opportune to organize any actions of this kind, since Czechoslovakia could rightfully

protest and anyway any such actions could endanger Soviet interests, and even told him that we (i.e. we Russians) could lose the war. Soviet Union adheres to the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty and will not interfere in Czechoslovak internal affairs. In this connection Dr. Židovský drew my attention to the former deputy, Dr. Piešťak, a barrister in Medzilaborce, who some time ago had started here and in the surrounding area, especially among the teachers, a petitionary action for the union of the East-Slovak territory, inhabited by Ruthenians, with the USSR. Deputy Piešťak belonged formerly to the Kurtyak Party, and had been a candidate for Parliament on the list of the Hlinka Party, when the Kurtyak Party, together with the Hlinka Party, went to the polls. Being a former teacher and a well known figure in the district, he has considerable influence.

Copy
In Czech¹

No. 78

*Address of the Ukrainian National Council of the
Presov Region to the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic*

Prešov, March 3, 1945

To President Dr. Eduard Beneš,
President of the Czechoslovak Republic,
Moscow.

We have the honour to announce to you, dear Mr. President, that on March 1, 1945, there took place in Prešov a congress of the delegates of the Ukrainian districts, in which through a free election the Ukrainian National Council has been elected as the only representative of the Ukrain-

ian population of the region of Prešov.

The congress ordered the National Ukrainian Council of the Prešov Region to represent and protect the interests of the Ukrainian population. We know that the Slovak National Council is sending its delegates to Moscow, where they will discuss with you questions concerning also the future of the Ukrainian population in the region of Prešov. Fulfilling the order of the congress, the National Ukrainian Council of the Prešov Region asks you, Mr. President, to also invite two of our representatives to the discussions in Moscow.

DR. ROHAL-ILKIV,
GENERAL SECRETARY

VASIL V. KARAMAN,
PRESIDENT

¹It could not be ascertained whether the original was in Czech or in Ukrainian.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I

Following is a list of books and articles referring to Subcarpathian Ruthenia up to the beginning of the second World War.

The list does not claim to be an exhaustive one. Only a few of the books are monographs; others were included insofar as they contained some detailed information on Ruthenia. Any good general history of Austria-Hungary, of Czechoslovakia or Hungary, and of Ukraine, gives at least a passing reference to Ruthenia. Books of this type were omitted.

Some detailed, if often incidental, information on Ruthenia up to 1914 may be gathered also from the collections of diplomatic documents such as Pokrovski's *Internationale Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus* or from *Oesterreich-Ungarns Ausenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* (editors L. Bittnar, A.F. Pribram, etc.). Indispensable for the period 1938-1939 are the *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (IInd series)* and the *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1946*, especially series D, vol. IV.

A considerable part of literature on Ruthenia is in the files of various, often ephemeral, periodicals. However, even in the case of the more solid ones, like *Central European Observer*, *Le Monde Slave*, *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie* or *Slavonic Review*, etc., the current information has to be supplemented from the daily press.

BOOKS

- Auerbach, B., *Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*. Paris, 1917.
- Baerlein, H., *In Czechoslovakia's Hinterland*. London, 1938.
- Beneš, E., *Reč o podkarpatskoi probleme*. Prague, 1934.
- Bethlen, S. (editor), *A Companion to Hungarian Studies*. Budapest, 1943.
- Borovička, J., *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics*. Prague, 1928.
- Bidermann, H.I., *Die ungarischen Ruthenen, ihr Wohngebiet, ihr Erwerb und ihre Geschichte*. Innsbruck, 1862.
- , *Russische Untriebe in Ungarn*. Innsbruck, 1867.
- Dami, A., *La Ruthénie subcarpathique*. Genève-Annemasse, 1944.
- Deák, F., *Hungary at the Peace Conference*. New York, 1942.
- Dulishkovich, I., *Istoricheskaia Cherty Ugro-Rusakikh*. Uzhgorod, 1877.
- Eisenmann, L., *Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867*. Paris, 1904.

- Fischl, A., *Der Panславismus bis zum Weltkrieg*. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919.
- Flachbart, E., *A History of Hungary's Nationalities*. Budapest, 1944.
- Geist-Lányi, P., *Das Nationalitätenproblem auf dem Reichstag zu Krensiar, 1848-1849*. München, 1920.
- Gnatiuk, V., *Natsionalne vidrozhdzenie avstro-ugors'kikh Uktainstsv (1772-1880)*. Vienna, 1916.
- Helfert, J.A. von, *Geschichte der oesterreichischen Revolution im Zusammenhange mit der mitteleuropaeischen Bewegung der Jahre 1848-1849*. Wien, 1907.
- Hoch, C., *The Political Parties of Czechoslovakia*. Prague, 1936.
- Hungarian Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction, *The Royal, Education in Hungary*. Budapest, 1908.
- Irányi, D., and Chassin, *Histoire politique de la révolution en Hongrie*. Paris, 1859. 2 vols.
- Jekelfalussy, J. de, *L'État hongrois millénaire*. Budapest, 1896.
- Kordt, E., *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*. Stuttgart, 1948.
- Krofta, K., *Carpathian Ruthenia and the Czechoslovak Republic*. Prague, 1945.
- Lemkin, R., *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Washington, 1940.
- Macartney, C.A., *Hungary and Her Successors*. London, 1937.
- Masuryk, T.G., *The Making of a State*. New York, 1927.
- , *Cesta demokracie*, vol. 1. Prague, 1933.
- Miller, D.H., *My Diary at the Conference in Paris*. New York, 1924-1926.
- Mitsiuk, O., *Naris sotsialno-gospodarskoi istorii Podkarpatskoi Rusi*. Prague, 1938. 2 vols.
- Mousset, J., *Les villes de la Russie subcarpathique*. Paris, 1938.
- Papoušek, J., *Caraské Rusko a naše osvobození*. Prague, 1927.
- Peroutka, F., *Budování státu*. Vols. 3 and 4. Prague, 1938.
- Ripka, H., *Munich, Before and After*. London, 1939.
- Schneider, L., *Die ungarische Auswanderung*. Zürich, 1915.
- Seton-Watson, R.W., *Racial Problems in Hungary*. London, 1908.
- , *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*. London, 1918.
- Spohr, L., *Die geistigen Grundlagen des Nationalismus in Ungarn*. Berlin und Leipzig, 1936.
- Szabó, S., *Ungarisches Volk*. Budapest-Leipzig, 1944.
- Szekfű, J., *Etat et nation*. Paris, 1945.
- Terjén, O. and Dr. A. Fall, *Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians in the Danube Valley*. Budapest, 1938.
- Tobolka, Z., *Slovanský sjezd v Praze*. Prague, 1901.
- Winch, M., *Republic for a Day*. London, 1939.
- Wolf, C., *Magyarisierung in Ungarn*. München, 1897.

- Zatloukal, J., editor, *Podkarpatáká Rus*. Bratislava, 1936.
- Zapletal, F., *A.I. Dobrjanskij a naši Rusíni r. 1849-1851*. Prague, 1927.

ARTICLES

- Baerlein, H., 'The restoration of Ruthenia', *Central European Observer*, vol. XVI, 1938.
- Beneš, F., 'Discours aux Slovaques sur le présent et l'avenir de notre nation', *Le Monde Slave*, 1934, January.
- Bidermann, H.L., 'La loi hongroise sur les nationalités dans ses rapports avec le passé et le présent de la Hongrie', *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, vol. 1, 1869.
- Bonkaió, A., 'Die ungarländischen Ruthenen', *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, vol., 1922.
- , 'Ungarn und die Ruthenen' in Gál, S., editor, *Ungarn und die Nachbervölker*, Budapest, n.d.
- Borchak, E., 'Le mouvement national ukrainien au XIXe siècle', *Le Monde Slave*, vol. III, 1940.
- Borsody, E., 'La frontière hungaro-slovaque', *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, 1941.
- Capek, T., Junior, 'Podkarpatští Rusíni v Americe před válkou a za války', *Naše Revoluce*, vol. IV.
- Coloman, A.P. and G.G. Bezinec, 'The rise of Carpatho-Russian Culture', *Central European Observer*, vol. XVI, 1938.
- Dama, A., 'Ce que j'ai vu en Subcarpathie', *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, May, 1940.
- Dushnyck, V.S., 'The Epopée of Carpatho-Ukraine', *The Trident*, vol. III, 1939.
- Hartl, A., 'Deux problèmes de la Russie subcarpathique', *Le Monde Slave*, April, 1936.
- Hodinka, A., 'L'habitat, l'économie et le passé du peuple ruthène au sud des Carpathes', *Revue des études hongroises et finno-ougriennes*, 2e année, 1924.
- Hrejsa, F., 'Evolution religieuse des confessions non catholiques depuis 1918', *Le Monde Slave*, May-June, 1930.
- Jászai, O., 'The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia' in R.J. Kerner, editor, *Czechoslovakia*. Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1949.

INDEX

Numbers refer to pages

- | A | C |
|---|--|
| Agrarian (Republican) Party
43, 44, 68; 71, 84, 85 | Chvalkovský, František 49 |
| American Ruthenians 18, 19, 33 | Churchill, Winston Spencer
79, 327, 330 |
| B | Cibere, Pavel 85, 157, 237 |
| Bechyně, Rudolf 71, 68 | Clementis, Vlado 168, 169 |
| Beck, Jozef 328 | Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
43, 45, 68, 78, 84, 102, 107, 126, 135, 139, 145, 149, 339 |
| Beneš, Eduard 24, 29-30, 45, 59-63, 65, 68, 69, 70-72, 75, 76, 97, 98, 129, 131, 134, 138, 150, 151, 152, 165, 291, 307, 308, 353, 356, 357 | Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine 103-105, 110-112, 118, 238, 239 |
| Bogomolov, Alexander Yefremovich 66 | Czechoslovak Government Delegate for Liberated Territories
nomination 84
powers 86
arrival at Hust 89 |
| Brody, Andrey 43, 50, 54, 102, 217 | |

(continued)

- Kozma, N., 'Le problème ruthène', *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, July, 1939.
- Kuschnir, W. 'Die Ruthenen in Ungarn', *Ruthenische Revue* vol II, 1904.
- Lapica, M. C., 'The Rise of Carpatho-Ukraine', *The Trident*, vol. III, 1939.
- , 'Republic for a Day', *The Trident*, vol. III, 1939.
- 'Lois et ordonnances hongroises portant sur la protection des droits minoritaires en Hongrie' *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, vol. XXX, 1924.
- Návay, L., 'Les lois scolaires Appónyi', *Revue de Hongrie*, 1909, vols. III, IV.
- Nolde, B., 'Les desseins politiques de la Russie pendant la Grande Guerre', *Le Monde Slave*, January-February 1931.
- Odložilík, O., 'A Czech Plan for a Danubian Federation', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. I.
- Popov, A., 'Chekhoslovatskyi vopros i tsarskaya diplomatsiya v 1914-1917', *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, vols. XXXIII, XXXIV, 1929.
- Steinacker, H., 'Die geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen des österreichischen Nationalitätenproblems und seine Entwicklung bis 1867' in Hugelmann, K.C., editor, *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Oesterreichs*. Vienna, 1934.
- Vološin, A., 'Carpathian Ruthenia', *Slavonic Review*, vol. 13, 1934-1935.

II

In the following list only books and articles quoted in the text of this work are indicated. They concern predominantly the establishment and the policy of the Czechoslovak Government in London during the period from 1939 to 1945. Again, no attempt has been made to give an exhaustive list.

However, a rather curious fact could be noted here, that is, the paucity of any historical or other works or at least of personal reminiscences relating to the period. With the exception of Dr. Beneš's *Memoirs*, which though valuable remains a torso, we have no personal testimony on the period from those who participated in the events. This is really surprising, in view of the great literary production of this kind in other languages as well as of the considerable number of former Ministers or members of the State Council in London who now live in the West. True, there have been reprints of some of the public utterances made during the war, but they are mostly radio talks destined for home consumption. (Drtina, Masaryk, Stránský.) Only Mr. Táborský who began, but unfortunately did not finish, the publication of his war diary (*Pravda vítězí*, Prague, 1947), wrote two valuable articles on the period, both cited below. Whatever the reasons, the harvest is very meagre and the fact remains that there is not yet a coherent story of the Czechoslovak policy between 1939 and 1945.

One more remark should perhaps be made. When examining this period, especially the organization of the London Government and the position of the President, the authors were interested more in the political and historical picture than in the purely legal aspects of the problems involved. For this reason they leaned almost exclusively on contemporary sources and kept away as much as possible from the post-war juristic literature (quite voluminous) which discussed various legal points of the theory of continuity, President's constitutional powers, etc. Although interesting in their juristic evolutions, the learned glossographers did not bring up any new material and limited themselves to interpretations and reinterpretations of known texts, so as to fit them into old theories or - as the case may be - into new requirements, often even to the detriment of undeniable facts (cf. footnote 62, page 86, *supra*).

Beneš, E., *Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace*. Fourth Message of the President of the Republic to the State Council on February 3, 1944. London, 1944.

—————, *Democracy Today and Tomorrow*. London, 1939.

—————, *Demokracie dnes a zítra*. First Czech edition. London, 1942.

—————, *Memoirs*. (Full title: *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš - From Munich to New War and New Victory*.) London, 1954. Translation of Dr. Beneš's book *Paměti*, cited below. Note: The citations in the text of the present volume are authors' translations from the Czech original of Dr. Beneš's book; the references are to its English edition.

- Beneš, E., *Paměti*. Vol. II, part 1. Prague, 1947.
- , 'Post-war Czechoslovakia', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, 1945-1946.
- , *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války*. First edition. London, 1945. (Title in English: *Six Years of Exile and of Second World War*. The book is a collection of official documents and Dr. Beneš's speeches.)
- , *Úvahy o slovanství*, London, n.d. (Title in English: *Essays on Slavonic Policy*.)
- Beneš, V., Drucker, A., and E. Táborský, editors, *Czechoslovak Yearbook of International Law*. London, 1942.
- Bílek, F., and V. Chalupný, 'Základní předpisy o obnovení právního pořádku' in J. Hoffmann (editor), *Nové zákony a nařízení*, vol. VIII, No. 12a.
- Churchill, W.S., *The Second World War*. Vol. 5. *Closing the Ring*. London, 1951.
- Das Land des Sozialismus heute und morgen*. Berichte und Reden auf dem XVIII Parteitag der KPdSU(B). 10 - 21 März 1939. Moscow, 1939.
- Four Fighting Years*. Published on behalf of the Czechoslovak Ministry of External Affairs. London, 1943.
- Levit, G., 'Zemské, okresní a místní národní výbory' in J. Hoffmann (editor), *Nové zákony a nařízení*, vol. VII, Nos. 3 and 4 (1 and 2).
- Peška, Z., *Než nově státní zřízení*. Prague, 1945.
- Ripka, H., *East and West*. London, 1944.
- , *The Repudiation of Munich*. London, 1943.
- Stránský, J., *Hovory k domovu*. Prague, 1945.
- Táborský, E., 'Benes and the Soviets', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, 1948-1949.
- , 'Benes and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XIII.
- , *The Czechoslovak Cause*. London, 1944.

Taufel, J., editor, *Dokumenty sovětsko-československého přátelství* Prague, 1946 (Title in English: Documents of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship.)

Zižka V. (editor), *Bojující Československo*. Košice, 1945 (Title in English: Fighting Czechoslovakia. The book is a collection of documents from the 1939-1945 period.)

INDEX

Numbers refer to pages

A	C
<p>Agrarian (Republican) Party 43, 44, 68, 71, 84, 85</p> <p>American Ruthenians 18, 19, 33</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px;">B</p> <p>Bechyně, Rudolf 71, 68</p> <p>Beck, Jozef 328</p> <p>Beneš, Eduard 24, 29-30, 45, 59-63, 65, 68, 69, 70-72, 75, 76, 97, 98, 129, 131, 134, 138, 150, 151, 152, 165, 291, 307, 308, 353, 356, 357</p> <p>Bogomolov, Alexander Yefremo- vich 66</p> <p>Brody, Andrey 43, 50, 54, 102, 217</p>	<p>Chvalkovský, František 49</p> <p>Churchill, Winston Spencer 79, 327, 330</p> <p>Cibere, Pavel 85, 157, 237</p> <p>Clementis, Vlado 168, 169</p> <p>Communist Party of Czechoslo- vakia 43, 45, 68, 78, 84, 102, 107, 126, 135, 139, 145, 149, 339</p> <p>Communist Party of Transcar- pathian Ukraine 103-105, 110-112, 118, 238, 239</p> <p>Czechoslovak Government Dele- gate for Liberated Terri- tories</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">nomination 84</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">powers 86</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">arrival at Hust 89</p>

(continued)

Czechoslovak Government Delegation (continued)	Drtina, Prokop	84 85
assuming power	100 221 224	
leaving Ruthenia	Fukhnovich Alexander V	15 44
termination of office		F
Czechoslovak Government Delegation	Fencik Ivan	44 50, 102, 216, 217
composition	Fierlinger, Zdeněk	98, 100, 107, 112, 125, 142, 143, 149, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 224, 324, 333, 334, 335, 348, 355
arrival at Hust		
radio communication		
attacked by militia		
ordered to leave		
leaving Ruthenia		G
Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of May 8, 1944	Gottwald, Klement	78, 126, 127, 128, 130, 145, 146, 148, 149, 233, 321, 339, 355, 356
Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1941		H
Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943	Hala, František	84, 271, 326
Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty Concerning the Transcarpathian Ukraine	Hasal-Nižborský, Antonín	85, 158, 160, 207, 249, 254, 259, 271, 277
Catholic (People's) Party of Czechoslovakia	Hodža, Fedor	85, 271, 339
	Hodža, Milan	23, 68, 71, 85
		I
	Ingr, Sergěj	304
		K
Dobryanski, Adolf I.	Karaman, Vasil	359, 361
	Károlyi Government	20, 21, 23

Kopecký, Václav 78, 146-150,
321

Krosnař, Josef 113, 114, 125,
239

Kun, Bela 21, 23

Kurtyak, Ivan 43, 217

L

Language, Ruthenian 4, 38,
42, 55

Lauřman, Bohumil 84, 85

Lebedyev, Viktor Zakharovich
97, 272, 291, 231, 232,
241, 291, 315, 323

League of Nations 27, 35, 36,
60

M

Masaryk, Jan 207, 231, 232,
299, 304

Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue 19,
23, 24, 31

Mekhliis, Lev Zakharyevich
89, 111, 112, 114-116,
119, 122, 160, 239-246,
249, 253, 290, 345-351

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhail-
ovich 97, 143-146, 149,
169, 170, 231, 315-318,
320, 321, 323, 325, 332,
346, 347, 359

N

National Committees 87,
102-106, 118, 269, 347

National Council of the Prešov
Region, Ukrainian
359-361

National Council of Transcar-
pathian Ukraine 180,
120-123, 143, 260, 263,
268, 270-272, 278, 279,
281, 285, 288, 337, 338,
358

National Socialist Party of
Czechoslovakia 44, 84

Nationalism in Ruthenia 6,
7, 14, 18, 21, 22, 33,
35, 42, 51

Nejedlý, Zdeněk 168

Němec, František
appointment as Delegate 84
termination of office 167

Nižborský - see Hasal

Nosek, Václav 135, 295

Novomeský, Laco 128-130, 146,
148, 157, 162, 311, 321,
349, 354

O

Orthodox Church 5, 16, 38, 44

P

Peace Conference, 1919 24, 25

Ukrainian National Council of the Prešov Region	359-361	W. Z	
Uniate Church	5 6, 14, 38, 42	Wilson, Woodrow	17, 19
UNRRA	167, 314	Žatkovič, Gregor	19, 23 31
Ursiny, Jan	129, 148, 157, 162, 168, 311, 313, 321, 323, 339 349, 354	Zorin, Valerian Alexandrovich	132, 133, 146 295-297, 300, 308, 312, 331, 332 333, 334